

Marine Corps Gazette

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JULY 1960
FORTY CENTS



MCAF IWAKUNI

HOME OF

THE 1st MAW

MCAF, Iwakuni, formerly a Naval Air Station, was redesignated to its present status 1 January 1958. Commanding Officer is Col John H. Earle, Jr. Since all MAGs are not based here, our cover painting shows instead the first expeditionary airfield (SELF) used by 1stMAW in Exercise Blue Star. Cover painting: AGySgt R. F. Fleischauer; Iwakuni photo: 1stLt J. L. Skinner.



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Marine Corps 1960

The Marine Corps Association Newsletter

*An unofficial digest
of news of interest
to our members*

Congress and the Corps

By the time you read this the Marine Corps budget should be established somewhere between the House and Senate versions. Once again, the Senate restored House cuts (procurement, departmental administration, travel) and authorized money for a 200,000 strength Marine Corps. These were the figures as we went to press:

	<i>Asked</i>	<i>House</i>	<i>Senate</i>
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	\$607,000,000	\$605,177,000	\$639,646,000
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps	\$ 25,000,000	\$ 24,661,000	\$ 24,831,000
Operation & Maint., Marine Corps	\$176,000,000	\$174,726,000	\$180,296,000
Procurement, Marine Corps	\$ 94,000,000	\$ 91,180,000	\$ 94,000,000

The bill worked out by House-Senate conference normally is passed by both chambers, then approved by the President. There's one catch: DoD can hold up funds for increase of 25,000 Marines. At SECON SecDef indicated he thought they were not needed.

Fleet Marine Force

Assigning transport helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, or both to a ground unit doesn't require a separate air-ground headquarters, CMC has told FMF commanders. Neither does assigning ground security or logistics units to combat aviation elements. Command will rest with the element having primary responsibility for the mission.

Further, CMC warns, unduly senior commanders of such attached units will not be assigned.

The term "Air-Ground Task Force" won't be used as a force title. Instead these are official designations for normal air-ground teams where there's a valid coordination need:

Marine Expeditionary Unit—A BLT plus fighter/attack aircraft units. Use arabic numerals; as 2dMEU.

Marine Expeditionary Brigade—An RLT and a composite MAG. Use arabic numerals; as 1stMarExBrig.

Marine Expeditionary Force—A MarDiv and MAW (or major elements of either or both) plus normal Force Troops. Use roman numerals; as, IMEF.

Amphibious Corps—A larger force than a MEF, when in a naval campaign. Use roman numerals; as IIPhibCorps.

Each air-ground headquarters above is to act as the Landing Force commander and coordinate with the Amphibious Task Force. It's intended to free the ground and air commanders for command and control of operations ashore. FMFPAC will use odd numbers, FMFLANT, even.

Planning Factor

You can expect follow-up waves of vehicles and heavy gear to be ashore faster. Reason: a standardized family of lift fixtures and cargo slings.

MCLFDC has completed four years' work aimed to expedite amphibious offloading for all services. Lift points and slings are expected to:

- Speed-up offloading 33 1/3%.
- "Practically eliminate" damage from faulty slings.
- Improve troop safety.

Final report asks CMC to recommend DoD approval. Also interested, the Canadian Army.

Conferences

Partly cloudy skies, near 90-degree temperatures, and spongy greens (four inches of rain fell earlier in the week) prevailed for 8th annual SECON (Secretary of Defense conference) at MCS, Quantico 16-18 June. SecDef T. S. Gates; the JCS, including CMC Gen D. M. Shoup, headed array of 175 civilian and military VIPs attending the conclave. A few topics informally discussed:

- Status of nuclear weapons.
- US Foreign policy.
- Service outlooks (by heads of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines).
- Disarmament.
- Disarmament implications.
- R&D outlook, logistics planning.

The Commandant was to convene the General Officers' Conference early this month (6-8 Jul) fresh from a first-hand look at West Coast training. Beginning 27 Jun he was to visit MCRD, San Diego, Camp Pendleton and El Toro. Also on the agenda, a talk to the San Diego Navy League and a tour as Grand Marshal of the Huntington Beach, Calif., 4th of July parade.

MCB, CamPen will host 32 SNCOs and wives, representing 22 posts and stations, at 5th Annual Staff NCO Symposium slated for 14-20 August. Symposium will follow past formats: group discussion and recommendations by delegates on promotion, training, physical fitness, retirement. Corps SgtMaj F. D. Rauber will preside. CMC gets for action final report of accepted ideas.

More of the Same

Old Breed Marines who missed the all-Divisions conclave last month in Washington, or who can take more of the same, can reminisce at San Diego's El Cortez Hotel 4-7 August. It's the sixth West Coast reunion of the 1stMar Div Association. MCRD will host an expected 500 with parade, reception and barbecue.

Shaky

The Third Annual Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition is shakily scheduled for Quantico 6-10 September. CMC warns that proposed budget cut in travel funds may force cancellation. In that case, local competitions are firm.

Billet Study

A major revision of obsolescent MOS Manual (virtually unchanged for 12 years) is underway. New manual will describe new MOSs, upgrade scope of duties of some old ones, downgrade a few, leave out unneeded ones —altogether cover 37 job fields embracing 287 MOSs, about 1,800 distinct billets. A special crew of SNCOs is helping HQMC planners get a fix on Corps job requirements. Trained in billet analysis they are checking billets Corps-wide. Example: Some 57 billets at MCSC, Albany, Ga., are being studied. This is a start. More are coming up. And its the same throughout the Corps. Each analysis is reviewed locally, sent to HQMC where it's evaluated, graded, screened by a board of 32 field grade officers. Manual will be one result of all this work but is not the primary goal. What CMC wants to know is how much is required for any Marine to fill a particular billet. These eight factors are involved:

- Knowledge, skill, training, experience needed to do the job.
- Does the billet require a degree of leadership? How great?
- Is supervision exercised? Received?
- Does billet allow freedom to take action (independent decisions)?
- How much, how fast and how often does the Marine in this billet have to shift gears, move from one kind of task to another? How much warning does he get?
- How much concentration does the job require?
- Any special physical skills involved?
- Does job require a sense of economy, responsibility for materiel?

How about billets not yet in the book nor in T/Os? Specifically, slots for MSgts and MGySgts? On the way. Billets have been tentatively established by G-1 planners, sent along to G-3 for working into unit T/Os. This doesn't mean a sudden reshuffle of the Corps' 1,100 MSgts/MGySgts. Many are already in billets G-1 has in the mill, the rest will be eased into new billets gradually.

Schedule of Selection Boards, FY '61

Selections For grade of:	Convening Date	Estimated Duration	Zone/ Selections	Zone Includes:
MajGen	5Jul60	10 Days	8/5	BGen S. R. Shaw
BGen	5Jul60	10 Days	36/7	Col A. R. Stacy
Col	18Jul60	3 Weeks	92/56	LtCol J. L. Warren
LtCol	15Aug60	6 Weeks	*798/177	Maj J. V. Booker *Maj W. M. McCulloch
Major	25Jul60	3 Weeks	————	Cpts w/date of rank prior to 1Jul57 (LDO) Capt L. F. Blake
Captain	22Aug60	4 Weeks	————	1stLts w/date of rank prior to 1Jul59
CWO	3Oct60	1 Week	————	W-3, 6 yrs in grade; W-2, 6 yrs in grade; W-1, 3 yrs in grade
Women Officers	5Sept60	10 Days	————	Majs, 4 yrs in grade Cpts, 4 yrs in grade Lts, 2 yrs in grade

Reserve Officers: None until January, 1961.

Staff NCO Selection Boards

Selections for rank of:		Requirements being calculated at pres- time. Promotions will at least equal last year, probably be larger—especial- ly to GySgt, SSgt.
SgtMaj, MGySgt	19Sept60	
1stSgt, MSgt	10Jul60	
GySgt	11Oct60	
SSgt		

Officer Retention Board

Col	12Sept60	(All Colonels, LtCols twice passed over)
LtCol	12Sept60	

*Zone of Consideration

Chow Call

On the menu for late summer maneuvers: teriyaki. Bring along your own soy sauce. Beginning in August some exercising Marines will carry canned meals that, among other items, include beef-steak, boned chicken and pecan rolls. Meals are outdated mount out safety level stock. They are now going to troops for training rations. Note: For teriyaki, simmer thin slices of beefsteak or chicken in soy sauce until tender. For best results add jigger of saki.

Have Gavel, Will Travel

These officers are filling newly created billets at bases indicated: At CamLej, LtCols C. E. Hinsdale and R. S. Stubbs; at CamPen, LtCols T. P. Casey and J. E. Hanthorn. All are lawyers. Now they are full time law officers, will preside over general courts in areas assigned. New duties begin 15 Sept. West Coast law officers will ride circuit between San Diego, El Toro, 29 Palms and Cam Pen; East Coast law officers between Parris Island, Norfolk and CamLej. MCS, Quantico will continue to appoint law officers when they're needed.

CMC launched the program for two reasons: 1) a shortage of lawyers and 2) to insure that law officers are capable, experienced to reduce number of errors resulting in rehearings and reversals.

Home Again

MAG-11, back home (NAS, Atsugi, Japan) after six months of operating at Cubi Point, P. I., has an extra 2,000 feet of runway. While the MAG was away, strip was re-surfaced, lengthened 1,000 feet at both ends. Extra footage is over-run, a safety factor for F8Us and F4Ds; both jets are heavy and fast.

Two squadrons used the trip back for "buddy system" inflight refueling practice. Operating from Naha, Okinawa, LtCol A. L. Clark's VMF-251 (MAG-12) used their A4Ds to refuel VMA-121 F8Us. LtCol T. J. Saxon, VMA-121 CO, said operations were "routine." Same squadrons worked same deal last January when MAG-11 was enroute to the Philippines.

Marine's Medic

Old friends: Marines and Navy medics. June 17 was 62d anniversary of the Hospital Corps. Also in June Sec Nav okayed CMC request to authorize RADM B. W. Hogan, Chief BuMed, to wear Marine "greens" on fall visit to West Coast Marine bases.

Marines at Work

Just 10 years ago (25 Jun 1950) North Korea attacked south across the 38th Parallel; within a year US Marines had their first experience fighting alongside ROK Marines. The partnership has grown.

Last month in Exercise SEAHAWK Seventh Fleet and ROK Navy amphibious forces landed the US 9th Marines and the ROK 3d Marines near Pohang in the largest exercise in Korean Navy history. Participating: 17,000 sailors and Marines, 30 US ships, 32 ROK ships. Supporting the landing were Marines of MASS-2, VMA-332, VMO-2, and MABS-12, plus USS Princeton-based helos. Air units operated from K-55 (Taegu).

Acting as Aggressors were elements of the US 1st Cav Div and ROK Marines. They were helped by Typhoon Mary, which delayed D-Day from 14 to 15 Jun.

Meanwhile, an ocean away the salty 2d Mar Div-2d MAW team kept the landing beaches busy. Returning from Vieques, Lt Col R. L. Autry's 3/6 finished TRALEX 3-60 with a crack at Onslow. The BLT was beefed-up with Btry E, 2/10, and detachments from 2d Pion Bn, 2d ATBn, 2d TkbN, 2d Am TracBn, 8th MTBn, 2d SerBn, and 2d FSR. D-Day was set for 22 Jun.

Vieques got little rest as the 12th Mar Brig (Col W. F. Cornnell) moved in on 21 Jun from the USS Boxer (LPH-4). Lt Col R. M. Hall's 3/2 was in assault, supported by Provisional MAG-30 (Lt Col T. M. Forsyth, Jr). Included: VMA-331 and HMR-264.

Also dealt a hand in 2d Mar Div's late June exercises: Lt Col R. C. Peck's 3/8, elements of 10th Marines, 2d ATBn, 2d PionBn, 2d SerBn, 2d MTBn, and 2d Am TracBn. Headed for a show of strength at Pendleton Beach (near Virginia Beach, Va.), the BLT loaded out of Morehead City, N. C. aboard LSTs *Grant City* and *Waldo County*. Invited observers: second class middies from the Naval Academy. A later phase of TRAMID-60 was to team middies and Marines for a week of joint training as a Provisional Landing Force, followed by a joint landing.

June exercises, coupled with transplacement of 1/8 and 1/6, had practically all 2d Div combat troops afloat sometime during the month.

Lejeune Housing Stalled

A BuDocks source said Camp Lejeune's 800-unit Capehart project faces up to "60 days" delay as result of "walk-off" by contractor. A performance bond in excess of \$12 million has been forfeited, paid off by the bonding company to the bank financing the project. Bank likely will negotiate a new contract.

Twenty-five units for junior officers are already completed. Before workers walked off the job, intent was to make remaining units available at the rate of 25 per week. The ultra-modern housing area has already been named: Entire enlisted area (677 units)—**Berkeley Manor**, after late Maj Gen R. C. Berkeley, father of 2d Div CG; junior officer area, Paradise Point—**Hill Plaza**, after retired Maj Gen W. P. T. Hill; junior officer area, Marston Pavilion—**Timmerman Place**, after late Sgt G. F. Timmerman, WWII Medal of Honor winner; senior officer quarters, River Drive—**Cukela Court**, after late Corps figure, Maj Louis Cukela.

MarCorps Museum

Scheduled for late summer: the official opening of the Marine Corps Museum at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico.

New Old Glory Rules

Coming up: a new Marine Corps Flag Manual. Published via new MCO series, the manual will spell out DoD policy with respect to displaying 50-star flag beginning 4 July. Some units, mainly high headquarters, are authorized to fly the new flag; others must first use up their supply of 48- and 49-star flags.

In the Air

Lost in flight: several cabin doors on some models of helicopters, including the HOK. Kaman has alerted maintenance crews to specifically check the following items whenever doors are put back after removal for inspection:

- Spring angle that clips around shank of each jettison fitting at top of door.
- Tee-shaped emergency release handles at top of door frame.
- The cables (should be tension-free).
- Lip along lower edge of door.

HOKs of Okinawa-based VMO-2 (MAG-16) are over the 2,000 mark in accident-free hours. Lt Col F. E. Hughes commands the squadron. Safe period covers nine months, more than 9,000 day and night flights in all kinds of weather.

Marine Corps Matches

A darkhorse shooter, AGySgt H. C. Stevenson, H&HS, MCAS, Cherry Point, N. C., fired a tie-breaking second stage 296 to win the McDougal Trophy by a cartridge length. He finished with 585, neck-and-neck with GySgt D. O. Faulkner, an old hand on the shooting circuit. Third place went to CWO H. E. Larkin. Still standing: Capt W. W. McMillan's record 589 for this event set in 1959.

ASgt L. M. Hunt, MCRD, San Diego's MTU, carried home a pair of trophies. His 571 was enough to win Marine Corps Pistol Trophy, added to his rifle match score—576—gave him the big edge—1147—in Lauchheimer Trophy Match. In second and third places: Capt H. W. Newton, 1st MAW; 1st Sgt J. M. Kozak, 1st Mar Div.

Top three places in all events:

McDougal Trophy Match

AGySgt H. C. Stevenson	
MCAS, CPNC	585
GySgt D. O. Faulkner	
3d MAW, El Toro	585
CWO H. E. Larkin	
3d MAW, El Toro	583

MC Pistol Trophy Match

ASgt L. M. Hunt	
MCRD, San Diego	571
Sgt L. T. Cassity	
MCRD, San Diego	569
1st Sgt R. O. Jones	
MCRD, San Diego	568

Lauchheimer Trophy

ASgt L. M. Hunt	
MCRD, San Diego	1147
Capt H. W. Newton	
1st MAW	1141
1st Sgt J. M. Kozak	
1st Mar Div	1141

Combat Infantry Trophy Match

3d Mar Div	1101
1st MAW	928
2d MAW	858

Inter-Division Pistol Team Match

Eastern Division (Red)	1413*
Western Division (Gold)	1402*
Western Division (Gray)	1390

Inter-Division Rifle Team Match

Western Division (Blue)	2883**
Pacific Division (Blue)	2871
Eastern Division (Red)	2860

*Exceeds old record 1400 set by Western Division "Red" in 1959.

**Exceeds old record 2882 set by Western Division "Blue" in 1959.

Correction

Revised *Guidebook for Marines* won't have revised drill or manual of arms. Under study: a new *Drill Manual*.

Packs are Back

Take off your pack, Marine. That new load carrier is still a long way from supply systems. But planners say one of these four types will eventually end up on your back:

- Battle jerkin.
- Present haversack, slightly modified (wider shoulder straps w/trick release, worn with modified pistol belt.
- Same as above only worn with modified BAR belt.
- Army's new standard load carrier M-1956.

All are designed to carry NATO ammunition.

First three types are going in September to three MarDivs (160 each) for short range testing (about 60 days). MCLFDC is buying 500 M-1956 packs, will divide them among three MarDivs. Meanwhile work on the battle jerkin continues.

Some say the jerkin is too warm. MCEB has come up with one with removable panels, fore and aft, for hot weather wear. Quantico's SDT is testing 50 to determine suitability. Panels snap-on; another method will use zippers.

The Automatic Birdie

If you don't like your new ID picture, you'll have only yourself to blame. Marine Corps is furnishing "do-it-yourself" photo machines to all major bases. Expected savings, which will repay costs in first year, include:

- 19¢ per photograph.
- Two squads of Marines.
- One Marine, civilian worker, or dependent-hour per visit.

The photos will be authorized for ID cards, security passes, dependents' ID cards, SRBs, passports, and officer promotion photos. The machines and laminating equipment require no photo experts. They can be set up in Provost Marshal offices, or other administrative offices.

Names and Addresses

A retired Marine, BGen Merritt B. Curtis has been nominated for president of the US by the Constitution party. Their platform is strongly conservative. It favors states rights and free enterprise, opposes Communism, the UN, and federal income tax.

One of 62 Naval Academy graduates, Class of '60, accepting Marine Corps commissions, 2dLt Karl Rippelmeyer is the fifth straight winner of NAA sword to choose the Marines. Sword goes each year to the Academy's top athlete, chosen by athletic committee. Note to coaches: 2dLt Rippelmeyer is a track man, specializes in the broad jump.

FMFLant and AirFMFLant merged headquarters at Norfolk, Va., 1 July. LtGen J. C. Burger continues as CG, MajGen R. C. Mangrum drops Air FMFLant title, continues as Deputy Commander, FMFLant. CMC is mulling a similar merger of FMFPac (Honolulu) and AirFMFPac (El Toro).

For Crying Out Loud

Note to SRB clerks: Your troubles aren't over yet. Recent reenlistments included ASgt Kenneth Yackytooahnipah, for six years at Camp Pen's Base Material Bn. His name, in Comanche, means "Crying Boy."

Campus Look

First PLC of the summer graduates 23 July, at MCS, Quantico after six weeks of drill, inspections, class work and physical conditioning. Next class convenes 25 July. More than 3,000 students from the nation's colleges and universities are making their bids for gold bars. Also, 352 Marine option students (NROTC midshipmen who have indicated a desire to be Marine officers) will take the six-week training course this summer.



At 1,500 feet, 90mph, Marine HUS piloted by Capt S. J. Fulton, HMX-1, lets go a Martin Bullpup missile in first test firing from a helicopter. Seconds later Bullpup snapped at a target disk floating two miles away in Chesapeake Bay.

Boot Test

Junk on the bunk display for 3/2 this summer will include four different kinds of combat boots. And a PFC's blister can decide what kind of boots you'll draw next year. Under test:

- Standard Marine Corps boots.
- Standard Army boots.
- New Army boot in only 28 sizes.
- New Marine boot in only 28 sizes.

A Fort Bragg-based battle group is also marching, wading, checking arches. DoD-directed end result by next spring: a standard combat boot for all services. Navy and Air Force will accept whatever is kindest to Marine, Army feet.

Fashions

The Commandant himself selected the raincoat destined to be the first brought into the supply system. His choice: Ounce and one half (per yard) Nylon twill, coated with Hy-car synthetic rubber. It replaces Nylon overcoat w/liner, will be issued to recruits in the fall.

All-weather "greens"? Sifting comments, Uniform Board found lightweight "greens" may be too cold for MB, Kodiak, too warm for wear in tropics, has scheduled a re-study of the problem.

Individual patterns and "basted try-on" technique are out at MCSA Philadelphia's Custom Uniform Shop. In cutting out extra hand work, cost of uniforms comes down. Uniforms will continue to be made to the customer's measurements; but no more alterations at government expense. Reduced price lists and ordering instructions will be published soon by MCSA.

Legal Billets

SECNAV has approved integration as regulars for legal duties of 20 Reserve lawyers. One's a major, the rest Capts and Lts. They're not LDOs, but will be kept in legal billets. Special language is planned in the precepts of selection boards to assure them equal opportunity for promotion.

Contracts

G-4 planners, exploring three possible kinds of Landing Force Support Vehicles, are dickering with Borg-Warner for a first military prototype of LFSV. Type: planing hull. Contract calls for delivery in 18 months. Meanwhile, R&D continues in hydrofoils and air support vehicles (GEM).

An Advance Look at New Chapter 49, MarCor Man

These plates will be published in the next change to Chapter 49, Marine Corps Manual, 1949, and will be incorporated with complete uniform information in a separate publication—*Marine Corps Uniform Regulations*—when the new Marine Corps Manual is published in July of next year. Plates of uniforms are printed through the courtesy of the Marine Corps Uniform Board.



(A) Winter Service "A"



(B) Overcoat w/ sword



(D) Summer Service "A"



(E) Summer Service "C"

(A & B) Cover, cap gr; Insignia, cap, bronze; Frame Cap, serv; Shirt, kh; Insignia of Rank, collar; Insignia, lapel, bronze; Insignia of rank, shoulder; Necktie, kh; Ribbons, (Badges may be prescribed); Coat, serv, winter; Belt, coat; Buckle, belt, coat; Belt, web, trous; Buckle, belt, trous; Gloves, br; Trous, gr; Socks, br; Shoes, br. Optional: Coat, serv, winter, w/bellows bk; Clasp, necktie; Shirt, kh w/French cuffs; Cuff links and tie bar serv (officers); scarf worn with overcoat.

(C) Cap, garrison, gr; Insignia collar, left (worn on cap); Insignia of Rank, collar, ea (worn on cap); Insignia of Rank, collar, pr; Shirt, kh; Necktie, kh; Clasp, tie; Belt, web, trous; Buckle, belt, trous; Trous, gr; Socks, shoes, br.



(C) Winter Service "C"

(D) Cover, cap, kh; Insignia, cap, bronze; Frame Cap, serv; Insignia of Rank; collar; Insignia, collar, bronze; Insignia of Rank, shoulder; Necktie, kh; Ribbons, (Badges may be prescribed); Coat, serv, summer; belt, coat; Buckle, belt, coat; Belt, web, trous; Buckle, belt, trous; Trous, kh; Socks, shoes br. Optional: Coat, serv, summer w/bellows bk; Clasp, necktie; Shirt, kh, w/French cuffs; cuff links and tie bar, serv (officers).

(E) Cap, kh, trop, garrison, (Frame Cap w/cover of matching material may be prescribed, w/trop garrison uniform); Insignia collar, left (worn on cap); Insignia of Rank, collar, ea (worn on cap); Insignia of Rank, collar, pr; Shirt, kh, trop garrison; Necktie, kh; Clasp, necktie, gold; Belt, web, trous; Buckle, belt, trous; Trous, kh, trop garrison; Socks, shoes, br. Optional: Ribbons and badges.



(A) Blue White Dress



(B) Blue White Undress



(C) Blue Dress



(D) Blue Dress w/ sword

(A&B) Insignia, cap, dress; Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress, w/gold chin strap; Strip Collar; Shirt, soft white neckband style, French cuff; Insignia, collar, dress; Insignia of Rank, shoulder; Decorations and Medals, large (Badges may be prescribed); Coat, blue; Belt, coat, blue; Buckle, belt, coat; Gloves, white; Belt web, kh w/buckle; Trous, white; Socks, Shoes, br, when in formation with troops. Suspenders optional. (B) Same as Blue White Dress with the following exception: Ribbons (Badges may be prescribed).

(C&D) Insignia, cap, dress; Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap; Collar Strip; Shirt, soft white neckband style; French cuffs; Insignia, collar, dress; Insignia of Rank, shoulder; Decorations and Medals, large (Badges may be prescribed); Coat, blue; Belt, coat, blue; Buckle, belt coat; Cufflinks, gold; Gloves, white; Trous, blue; Belt, web, kh w/buckle; Socks, blk; Shoes, blk. Optional: suspenders. (D) Same as Blue Dress; Sword, and accessories.



(E) Blue Undress



Blue Undress w/sword



(G)

Blue Undress w/o coat

(E&F) Insignia, cap, dress; Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap; Collar Strip; Shirt, soft white neckband style, French cuffs, Insignia, collar, dress; Insignia of Rank, shoulder; Ribbons (Badges may be prescribed); Coat, blue; Belt, coat; Buckle, belt, coat; Cufflinks, gold; Gloves, white; Trous, blue; Belt, web, kh w/buckle; Socks, shoes blk; (F) w/Sword and accessories. Optional: Suspenders.

(G) Insignia, cap, dress; Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap, Insignia of Rank, collar; Shirt, kh, trop, garrison w/barrel cuff; Ribbons (Badges may be prescribed); Necktie, kh; Clasp, tie, gold; Belt, web, trous; Buckle, belt, web; Trous, blue; Socks, shoes black.



(A) White Dress w/sword



(B) White Dress

A) Insignia, cap, dress; Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap; Insignia, collar, dress; Insignia of Rank, shoulder; Decorations and Medals, large (Badges may be prescribed); Coat, white; Gloves, white; Trousers, white; Belt, web, khaki w/buckle; socks, white; Shoes, white; Sword; Knot, sword; Sling, shoulder web, sword; Sling, leather, sword; scabbard.

Optional: Suspenders.

(B) Insignia, cap, dress; Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap; Insignia, collar, dress; Insignia of Rank, shoulder; Decorations and Medals, large (Badges may be prescribed); Coat, white; Gloves, white; Trousers, white; Belt, web, khaki w/buckle; socks, white; Shoes, white.


Optional: Suspenders.

(C) Insignia, cap, dress; Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap; Insignia, collar, dress; Insignia of Rank, shoulder; Ribbons (Badges may be prescribed); Coat, white; Gloves, white; Trousers, white; Belt, web, khaki w/buckle; Socks, white; Shoes, white; Sword; Knot, sword; Sling, shoulder, web, sword; Sling, leather, sword; scabbard.

Optional: Suspenders.

(D) Insignia, cap, dress; Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap; Insignia, collar, dress; Insignia of Rank, shoulder; Ribbons (Badges may be prescribed); Coat, white; Gloves, white; Trousers, white; Belt, web, khaki w/buckle; Socks, white; Shoes, white.

Optional: Suspenders.



(C) White Undress w/sword



(D) White Undress



(A) Evening Dress w/cummerbund



(B) Evening Dress w/waistcoat


A) Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap; Insignia, cap, dress; Insignia, collar, dress; Insignia of Rank, shoulder, embroidered; Decorations and Medals, miniature; Jacket, dress, evening; Collar Strip; Shirt, stiff bosom, neckband style w/French cuffs; Studs and cufflinks, gold; Cummerbund, scarlet; Suspenders, white; Gloves, white, (br w/Overcoat, Raincoat, Topcoat); Trous, dress, evening; Socks, blk; shoes, blk leather or patent leather.

B) Cover, cap, white; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap; Insignia, cap, dress; Insignia, collar, dress; Insignia of Rank, shoulder, embroidered; Decorations and Medals, miniature; Jacket, dress, evening; Collar Strip; Shirt, dress, stiff bosom, neckband style, w/French cuff; Studs and cufflinks, gold; Waistcoat, white; Suspenders, white; Gloves, white (br w/Overcoat, Raincoat, Topcoat); Trous, dress, evening; Socks, shoes blk (shoes, leather or patent leather).

(C) Cover, cap, white; Insignia, cap, dress; Insignia, collar, dress; Frame Cap, dress w/gold chin strap; Necktie bow, black; Insignia of Rank, shoulder; Decorations and Medals, miniature; Jacket, mess, white w/button, chain link, 27 line; Shirt, pleated bosom, regular collar, French cuffs, white; Studs and Cufflinks, gold; Cummerbund, Scarlet; Suspenders, white; Gloves, white; Trousers, black mess; Tuxedo trousers (optional), Evening dress (when prescribed), Socks, black; Shoes, black leather or patent leather.

(D) The optional Boat Cloak w/white gloves may be worn with the following uniforms:

- Blue Dress
- Blue Dress w/sword
- Blue Undress
- Blue Undress w/sword
- Evening Dress w/cummerbund
- Evening Dress w/waistcoat




(C) Mess Dress



(D)

Evening Dress w/optional Boat Cloak

HOW TO SCRIBE A "PERFECT" CIRCLE IN OUTER SPACE




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Two Bell Laboratories engineers, T. J. Grieser and D. R. Hagner, look over the second-stage section of the Air Force Thor-Able missile used to launch the NASA Tiros weather satellite.



the deviation from this mean was less than $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, making it the most-nearly-perfect circular orbit ever achieved with a space vehicle by either the United States or Russia.

The dependability and accuracy of Bell Telephone Laboratories' ground-controlled Command Guidance System have been proved before—in the successful tests of the Air Force Titan intercontinental ballistic missile, and in last year's Air Force Thor-Able re-entry test shots from which the first nose-cone recoveries were made at ICBM distance. Now, with Tiros, the system contributes to a dramatic *non-military* project. Other uses are in the offing.

This achievement in precise guidance again illustrates the versatility of Bell Laboratories' research and development capabilities—directed primarily toward improving your Bell telephone service.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM



JULY 1960
VOLUME 44
NUMBER 7

40¢

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Marine Corps Gazette

Professional Magazine for United States Marines

Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.

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RAVEN MOST VALUABLE PERFORMER

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Total flight hours training per month	7,000
Number of Aircraft	130
Availability, Including All Maintenance And Overhaul	85%
No. Autorotation (Practice Power Off) Landings per School Day	1,000
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Maintenance Hours, Ravens vs. all Army Average	less than 50%

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Eye to Eye

... I was particularly impressed by Hanson W. Baldwin's article, *The Seas Are Our Strength* (GAZETTE: Mar '60). I'm greatly pleased to note that Mr. Baldwin expounds a view which I heartily share, that the Army's airborne-ready units have a definite contributory role in provision of a mobile force for limited war. His further comments that the Marine and Army mobile forces are primarily complementary, mirror my own feelings. The very concept of mobile striking forces (stressing secrecy and mobility), to be employed in "limited wars" is a concept born of brute fact and costly experience in the not too distant past. Any one weapon, or one-type-warfare theory cannot be supported in the light of recent history or prognostications of coming military commitments. As long as a diversified man inhabits the face of the earth, we will be faced with a requirement of preparedness for combat, diversified in type.

Col T. C. Mataxis

CO, 1st Airborne Battle Group
APO 185, US Forces

... In *The Seas Are Our Strength*, the author presented an exact and objective evaluation of the present military and political world situation, with probable and possible consequences. This confirms the enormous changes in the doctrine of warfare since the end of WWII—primarily a result of scientific and technical advancements.

Maj Helmut Dürr

17 Schumannstrasse
Bad Godesberg, West Germany

Salty Assaulted

... I read the GAZETTE with great interest each month and find every article of great professional interest with one exception—*The Salty Skipper*. This article is the most childish bit of tripe it has ever been my misfortune to read. Your readers are adults, not retarded ten-year-olds. Surely anyone holding the rank of captain in the Marine Corps can express his thoughts on a much higher level.

I suggest that you devote that page in the GAZETTE to an article that lives up to the high quality of your magazine.

1stLt Glen Golden

HqBtry
2/11 1stMarDiv

But, But, But, But...

... The recently revised GAZETTE is probably now the finest and most stimulating of all the "service" periodicals.

I might point out, however, the following minor errors in the May edition.

Page 24: The HR2S pictured is not landing on the *Princeton* but on the *Thetis Bay*. The island and funnels are a dead give-away.

Page 32: The bottom photo shows an OY Vultee-Stinson Sentinel (Army L-5),

not an OE which had not been built at the time of the Okinawan campaign.

Page 34: The LST pictured is not the USS Brodie. No such ship ever existed. The take off device on the LST 776 was called a "Brodie Rig" at the time, which is probably the source of your confusion.

Page 35: The bottom photo does not show an LPH; it is a photo of the CVE *Kula Gulf* recently classified as an AKV.

Maj Michael Spark

MB, 8th & Eye
Washington, D.C.

Rents Up

... The feature "For Rent" (MCA Newsletter: May '60) was a very good idea and should prove to be a great help to a number of "on the move" officers. In order to prevent those headed for Camp Pendleton from some disappointments when they get here, I'd like to list the rental quotations which my wife and I were greeted with upon our arrival here. Here they are:

DeLuz Homes—Company Grade Units

1 Bedroom, \$80.40

2 Bedroom 86.10

3 Bedroom 94.50

Wire Mountain—Company Grade Units

2 Bedroom 86.70

3 Bedroom 96.60

Hope to see more of the same stuff I've been seeing in the GAZETTE for the past half year.

2dLt D. D. Laumbach

7thEngrBn, 1stMar Div
CampPen, Calif.

... Your article, "For Rent" in the May issue of the GAZETTE is most informative and is a service needed by Marine personnel. May I point out, however, some minor discrepancies concerning housing at this Center which may be misleading to Marine officer personnel being transferred here.

We have a total of 22 MOQ assigned as follows:

CG	C/S	SrO	CoGrO	Total
1	1	9	11	22

The assignments to the nine Senior Officer Quarters are generally made by job assignment and not by rank although all would be major or lieutenant commander and above. The 11 Company Grade Quarters available to WO-Capts, are generally assigned by date of application for quarters, regardless of rank.

Our Wherry officer units, and the current rental rates are as follows:

Maj-Gen—8 units, 3 bedrooms, \$113.09.

WO-Capt—11 units, 3 bedrooms, \$91.99.

WO-Capt—14 units, 2 bedrooms (single unit), \$85.09.

WO-Capt—19 units, 2 bedrooms (duplex unit), \$79.99.

Total units, 52.

LtCol H. Wallace

Dir, Service Division
MCSC, Barstow, Calif.

Combat Uniform Sought

... I suppose most Marines did what I did—wore out their old utilities down on the farm. But I'm hopeful of finding at least one Marine who took a more sentimental approach to his WWII relics. The Marine Corps Museum needs a WWII "jungle suit"—camouflage utilities, jacket and trousers, worn by FMF during WWII.

The Museum will display those received in the donor's name. To enshrine yourself in the "scrapbook" of your Corps, write: The Director, Marine Corps Museum, Quantico, Va.

LtCol J. H. Magruder III

Dir, Marine Corps Museum
Quantico, Va.

Fare for a Free Ride

... To those who never join MCA because they are in a position to read a troop or borrowed copy of the GAZETTE:

There are thousands of colleges and high schools in this country. Each has a library. Each male student is a potential Marine. So while reading your troop copy this month, dig down into your pocket and donate a three-year subscription to a college or high school library of your choice.

Capt J. W. Hammond, Jr.

Basic School
MCS, Quantico, Va.

Ed: You'll still miss the MCA Newsletter.

Get in the Swim

... The Marine Corps is supposed to be proud of the fact it is the "first to fight for right and freedom and to keep our honor clean." What's so honorable about men not considering themselves qualified to be recruiters? Maybe this isn't the answer at all. Maybe today's SNCOs don't like a good challenge. Or is it because they figure they will be putting their careers on the line? If this isn't the real consensus, I sure wish someone would explain the real reasons recruiting service can't get enough qualified volunteers.

The men of the recruiting service are doing an outstanding job; right now they need help. Don't listen only to the bad points. Get the facts straight. In other words: Come on in, the water's fine. See your CO today and tell him you want to be a Marine recruiter.

AGySgt J. V. Mumford

RS, Boston, Mass.

Adjust Slings

... About Capt Aichele's "Shooting for 30" in the May issue: When do we get on the firing line? I sure appreciate the Captain's views, and I'm ready to start shooting. Let's see HQMC help us potential 19 & 6ers by letting us "adjust slings" before we come up on the firing line.

We know HQMC must approve retention of enlisted Marines beyond 20 years; it provides a method in MCM 9369.1a. Now, with 19 years active duty, am I asking too much to learn now if I may be retained beyond 20? The reference says that I must apply "not less than three months" before I am eligible for transfer to the FMCR. That's only six months away, though my EofE, and full 20, occurs 12 months from now.

(Continued on page 6)

BEECH "IMAGINIVITY" IN *Air Mobility*

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short field performance, rugged durability and low operating costs to meet a wide range of needs . . . as a command liaison or personnel transport, a carrier of high-priority cargo, an aerial ambulance, or a multi-engine instrument trainer with a "big plane" feel. Designed and engineered for future pressurization and turbo-prop modification.

Beech Aerospace Division projects include R&D on manned aircraft; missile target and reconnaissance systems; complete missile systems; electronic guidance systems; programs pertaining to liquid hydrogen propellants and cryogenic tankage systems; environmental testing of missile systems and components; and GSE. May we help you? Write, wire, or phone Contract Administrator, Beech Aircraft Corp., Wichita 1, Kansas—or nearest Area Office.

Beech Aerospace Division

BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION • WICHITA 1, KANSAS.

(Continued from page 4)

If I am not allowed to remain beyond 20, I'll have a reasonable time to prepare for civilian life. Possibly I could have a so-called "twilight cruise" transfer request approved so I could arrange my affairs at a station near where I hope to retire. Statistics show that I'm in the same status as many eligible for FMCR this year, a few next year, and lots in 1962.

NATTU, NAS
Olathe, Kansas

AMSgt Lewis Slepín

A Touch of Hollywood

... The training film, "Backbone of the Corps," (MH-8754) depicting the various duties and responsibilities of SNCOs was recently included in the training schedule of this MB.

After seeing the film a few times it became apparent this motion picture had definite possibilities in the command reenlistment program. The film, for the benefit of those who have not seen it, deals

with a gunnery sergeant returning home on leave and describing, through "flashbacks," his duties as the battery gunnery sergeant of an artillery unit. The following day he visits his former classmates on their civilian jobs and as he watches them at their daily tasks, the screen flashes a brief description of a Marine GySgt counterpart.

It is my belief that a series of films along this line, describing and depicting the functions of Marines and junior NCOs in the many functional fields in the Marine Corps, would indeed help any reenlistment program.

Another film could reveal the varied types of duty stations available and the geographic areas where Marines serve.

There are many more phases of Marine Corps life which could be filmed. The entire series of films could be used in the reenlistment program, thereby giving each eligible Marine "food for thought" in connection with reenlisting for one of the options offered as an incentive.

MB, USNAS
Brunswick, Maine

1stSgt L. R. Anderson

Physical Fitness For All

... CMC directed CMCS, Quantico to come up with a new physical test to replace MCO 6100.3A and has previously noted concern with the fact that SNCOs are not, in many cases, required to take physicals other than for reenlistment. Why not combine the two requirements and assign a true PULHES?

The cold hard fact is that SNCOs with an MOS of 0869 are being assigned to infantry battalions and who are not physically qualified to do the common tasks performed by Marines in the field. These SNCOs, many who do have "C" profiles, are being assigned to transplacement infantry battalions. In the training of troops, a correct example is as important a factor as is correct supervision.

Certainly the experience and knowledge of many of our senior NCOs with service-connected physical limitations can be used more effectively in non-FMF billets.

SgtMaj A. B. Kouma

3/5 1stMarDiv
Campen, Calif.

SERVICE

... TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO SERVE




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Off the Cuff

... The order authorizing wear of the short sleeve shirt specifically prohibits the conversion of a regular shirt by cutting off the sleeves. Why? The reason stated is that the different collar style prevents such action.

The first place that a regular shirt shows wear is normally at the cuffs, then the elbows. When frayed, they must be discarded. What a saving if a well-worn regular shirt could be converted to short sleeve style by removing the worn sleeves to a specified length! If the collar were then pressed in an open-spread position, I believe the difference between it and the new short sleeve issue would be barely discernible. Perfect fit is assured, since, if the owner is the typical Marine, the shirt was likely cut down in the waist originally.

Maj W. G. Tanzler

MCRS
Cincinnati, Ohio

Getting the Scoop

... In the January issue of the GAZETTE, an article titled *The Option Act Elect or Decline* by Maj R. C. Lutz, appeared. It is, by far, the most comprehensive interpretation of the Contingency Option Act of 1953 that has ever appeared in print.


In the Marine Corps it is policy to inform all Marines, in writing, upon completion of 17 years' service that they are required to make a choice: either elect an option or decline to elect. The Marine may refer to MCO 1750-2A, a copy of the Act itself, perhaps, and usually an officer or SNCO who has tried to understand all the technical language and legal ramifications set forth in these documents. It is questionable as to whether or not the average enlisted man or officer is qualified to interpret or really understand the prerogatives of the individual or the importance of his decision to elect or decline. Why not authorize funds for the reproduction and distribution of Maj Lutz's article or a similar article in sufficient quantity to provide each Marine completing 17 years' service a copy, to assist him in making this all important decision?

Capt R. W. Crook

5509 Gary St.
Alexandria, Va.

Marine Corps Gazette • July 1960

✓ **VERSATILITY...**




... a Marine plane comes in, touches down and is brought home safely on SATS ... the Marine Corps' expeditionary airfields vital to maintaining support for Marines ashore in combat. Heart of *SATS are the Fenestra aluminum panels that can be laid down rapidly to form the landing strip.

*Small Airfields for Tactical Support.



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
Whatever the service, whatever the mission — the Vertol 107 offers a new magnitude of air mobility.

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MARINES AND STRATEGY

By Capt B. H. Liddell Hart

THE PACIFIC CAMPAIGN IN WWII has long been recognized as a superb demonstration of the strategic value of amphibious flexibility. It is very clear that without the distracting and the by-passing power it conferred—the ability to vary the thrust-point while keeping the opponent on the stretch—the penetration of Japan's successive outlying defense-lines would have been a far slower and more costly process.

In contrast, the war in Europe is regarded as mainly a continental land struggle, determined by the direct action of the armies and air forces, in which sea power merely played a subsidiary role as the means of conveying troops and supplies to feed the fight. Moreover, in the familiar picture of the war, such part as

sea power played appears to be of relatively little importance as an influence on the Eastern Front—the only fighting front in Europe until late in 1943, and the one where the largest part of the German Army continued to be engaged until the end of the war.

But analysis of the distribution of Germany's strength at successive stages of the war leads to very different conclusions, and changes the picture. From such analysis it becomes evident that the amphibious flexibility provided by seapower, which the Western allies possessed, exerted a much greater influence than appears on the surface of events.

In May 1940 the Germans massed 65 per cent of their strength in the

armies deployed to invade France and the Low Countries, leaving only 5 per cent to guard their rear against the Russian armies that had advanced into and occupied the eastern half of Poland. That immensely disproportionate distribution was not due to unreserved trust in the Russians' peaceful intentions, but to the temporary insurance provided by their own large strategic reserve (OKH Reserve) amounting to 30 per cent of their total strength in divisions. For, although it was handily placed to back up the offensive in the West, part of it could have been quickly switched eastward to Poland if the Russians had made any threatening move on that front. The distance between the two fronts was not large. Moreover, when it

became quite clear that no Russian move in Poland was developing, the Germans were emboldened to use the whole of this reserve to support their advance into the West, so that 95 per cent of their strength was eventually committed there.

A very significant difference was seen in the Germans' deployment, and proportionate concentration, for the invasion of Russia in 1941. Here, only 60 per cent (120 divisions) of their strength was launched in the offensive, and only 13 per cent (26 divisions) was in strategic reserve—to reinforce the attacking armies. For 27 per cent of the German strength (53 divisions) was standing guard in the sea-girdled and sea-menaced areas of Western, Northwestern and Southeastern Europe.

That large subtraction from the concentration against Russia was of great detriment to Germany's chances of victory and of great help to Russia's chances of withstanding attack. It became of increasingly vital importance once Russia succeeded in surviving the first onslaught.

Such a conclusion is not a claim for the *actual* effect of what Britain, the only survivor of the original Western alliance, did to draw German strength away from the Russian front. Her efforts were small, and their effect slighter than has been claimed by Churchill, Alanbrooke and other British military chiefs, or their spokesmen. These overclaims have obscured, or at least blurred, the basic fact—and basic lesson. For the vital subtraction was really due to the widespread threat, and consequent distraction, inherent in sea-power and its essential complement,



British seapower and amphibious flexibility forced Germany to hold back 27% of her strength in the attack against Russia, 1941.

amphibious flexibility of striking power against any sea-coast stretches. It was the potential threat that had the actual effect.

Further significant points, and lessons, emerge in closer examination of the 1941 situation, at the time that the Germans embarked on the invasion of Russia. In the first place the detailed distribution of the subtracted strength is worth study, and emphasis.

In France and the Low Countries were stationed 38 divisions—19 per cent of the Germans' total field army. In Norway and Denmark there were 8 divisions—a further 4 per cent of the total. In neither of these areas was the subtraction due to any imminent counter-invasion that the British looked likely to make, or were capable of making in the period of gradual recuperation from the 1940 disaster in France, when they had lost most of their equipment although they had managed to extricate most of their troops. But the largeness of the subtraction to guard these areas cannot, alternatively, be ascribed simply to the fact they consisted of countries

recently conquered and occupied by the Germans, which had to be held down. For at this time the resistance movements in these countries were causing no serious trouble, and were not as formidable as in Poland, where the Germans had nevertheless dared to reduce their forces much more, when striking westward in 1940, despite having simultaneously to hold down the Poles and keep on guard against the Russians.

Thus it is difficult to see any factor that can be credited with major effect on the subtraction except the mental impression, on Continental minds, of the inherent threat and instinctive stretch produced by sea-power *plus* amphibious flexibility. That inference is reinforced by the fact that of the eight divisions posted in the Scandinavian area, only one was in Denmark while seven were in Norway—which presented a far longer and more exposed coastline to seaborne counter-moves. It is the *potential* effectiveness of the threat, and disturbance, that best explains the seven-fold difference in the protective strength allocated by the Germans to Norway as compared with Denmark—where a British landing would have been a closer menace to Germany itself, but was much more difficult to gain and maintain, as the Germans realized.

In the Mediterranean theatre, the Germans left nine divisions at the time they invaded Russia. Seven of these were in the Balkans, which Hitler had been impelled to invade, before tackling Russia, by his fear of a British seaborne threat to the flank of his advance into Russia and to the Rumanian oilfields on which his forces depended for fuel. Although he had expelled the British



"Adequate amphibious means" are not only a matter of ships.



Pacific war showed value of specialized force, a tool missing in Europe.

from Greece he continued to fear a renewal of the threat, and his Balkan detachment would have been larger still but for the fact that his Italian allies took a big share in garrisoning that area.

The other two German divisions in the Mediterranean theater formed the panzer group that had recently been dispatched overseas, under Rommel's command, to support the Italian army in North Africa after its shattering defeat by the British. That small detachment proved a profitable strategic investment, in contrast to the much larger ones elsewhere. For it not only saved the Italians from complete collapse, and preserved the Axis position in North Africa for a further two years, but developed a threat to the British hold on Egypt and the Suez Canal which drew thither more than twenty divisions from Britain's reserves—nearly half her operational strength. It was by far the most effective distraction that Germany produced in the war, and one of the most striking examples in history of what can be achieved in that way by an overseas expedition. Even so, it was far from equalling the overall balance of distraction produced, to the Germans' disadvantage, merely by the threat of amphibious flexibility—that "potential" which had been Britain's greatest asset in all her wars, and which was now greatly augmented by American reinforcement.

Seapower made possible the combined American and British landings on the coast of French North Africa, in November 1942, and then trapped the German and Italian forces in Tunisia, ensuring that the whole of them were "put in the bag"—in May 1943. That result cleared the way for the Allies' re-entry into Europe, by eliminating the bulk of

the forces which would otherwise have faced the Allies in Sicily—and might easily have blocked their capture of that stepping stone. The successful landing in Sicily, two months later, produced the downfall of Mussolini and the quickly following surrender of Italy.

The Allies' follow-up on the mainland of Italy, and her break-away from alliance with Germany, immediately drew 18 German divisions into Italy in an effort to check the Allies' invasion—made with 15 divisions—while the German forces in the Balkans were also doubled, being brought up to 15 divisions there, as a protective measure. That was a good balance of distraction in the Allies' favor.

But in Italy itself the balance tilted the opposite way when the Allied armies suffered repeated and prolonged checks in their effort to advance up the narrow peninsula. To revive the advance, in 1944, the Allies poured 30 divisions into Italy against the Germans' 22—which were, on the average, barely two-thirds the strength of Allied divisions. Although that swelling reinforcement now, at last, succeeded in levering the Germans out of Rome, and driving them back to the Gothic Line in the mountain belt north of Florence—where they held on until the following year—the invasion of Italy had ceased to pay a good stra-

tegic dividend in proportion to the resources invested in it.

Nevertheless the Allies' amphibious power had in other respects achieved an increasing strategic effect on the situation as a whole, to Germany's detriment and Russia's benefit. For at the beginning of June 1944, before any other Allied landing had taken place, only 55 per cent (165 divisions) of the German Army* remained on the Eastern front, to meet the increasing pressure of the Russians' tidal advance, while nearly 45 per cent (133 divisions) had been drawn westward or southward to guard against the threat of Anglo-American seaborne invasion.

It is also very significant that, of the total, barely 10 per cent (32 divisions) was posted in the northern part of France (north of the Loire) to meet the impending cross-Channel attack. Moreover, only 6 per cent (18 divisions) was employed with the two armies that held the front in central Italy against the Allied offensive there.

In contrast, 18 divisions were posted in Norway and Denmark; 9 in the Low Countries; 8 in the southwest of France covering the Biscay coast; 10 in the south-east of France covering the Mediterranean coast; 10 covering the Mediterranean and Adriatic coasts of Northern Italy; and a further 28 in the south-east of Europe, another area which presented a long coastline to potential seaborne invasion. This total of 83 divisions was a subtraction of German strength produced mainly by the looming shadow of possible seaborne attack by the Western allies—for partisan activity was formidable only in Yugoslavia. Such a vast distraction, nearly 30 per cent of Germany's total resources, was

*The total number of divisions had been increased from 200 in 1941 to approximately 300 by 1944, but divisional strengths were reduced.



B. H. Liddell Hart is recognized world-wide as a leading military analyst. As adviser to the War Minister in 1937-38, he helped plan the reorganization of the British Army. His studies and writings (more than 30 books) have kept pace with the changing military scene; here he undertakes a major evaluation of seapower and amphibious flexibility.

tremendous testimony to the effect of amphibious flexibility.

It is worth note, however, that when the Allies actually landed their distraction effect did not increase proportionately to the effort made, and in some cases began to diminish soon after the landing. That diminishing return was most marked in the Italian campaign—where, after the opening phase, the Allies were employing a much larger force than that opposing their advance. The unfavorable turn was due partly to the narrowness of the Italian peninsula. The basic lesson is that *offensive* distraction is most effective *when* it carries a wide strategic threat, and *where* there is ample room for its development by attack to be expanded easily and quickly into a widening tactical threat.

But the comparatively poor distraction effect of the Italian campaign, after the landing, was also due to diminishing amphibious power in the Mediterranean theatre. Italy would have been a more suitable site for attack if there had been ample assault shipping, and for a long enough time. But when the decision was made to land there, the planners had already committed themselves to an undertaking that most of the assault shipping which was available should be moved back to harbors in Britain in readiness for the cross-Channel attack. The key importance of adequate amphibious means is another basic lesson of modern warfare.

"Adequate amphibious means" are not only a matter of ships. Skilled personnel are of no less importance, and they need to be available in adequate numbers if landing operations are to be executed smoothly and exploited quickly. The required skill is the fruit of long training in amphibious techniques, and of constant practice in combination of the various elements in such a force.

In studying the African, Sicilian, Salerno and Anzio landings it becomes evident that many hitches and delays occurred from lack of knowledge and experience in dealing with amphibious problems, and from differences of view between the Army and the Navy commanders and staffs respectively. At Salerno, the first time when tough opposition was



British Marines were never capable of large-scale landing operations.

met, a costly check was suffered and a crisis developed—so grave that Gen Mark Clark described it, even in cool retrospect, as "a near disaster." Only by a narrow margin did the landing force hold off the German counter-attack and avoid being driven back into the sea. Yet the counter-attack did not come until five days after the landing, and was even then delivered by a force much smaller than the Allies had by then placed ashore. At Anzio, four months later, a great opportunity was lost of unhinging the German front by this landing in its rear, near Rome—and then another crisis developed. Yet the Germans were so weak in the area, and so strained in general, that thirteen days passed before the counter-attack was delivered. Such lengthy time lapses offered the Allies ample opportunity to establish and exploit their lodgment, and their failure to profit from the long respite emphasizes the inefficiency of these landing operations—in execution as contrasted with conception.

In searching for the explanation, and in comparing the execution with the better performances among Pacific landing operations, a clue can be found in a significant factor there—which was missing in the Mediterranean, and in the European theatre as a whole. For in this theatre there was no specialized amphibious force such as the US Marine Corps divisions provided in the Pacific. A spearhead of such divisions might well have made a striking difference to the rapidity and effectiveness of the landing operations in the European theatre.

That deduction is strengthened in the course of studying British landing operations—not only those in WWII, but throughout the past three hundred years. During these centuries, Britain has by force of cir-

cumstances, particularly her geographical situation, been the most distinctively amphibious of all the powers. Until very recently, the last generation, her Navy was supreme among the fleets of the world, and by it she maintained a world-wide empire—despite the smallness of her island home base. Yet for all her success at sea, and in expanding overseas, her performance in amphibious warfare did not match her experience of it. Her expeditionary forces more often failed than succeeded in gaining their objectives when they met any serious opposition.

During the hundred years prior to the French Revolution, Britain was repeatedly at war with France—which, under the Bourbons, was not only threatening to dominate the Continent of Europe, but also the world overseas. In these struggles, Britain relied on seapower to counterbalance French landpower, and exploited her advantage at sea to achieve compensating gains that could provide bargaining counters in peace negotiations. An examination of the record shows, however, that out of seventeen amphibious expeditions which Britain launched during these hundred years against France and her colonies, only seven attained their objectives. In the twenty years' struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France that followed, only four out of twelve were successful. The most common cause of failure was mutual misunderstanding, of the other Service's problems, between the general in charge of the expeditionary force and the admiral in charge of the escorting fleet, and between their respective subordinates. All too often, the attack miscarried or evaporated in wrangling between the co-operating services—who, through incompatibility of views and loyalties, were

apt to become the enemy's best allies.

The record of British amphibious operations was even more disappointing in the next great war, a century later—the First World War. At this time the leaders of the British Army had become so continental-minded that their governing idea was simply to provide a direct reinforcement to France—the traditional enemy who had now become Britain's ally—by shipping the bulk of the Army across the Channel to fight alongside the French Army. They frowned on the arguments, voiced by Winston Churchill, Adm "Jacky" Fisher, and Maurice Hankey (the Marine officer who became Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the War Cabinet) for continuing to follow the historic principles of British strategy—a strategic tradition which had now in soldiers' eyes become a heresy. Thus few amphibious operations were attempted, compared with the number in earlier wars; and they did not fulfil expectations, owing largely to the continuance of mutual misunderstanding and difference of view between the Services.

The attempt, in October 1914, to save Antwerp from the Germans became a disjointed fiasco. Early in November a seaborne expeditionary force, sent to capture German East Africa, landed at Tanga but was driven to re-embark three days later. After that repulse it was decided to substitute an overland advance, but this took four years to achieve its purpose. Germany's other colonies in Africa were also conquered by overland expeditions, of varying duration, and only her undefended Pacific islands were captured by seaborne moves.

In 1915 the one important amphibious operation of the war was launched—to open the Dardanelles by capturing the Gallipoli peninsula, which commands the gateway to these straits, and knock out Germany's Turkish ally. Amphibious flexibility, and its distracting effect, helped the British to take the Turks off balance both in the original April landing and again in the fresh August landing further up the peninsula. But on each occasion opportunity was forfeited on landing, and a costly stalemate ensued, so at the end of the year the expeditionary force was evacuated.



From Gideon to Guderian the value of elite forces has been proven.

Even though it failed, the Gallipoli expedition had by its threat upset the whole war plan of the Germans for 1915. What success would have meant to the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia) is shown by the testimony of Gen von Falkenhayn, then the directing head of the Germanic alliance: "If the straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea were not permanently closed to Entente traffic, all [our] hopes of a successful issue of the war would be seriously diminished. Russia would have been freed from her strategic isolation which . . . offered a surer guarantee than any military success . . . that the forces of this Titan would eventually and automatically be crippled." That eventual crippling, by 1917, resulted from the way that, in 1915, a farsighted amphibious conception was wrecked by a chain of errors in execution. The consequences were far-reaching, for the crippling of Russia's forces led to the Revolution there and the establishment of the Communist regime.

More immediately, the dismal ending of the Gallipoli expedition caused the British to abandon the idea of renewing their amphibious strategy, and committed them more fully to the grinding and long-drawn attrition campaign on the deeply entrenched Western Front that left both Britain and France exhausted by the time that the war was ended. The only bright amphibious flash in these years was the raid on the Germans' advanced naval base at Zeebrugge in 1918—on "St. George's Day"—which was carried out purely by the Navy, with assault com-

panies of Marines.

Between then and the Second World War, the introduction of some measures of joint staff training raised hopes that amphibious operations would be better conducted if war came again. But in 1940 the seaborne moves to counter the German invasion of Norway were as badly bungled as almost any of those in the past. The next important amphibious thrust, that against Dieppe in 1942, was also a depressing fiasco. Subsequent amphibious operations, carried out in conjunction with American forces, have already been examined and discussed.

It is strange, and puzzling, that Britain's performance in amphibious operations during the course of these three centuries should have been so poor in comparison with the achievement of her Navy on the seas, and, also of her Army in many of the battles it fought on foreign soil, when operating on its own—out of reach of naval support. The clue to the puzzle can be found in a missing factor, and instrument. For although Britain formed a force of Marines as far back as 1664—originally named the "Admiral's regiment"—and although its great value was soon proved, it has always been confined to a very limited scale and scope. It has never been developed, like the US Marine Corps, into a strong amphibious fighting force embodying all the different arms and elements required for effective attacking power, and capable of carrying out a large-scale landing operation. An explanation of Britain's oft-repeated failure in such operations can be seen in her neglect to develop the

Royal Marines in this way, and for this purpose. Moreover, no other explanation becomes apparent in studying the record.

The official neglect, or reluctance, to develop them is the more strange because their value was so amply acknowledged by famous expeditionary commanders. Indeed, Adm Vernon was so impressed that in 1739 he urged "the necessity of converting most of our marching regiments into marines." In 1802 they were made a royal corps on the recommendation of that great commander and strategist, Lord St. Vincent, who declared: "There never was an appeal made to them for honour, courage or loyalty, that they did not more than realize my highest expectations. If ever real danger should come to England, the marines will be found the country's sheet-anchor." In default of their expansion on an adequate scale, he urged that England's next best policy, as an amphibious power, would be to make every infantry regiment serve afloat as Marines, in rotation, as part of their duty. In 1804, on Nelson's recommendation, a corps of artillery was added to the Royal Marines for duty both in ships and ashore. Their performance in the shore role was so good that Napier, the soldier historian of the Peninsular War, frankly acknowledged that: "Never in my life have I seen soldiers like the Royal Marine Artillery." But sixteen years after the war, when its lessons were fading, the Royal Marine Artillery was abolished as a measure of economy—although subsequently revived after further reflection on experience.

Why is it that in Britain, the country most dependent on seapower, the Marines have never been developed in adequate scale and scope, as they have been in America? The basic hindrance has been that opposing vested interests, which are strong everywhere, are reinforced by the distrust of specialization that is a British characteristic. The Services, and particularly the Army, have always been inclined to resist specialist claims and specialized forces.

If compelled by necessity to accept these, the Army has sought to discard them as soon as possible—and usually too soon. It maintains its faith in the "general purpose" concept—the idea and ideal that every


man should be capable of fitting any job, and be a "jack of all trades." Linked with such disregard of differing aptitudes has been an ingrained distrust of those who mastered any special technique—often prompted by an underlying fear that recognition of its importance would disqualify for promotion those who had not acquired it. This very common attitude is reinforced by the repugnance which armies have constantly shown towards new methods and new instruments. Even when something new could no longer be resisted, its further development has too often been handed over to a general "handyman" who would not be likely to make the most of its potentialities.

The most significant development of the 19th Century was the introduction of "light infantry"—nimble sharpshooters who skirmished ahead of the line, using cover and individual aimed fire, to harass the close-packed ranks of the enemy's line or massive columns, and thus pave their way for the advance of their own. A light company was added to each battalion. Then, profiting from bitter experience in the American backwoods, some of the more progressive British officers secured the formation of regiments composed entirely of light infantry. Nursed by Sir John Moore, they were formed into an elite force—the famous Light Division of the Peninsular War, which surpassed all other infantry in its combined exploitation of mobility and firepower. But during the long peace that followed, the force was broken up and the regiments were brought back into conformity of role and tactics with the ordinary infan-

try—retaining only their distinctive title, tradition, a more flexible system of drill, and a faster pace.

Towards the end of the 19th century, the invention of the machine-gun foreshadowed another radical change in tactics, but when it was at last adopted in the British Army, it was parcelled out among the infantry, two to a battalion. These little special packets did not fit into the battalion pattern, and on exercises the only orders that the machine-gun officer was apt to get were: "Take the damned things away and hide 'em." They were not effectively used until a Machine Gun Corps was formed late in 1915, after more than a year of war. And when the war ended the Corps was disbanded.

The most revolutionary invention in that war was the tank. But the personnel of this new arm were at first organized only as a branch of the Machine Gun Corps, and even when a Tank Corps was created in 1917 as a recognition of what it had achieved, it was maintained on a temporary basis for a further six years. Only in 1923 did the Army Council, after much hesitation, agree to it being made permanent—as the Royal Tank Corps. But it was kept on a very small scale. Sixteen years later, on the eve of WWII, it was merged with the cavalry, who were belatedly converted from horses and much more numerous, in a common frame entitled the Royal Armoured Corps. The resulting scarcity, and dilution, of expert knowledge and experience in Britain's Armoured Corps goes far to explain why, despite its pioneer achievements, its performance as a whole in WWII compared poorly with the German—



Decisive in WWII: Seapower plus amphibious forces.

which, although not formed until 1933, was treated as an elite force from that time on.

From Gideon to Guderian, the value of elite forces has been repeatedly demonstrated in warfare. The "300" that formed "The sword of the Lord, and of Gideon" in defeating the host of Midian were picked, out of ten thousand, by the way they gave evidence of exceptional dash. The "Royal Companions" (cavalry) and "Royal Hypaspists" (foot) played a decisive part in Alexander the Great's unbroken run of victories. So did the Guards division in Genghis Khan's. Cromwell's "Ironsides" of the "New Model," Napoleon's Imperial Guard, Ludendorff's "storm troops" in the German break-through attacks of 1918, and "Guderian's Panzers" in 1940, are among the other successive links in the historical chain of evidence that proves the value of having elite forces for tasks of key importance.

The British, however, have long shown an obstinate disfavor for the concept, except in its application to the social sphere. Although the Foot Guards have a very fine military record, they would hardly have survived but for their intimate association with the monarchy. In war, the British have paid heavily for their reluctance to recognize the need and value of special skills—and in no respect have they paid so heavily as in amphibious operations.

The Americans have adjusted their forces far better to changing conditions and new needs, especially in the amphibious sphere. The development of the Marine Corps as a spearhead force in this sphere, embodying all the various elements required for timely effect, has been a striking example. It is a model of how special problems should be tackled by special means.

It was through seapower and its "companion"—the power to carry by sea a force that can be thrown ashore wherever desired or needed—that for centuries Britain helped her friends on the Continent to resist aggression, and averted its domination by any single nation or tyrant. The same coupled power also enabled this small island country of very limited strength to maintain a world-wide network of colonies and protectorates.



It is desirable to have an airborne force for quick intervention.

In WWII this coupled power, immensely reinforced when the United States came into the war alongside Britain, was basically the decisive factor in liberating Europe from Hitler's tyranny, as well as in liberating the Far East from Japan's. For airpower then had not the range to exert its effect until bases were gained within close enough reach of the enemy for it to operate effectively, while Russia's landpower was not enough by itself to overthrow him.

After the war, the older kinds of military power were for a time overshadowed—and in the public's eye eclipsed—by the development of nuclear power, conveyed by air. But nuclear power was too drastic and dangerous for use except as a last resort, even while it remained a monopoly, and thus in many respects unsuitable as a counter to insidious or limited forms of aggression. So seapower and its amphibious companion continued to be the operative means for curbing aggression against any of the free countries on the Eurasian land mass. Their prospects of protection have depended more on being within supporting reach from the sea than on the shadowy, and boomerang, threat of a nuclear retort.

Now that Russia has produced nuclear weapons in large quantity to match America's, and taken the lead with intercontinental missiles, a nuclear stalemate has developed. In these circumstances, local and limited aggression becomes more likely, while amphibious forces become more necessary, both as a deterrent and as a counter to it—a counter which can be used without being suicidal, and a deterrent which is therefore credible.

On a superficial view, airborne forces may appear to be a better counter, as being quicker to arrive. But their speed of strategic movement, and effect on arrival, are subject to many limitations.

Many of the spots where an emergency may arise are far distant, and cannot be reached by air without flying over foreign territory or making a long circuit to avoid it. Most of the Asiatic and African countries are acutely sensitive to any infringement of their recently acquired independence, resentful of Western interference in those regions, and insistent on preserving neutrality, or apt to side with the opponents of the West. A circuitous air approach, even where possible, increases the need for intermediate bases, where

aircraft can be refueled and serviced, while their establishment and maintenance are subject to similar political difficulties.

Strategic movement by air is so liable to be blocked or impeded by countries in its path so that it is becoming strategically *unreliable* as a way of meeting the world-wide problems of the Atlantic Alliance—which more truly should be called the Oceanic Alliance.

Moreover, on arrival, an airborne force needs airfields for its disembarkation and logistic support. Adequate ones for large aircraft and a large force do not exist in many areas, and even when they do they may be in hostile hands. If well defended, an attempt to capture them by parachute drop can easily turn into disaster, while a ground approach may be checked through lack of tactical mobility and of weapon-power sufficient to overcome strong resistance. For an airborne force is narrowly limited in the vehicles, heavy weapons, and ammunition it can carry. If it is held up and has to wait for these requirements to arrive by sea, it loses its main advantage—rapidity of intervention. Another of its drawbacks is its vulnerability to interception while in transit. On top of all comes the high cost of strategic air movement—for one division, twenty times what it costs by sea for a medium-range move of about 2000 miles, and forty times for long-range moves of about 8000 miles.

In tackling emergencies two hands are better than one and essential when one is unreliable. While it is desirable to have an airborne force, which enables quicker intervention where its use is possible, it is essential to have a Marine force—and better that this should be the bigger of the two. For the bigger it is the more possible becomes a strategic deployment wide enough and strong enough to ensure early and effective intervention wherever there is a blaze, and before it spreads. An amphibious force of modern type, operating from the sea and equipped with helicopters, is free from dependence on airfields, beaches, ports, landbases—with all their logistical and political complications. The use of an airborne force, or of any land-based force, is a more irrevocable step, since its commitment is more



It is essential to have a Marine force—chopper and carrier.

definite and its withdrawal more difficult. A self-contained and sea-based amphibious force, of which the US Marine Corps is the prototype, is the best kind of fire-extinguisher—because of its flexibility, reliability, logistic simplicity, and relative economy.

Finally, it may be useful to summarize the principal conclusions that emerge from an extensive study of war history, past and contemporary, and in particular of the part that sea-based powers have played:

Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power possesses. It creates a distraction to a continental enemy's concentration that is most advantageously disproportionate to the resources employed.

The distracting effect is apt to diminish, however, after a landing takes place unless this is made in an area spacious enough for its expansion into a widening threat, and unless its exploitation is rapid—particularly in the opening phase.

The best way to ensure such initial rapidity lies in the use of a specialized amphibious force—and the need for it is now greater than ever before. Although Britain has, by force of geographical circumstances, been more amphibious in action than any other power, her performance has been much poorer than her experience. That deficiency is due to her failure to develop her Marines into a special "lock-opening" force of adequate scale. The United States has been wiser in this important respect.

The value of such a force is endorsed by the sum of experience through the ages about the value of elite forces in general. Their key importance as lock-openers has been repeatedly proved in the history of

warfare, and more than ever in recent times.

No fresh problem in war has been effectively tackled if treated in a "general purpose" way, and entrusted to a Service or arm primarily concerned with other and more familiar problems that habitually come within its sphere. The unhappy history of armored forces, particularly in Britain and France, is a recent example—and lesson. Amphibious warfare is one of the basic problems that call for specialized treatment.

These conclusions lead on to a further reflection. It has come to be recognized that the old distinction between land and sea operations is no longer suitable. But the recent three-fold division into land, sea, and air operations fits no better and is already out of date. While operational problems are different, their differences cannot be solved on three separate lines. Problems need to be tackled in a more integrated way, blending the functions of the three Services.

The US Marine Corps is a three-in-one Service in embryo. It has gained so much experience in combining land, sea and air action that it forms a nucleus and a pattern for further development. Logically it should be the basis for further progress in integration. Any reduction of its scale and function would be a retrograde step. For it is the most important advance in military organization since the "divisional system"—the division of an army into self-contained fractions, embodying all arms and capable of fighting independently—was introduced near the end of the 18th Century, and became the key instrument of Napoleon's operations.

US MC

YEMS, YAMS, PG, E3, and YOU

By Maj Leon Utter



PRIDE IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT IN THE MAKING OF a Marine. If you disagree with that statement, don't read any further. In fact you shouldn't be reading the GAZETTE in the first place.

We ARE a proud bunch—we Marines. We're proud of our Corps, its accomplishments, and of ourselves. We should be. Pride is the very skeleton around which the healthy body of our Corps is built. That skeleton gives the body strength and self-control. The marrow in the bones is the pride of the individual Marine. All in all, it's a pretty fine looking physical specimen, and worthy of being tabbed, "Marine."

All services have pride in their titles. Last November, at the Birthday Ball in Washington, Adm Burke repeatedly referred to himself as a "Sailor." He likes the term. Gen Ridgway evidenced his feeling for the term "Soldier" when he made that one word the title of his book. The best known man in the Air Force is proud to be dubbed as "Airman" LeMay. And it goes without saying, that every man in the Corps—from the Commandant right down to the last boot to enter Parris Island today—is "proud to claim the title of United States Marine."

Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine. Good words, all four of them. They tell you something about the man to whom they are applied. They connote pride. They ring in a man's ears when he is addressed by one of them.

But in recent years, for nothing more than a convenience to the UNIVAC, the IBM, and the digital computer, some of these terms have fallen into disuse. There is an insidious practice, now common to some services, of referring to enlisted men as EM.

Now there is nothing wrong with the term enlisted men. The vast majority of Marines are, or have been, enlisted men. The term "enlisted man" simply tells us that a man has signed a contract to serve his country for a certain period of time. This is an honorable act, hence the term is also honorable. But the meaningless abbreviation of the term by use of the letters "EM" is one of the most deplorable practices it has ever been my displeasure to observe. Why? Say it out loud a few times. EM, EM, yEM, YEM. Hear how it comes out?

YEM. You can't get away from it—"yem." In one service, enlisted men are known as "yams."

I first became aware of this idiotic practice of convenience when, in early 1950, I reported to a joint unit as a Naval Gunfire Spotter. Checking in with the Adjutant, I was asked: "How many yem ya' got?"

Puzzled, I said, "How many what I got?"

"How many yem ya' got? Yem. Yem."

"I'm sorry. I still don't understand."

Painfully and slowly, the Adjutant repeated, "How many yem? Yem? EM? Enlisted men?"

With audible displeasure, I answered, "There are two Naval officers and twelve *Marines* in my detail, if that is what you want to know."

The master of the machine record forms didn't even get the point. "O.K. Three officers and twelve yem."

That's the way he wrote it down.

My two months with the outfit was a nightmare for anyone proud of his troops. I was proud of mine. For the entire time we were there they withstood the indignity of being called "yems" at every turn. It was, "You yem line up to get paid." And "All yem going to the yem's dance tonight, board busses at 1900." The term was in official correspondence, it popped out in oral commands, and was repeated in barracks conversation. Nobody liked it but it was convenient. All this in an organization engaged in an intensive campaign to build individual pride. A few months later in Korea, it was shown they had missed the boat.

Today you can pick up any one of the various service "Times" papers. I'll guarantee a considerable number of the headlines and articles will flaunt dignity with use of the term "EM." It is also running wild in a number of official service publications. EM Clubs are prevalent at home and abroad. The term is "convenient."

Well, for the past ten years this writer remained rather smug about the whole business. Oh, once in a great while the term would pop up in the Marine Corps, but it never caught on to a harmful degree. I chortled to myself, thinking Marine Corps pride would keep it down.

But last fall there was cause for concern. Then, with

the advent of the new enlisted rank structure, there was started a practice that knocked out my smugness completely. Yems and yams was bad, but today, in the Marine Corps, we have something even worse. That skeleton of pride previously mentioned has a bone disease. The marrow that is the pride of the individual Marine has a rotten, cancerous growth eating away. It is spreading rapidly. It is diagnosed as the sick practice of referring to Marines by pay grade instead of by rank. It grows by leaps and bounds because it is "convenient."

Pick up any recent Marine Corps directive. You'll see predominant use of pay grade, with maybe a passing reference to rank. Listen to any conversation by Marines. You'll hear the ranks of Master Gunnery Sergeant and Sergeant Major lumped together under the expression, E-9.

Every day I read something like, "Commanding officers have promotional authority to E-4," instead of "Commanding officers have authority to promote to the rank of Corporal." Which tells you more? One spells out how much money the commanding officer thinks the man is worth. Nothing more. The other tells you the commanding officer can select his best junior leaders, that he can put two stripes on their sleeves, that he can give men authority, and that he expects them to use that authority.



What about the Marine himself? What does he think? Call him an E-4 and he'll think of where he fits in the pay line twice a month. Address him as "Corporal." Then he'll remember who he is and what he is. He'll recall he has some time in the Corps, that he has seen something of the world, that he has some useful experience, and that he has authority and responsibility to get his job done. These things make him proud to be a Corporal. He'll be proud of his record, his position, and his ability. There will be meaning to his rank. Which way do you want your noncommissioned officers to think?

Marines on commuted rations are now signing for meals taken in the mess hall as "E-6 Joe Doaks." So help me, I actually saw a guard roster listing "E-5 Billy Bilgewater" as Sergeant of the Guard. (The names have been changed to protect the innocent.) What does such administrative hocus-pocus do to a Marine's pride in his rank?

Remember the story of how a captain approached the then Col Lewis B. Puller in Korea. He wanted a commission for one of his squad leaders. "Chesty" asked him, "Why?"



Maj Utter served in the 1stMarDiv as an enlisted man from Jan '43 to Oct '45. As an officer, he served in the 2d and 3dMarDivs, since WWII in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, and Japan. Now assigned to the Training Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, he expects to graduate from the University of Maryland this month.

"Colonel," said the good skipper, "the man's better than a sergeant."

"Captain," was Col Puller's short reply, "There's nothing better than a sergeant."

"Now let's put the punch line in our 'convenient' vernacular.

"O-3, there's nothing better than an E-5!"

Sorta' gets you right here, doesn't it?

Then things reached an all time low. I picked up a recent GAZETTE, and read an article dealing with promotion policies. In horror, I saw pay grade used exclusively and rank almost completely ignored. Almost, but not quite. The GAZETTE, and the author, salvaged a little with the block of bold type at the bottom of the page. It said the author disliked referring to Staff NCOs by pay grade. "He considers use of rank titles more fitting. However, for this discussion, use of pay grade seems more convenient."

More convenient? Is it convenient to have Marines who think of themselves as ciphers on a pay scale? Have we avoided the pitfall of calling our troops "yem" only to insult them with a letter and a digit? Do you want your sergeant major to think of himself as the ranking enlisted man in the entire battalion, capable of taking command when the chips are down? Do those seven stripes and the star mean something to him? Does the title "Sergeant Major" tell a story? It does. It tells you that here is a *man*. One with around 20 years' service, a couple of wars under his belt, and a knowledge of all things military.

Or is it more convenient to have your top enlisted man think of himself as simply the highest paid man in the outfit, E-9?

That's where we're headed. Now what can we do to reverse the trend? Simple, but concerted effort is the answer. First: learn the enlisted rank structure of your Corps. It really is quite simple. Second: refer to all Marines, in speaking or in writing, by rank. Demand your subordinates and request your seniors to do the same. Third: make a protest. That's what this is.

Forty-two years ago a white haired Marine stood up in France. He shouted above the rattle of small arms fire, "Come on, you sons-a-bitches! Who wants to live forever?" Well, the Marines took Belleau Wood. I wonder if they would have, had Sergeant Major Dan Daley shouted, "Come on, all you yem from E-1 through E-7! Who wants to get paid forever?"

I, too, would respond more quickly to a reflection on my ancestry than to the meaningless nothing of "Yem, E-8." How about you?

USMC


REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

1st MARINE AIR WING

PART
ONE

DETERRENCE or REACTION

By Maj C. B. Malone, USMC



BGen L. B. Robertshaw
A/WC



BGen A. R. Kier
CG



Col C. J. Quilter
C/S




Col W. C. Humbird
G-1



Col W. A. Cloman
G-2




Col H. G. Hutchinson
G-3



Col O. V. Calhoun
G-4




Col T. J. Ahern
CO MWHG



Col N. J. Anderson
CO MAG-11



Col G. C. Axtell
CO MAG-12



Col E. F. Finn
CO MAG-16

THE SHATTERING CLAMOR OF AN alert phone breaks the mid-afternoon routine. Quickly the starter units energize the powerful F8Us, and the deafening whine is replaced by a deeper roar as the first Crusader cuts in its after-burner and leaps off the 3400-foot aluminum-clad runway. In less than two minutes after the phone rings, four F8Us have scrambled. We barely recover our hearing when another alert phone cuts loose. This one comes from the other side of the runway and is followed by frenzied activity. Pilots rush to their A4Ds, bombs and rockets already loaded. In brief minutes after the alert phone rings, the A4Ds are airborne, using their JATO to blast off the short strip.

New aircraft are towed onto the hotpads on either side of the runway, and other pilots are seated around the briefing tents, ready for a repeat performance if necessary.

The TACC (Tactical Air Control Center) passes the word the fighter intercept mission is returning. As the F8Us report over the portable UHF homer, the single Marine in the quad-radar gives them let-down instructions. They come into the 650-foot traffic pattern in pairs and are picked up by the same Marine on his GCA (Ground Controlled

Approach) radar. He vectors the first one into the groove and the pilot picks up the landing mirror. The portable tower operator clears him to land and the pilot maneuvers to catch the "meat-ball." Down the slope he comes and hits the 36-foot-wide strip of aluminum on the centerline.

Before he has rolled 2000 feet, he comes to a quick halt as his tailhook picks up the first pendant of the Mark 5 Moresst gear. At one-and-a-half minute intervals the other Crusaders follow the first.

This was BLUE STAR, and the SELF (Short Expeditionary Landing Field) concept in operation as part of the exercise which demonstrated the skill and readiness of the Seventh Fleet and its Fleet Marine Force elements.

United States policy requires readiness. If *Deterrence* fails, then *Reaction* must be certain and quick. It takes ready forces to maintain this posture. BLUE STAR and projects like SELF prove this force is ready—for *Deterrence* or *Reaction*. The deterrent posture maintained by the 1st MAW is aimed primarily towards preventing "brush-fire" war. If one does start, quick reaction can be taken to stop its spread.

BLUE STAR was a full scale amphibious exercise with the Commander, Seventh Fleet as the OSE (Officer Scheduling the Exercise). The Commander, PhibGruOne acted as the OCE (Officer Conducting the Exercise). The Landing Force was the 1st Marine Expedi-

tionary Force composed of the Marine Air/Ground Team of the 1st MAW and the 3d MarDiv. The landings were made on the southern and western shores of Taiwan. Naval, Air, and Marine Forces of the Government of the Republic of China participated.

BLUE STAR exercised the First Marine Aircraft Wing's capabilities in performing its missions. It required maximum effectiveness in the execution of air operations in support of the Seventh Fleet's Fleet Marine Forces.



To carry out the tasks required by its missions the First Wing has five organic Marine Aircraft Groups which furnish a balanced, self-sustaining air capability.

MAG-11 is the Fighter Group and is based at NAS, Atsugi, Japan. It recently spent five months at NAS, Cubi Point in the Philippines while its home station was undergoing a "face-lifting" (runway resurfacing). MAG-11 has a squadron of F8U Crusaders, two squadrons of F4D Skyrajs, and an air control squadron. The F8U is a supersonic fighter with an amazing rate of climb. Despite its speed and weight it still lands at 130-135 knots. The

F4D is a comparatively small, all-weather interceptor with many of the same capabilities.


In 1958, during the Taiwan Straits Crisis, MAG-11 fulfilled our secondary mission by providing additional CAP (Combat Air Patrol) for the Fleet. This outfit is prepared to serve as the CAP at anytime—with the best aircraft and weapons available in the world today.

MAG-12 is the Attack Group, based at MCAF, Iwakuni, Japan. It has two Squadrons of A4D Sky Hawks and a composite Reconnaissance Squadron. The Reconnaissance Squadron's F3D-2Qs are used for electronic reconnaissance and its F8Us are equipped for photographic reconnaissance. The A4D is a very small jet aircraft with a large capability. It is modified to carry a total of 8000 pounds of external stores.

MAG-16 is the Helicopter Group. Formerly based at Oppama, Japan, it has just completed a move to its new home at MCAF, Futema, Okinawa. This move places it in close proximity to the 3d Mar Div. The Group has two squadrons of HUSs and an observation squadron of OEs and HOKs. The HUSs are noted for their versatility in operating under difficult conditions.

Marine Wing Headquarters Group (MWHG) at MCAF, Iwakuni, while supporting the Wing Headquarters, also controls Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 2 and Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 4. MACS-8 is based at Atsugi to sup-





F8U of VM CJ-1 over Mt. Fuji, Japan

port MAG-11. MASS-2 furnishes the DASC (Direct Air Support Center) and the MASRTs (Marine Air Support Radar Teams) for round-the-clock precision radar control of all-weather air support for the Marine Air/Ground Team and is consequently on the move most of the time on Division/Wing exercises. It controls both helicopter and attack aircraft in support of the ground troops. MACS-4 controls friendly aircraft, tracks enemy aircraft, and directs the friendlies to the enemy.

Marine Wing Service Group (MWSG) 17 does the impossible for the wing. When no one else can do it, it is given to the Service Group. Its Marine Aircraft Repair Squadron (MARS) normally repairs aircraft. When the Wing looked for a way to launch heavily-loaded A4Ds from a short runway, MARS came up with a prototype JATO installation that immediately met with BUWEPS approval and the job was done in record time.

MWSG-17 has the additional task of providing the means to operate MCAF, Iwakuni, Japan. This Air Facility is home for Navy Fleet Air Wing Six and a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Flight Training Center. It is also the commercial airport for the area, including the City of Hiroshima, and the crossroads for three major airways. Consequently its Marine Air Traffic Control Unit (MATCU) 60 must comply with Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) rules and with Japanese Air Regulations. It operates a sea plane drome and ramp, a boat dock, an all-weather air station, and serves as a major weather station and as a major airways communications station. There are some unusual jobs for Marines as a result.

MWSG 17 also controls the Wing's transport squadron—VMR-253. That squadron has the R4Q workhorses

and the old reliable R5Ds. Its operations in support of the Wing, the 3dMarDiv and the Seventh Fleet carry them all over the Pacific. Plane loads vary from priority supplies and all-important mail to relief supplies for disaster areas. During the past year VMR-253 logged more than 13,000 hours in the air while flying 1,994,553 miles, hauling 30,000 passengers and 6,000 tons of cargo.

MWSG provides the means to operate another Air Facility at Futema, Okinawa—the home of MAG-16.

The co-ordinated teamwork of these five Marine Aircraft Groups is the 1stMAW, the aviation half of the Marine Air/Ground Team in the Far East. The other half is the 3dMarDiv. Under the operational control of the Seventh Fleet this Air/Ground team stands ready to move out on a moment's notice. Many factors contribute to this readiness.

The strategic location in the Far East coupled with friendly working relations among the free nations in this area make the Wing instantly available. Change to new-type tactical aircraft during the past year provides an up-to-date inventory of modern aircraft.

Marines love their families but serve 15 months without them in the Far East in order that complete and instant mobility is insured.

The fact that all personnel report to this command combat-trained maintains readiness and combat effectiveness, and further, tactical squadrons join as integral, trained units. Each squadron comes from the 2d or 3d MAW and remains together throughout its stay with the First Wing. This allows the command to pursue combat readiness on an advanced basis.

Exercises and maneuvers with units of the 3dMarDiv are con-

tinuous. This constant teamwork results in a powerful and tangible increase in readiness. The payoff becomes apparent in an operation such as BLUE STAR. On D + 3 an airfield was in operation on uncovered territory close behind the MLR and every single piece of necessary equipment came over the beach in assault shipping. This takes efficient teamwork and is substantial evidence of readiness.

Not all the time is spent in preparing for amphibious operations or for rapid movement to any trouble spot where US forces may be ordered. In furtherance of the President's People to People programs, nearly every unit has a voluntary community project—an orphanage or a school. In addition the command stands ready to assist communities when disaster strikes. Last August the helicopters of HMR-216 were diverted from a maneuver at sea to Taiwan to assist in flood relief. In a ten-day period they evacuated almost a thousand people by air and flew in more than a million and a half pounds of clothing and food for the homeless. Last December the transports of VMR-253 flew in over 50,000 pounds of food, clothing, and toys to the victims of Typhoon Vera at Nagoya, Japan. The transports and helicopters of this command make a winning combination over distance and time—in peace as well as war.

The quality of an amphibious force in readiness is not hard to estimate. The facts of training, equipment, mobility, and the improvements in combat techniques are there for all to see. Together, the Navy-Marine Air-Ground-Surface team in the Western Pacific is a tremendous example of seapower as a force for peace—a powerful deterrent to aggression and immediately ready to react if deterrence fails. The 1stMAW is proud to be a part of that team.

The best way I know to sum up the readiness of the Wing is to quote its former CG, MajGen R. C. Mangrum, who said, "These are professionals. In more than thirty years' service I have not seen any pilots or men as well trained and qualified to do the job that we must be prepared to do."

USMC

REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

PART TWO

PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE READINESS

By Maj C. B. Malone, USMC

ALL SQUADRONS OF THE FIRST MARINE AIR WING ARE COMBAT READY BEFORE they come to the First Wing. Both the Second and Third Wings furnish trained replacement **squadrons** for this command. Although this detracts but little from the readiness of these Wings, it enables the First Wing to be fully ready to fight at all times.

The Wing thus is able to concentrate on perfecting combat techniques and improving new concepts. During the past year many areas and ideas came up for review. They started off as staff studies or conferences and went on into small exercises and maneuvers. The ones that passed the preliminaries were written into the scenario for BLUE STAR. Those that stood up under these rigorous combat requirements are the subject of this article.

Helicopter Operations

Everybody is concerned with the vulnerability of helicopters in the "iron bomb" environment. We already know a path can easily be blasted for them with the use of atomic weapons; they can evade defended areas; they can operate in low visibility or darkness. However, if these advantages are missing; if assault troops *must* be carried in helicopters through areas of enemy fire, then the choppers *must* be defended if the troops are to reach the objective area.

Marine attack aircraft are used to defend the helicopters from ground fire. The control and communications procedures for their employment were modified to allow instantaneous reaction to observed enemy fire. When the pilots check into the TACC (Tactical Air Control Center) to start their mission, TACC turns them over to the HDC (Helicopter Direction Center). The HDC assigns them to helicopter wave flight leaders. The flight leaders control the aircraft which stay above them on-call during the flight. The flight leaders also have continuous radio contact with the TAC(A)

(Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne)). He has radio communication with the FSCC (Fire Support Control Center) and the CIC (Combat Information Center). He furnishes the helicopters with all perti-



nent information as it becomes available.

Additional techniques in vertical envelopment have been exploited to make for a still more potent combat force.

One improvement in this command is the incorporation of the LZCP (Landing Zone Control Party) into the Pathfinder Team. The team is assigned to the helicopter squadron it is supporting. This allows better indoctrination, better control and coordination, and eliminates duplication.

Another improvement is the assignment of color codes to the Landing Sites. This facilitates the marking of sites and furnishes better control of helicopters within the Landing Zones.

During BLUE STAR the HBAF (Helicopter-Borne Assault Force) formed a TACLOG (Tactical Logistics Party). The TACLOG advised the assistant Central Control Officer at the HDC on board the LPH (Helicopter Carrier). It allowed the use of "on-call" loads. In other words, the assault troops are able to call for what they need and get it when they need it.

These improvements are only mentioned here as areas in which the Wing has been working during the past year. They are promulgated in more formal reports to appropriate agencies.

Close Air Support


One of the important functions of Marine Aviation is the close air support given to the ground forces. In the A4D (Douglas Sky Hawk) we have a delivery vehicle that is able to live in the environment of modern warfare. It is a fast, high flying aircraft that can carry tremendous loads and varieties of ordnance. It carries a larger load further than the old attack aircraft and its speed enables it to cycle within a given radius more frequently.

With new aircraft, the Wing is developing better techniques to improve close air support still further. The TACC is now a monitor station instead of a controlling agency. Its controllers can still cancel or modify a called strike if other considerations so dictate. The DASC (Direct Air Support Center) is the controlling agency. It has a direct radio relay line to the alert tent on the aircraft line to scramble pilots on attack missions. The pilots, sitting at ease in the alert tent, are already briefed on the current combat situation, weather, intelligence and other matters and await the word to

scramble. Ready aircraft sit on the hot-pad with their guns and racks loaded. Various types of ordnance are nearby in the ready depot with each lot assigned a munitions code.

When the alert phone rings, the pilots scramble to their aircraft. The first word passed is the munitions code. The ordnance crew wheels out the appropriate lot and hangs it on the plane, while the duty officer takes down the necessary information on a prepared form. As soon as he hands this to the flight leader, the aircraft take off. The whole procedure takes less than ten minutes.

Although the above procedure appears to be a better solution to close air support requirements, the A4D can still be used on airborne alert if the tactical situation requires it. If the situation demands, they can stay in the air indefinitely, for the buddy or tanker system of air-to-air refueling is a routine affair. If an airborne alert is needed because of a rapidly changing combat picture, we can pay the price of having the planes mill around upstairs awaiting a call for instantaneous



reaction. However, planes, pilots and fuel are saved by the hot pad alert system, provided they are not too far from the targets.

The time required for the close air support mission is computed by adding ten minutes to the time necessary to fly the distance to the target. This distance becomes very important. When the local ground commander calls for close air support, he wants it right now. The ordnance should be delivered on target within 30 minutes of the time it is initially requested. The Marine Corps has long foreseen the need of getting the planes closer to the battle lines and most of the time modern airfields are not where they are needed. From this need the SATS concept was evolved.

Short Airfield for Tactical Support

The advent of high performance aircraft requires longer, more expensive runways. These take time—lots of it—to build. In the modern concept of fluid warfare the situation will not permit such complex airfield construction in the battle area.

To overcome this obstacle and to furnish airfields for tactical support, CMC assigned the SATS concept to the Landing Force Development

Center (LFDC) with the following general requirements:

(1) The airfield must be small, quickly constructed, and ready for use within three to five days after D-Day.

(2) It must be capable of handling a squadron of tactical aircraft under sustained all-weather operations for at least 30 days.

(3) All the components must be helicopter transportable.

The LFDC at Quantico began to

come up with the various components. It developed or adapted the portable tower, the one-man quadraradar used for approach control and GCA, the mobile arresting gear (Morest), the field lighting system, the portable mirror landing system, and the runway surface itself. These components were field tested at various times and places. The runway matting is aluminum, named M9M2, and was tested extensively at MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina.

Further developmental work is being carried out to see how much shorter the landing strip can be made. This requires a stronger arresting unit and a launching catapult.

To the 1stMAW, it appeared that the essential elements of SATS were ready for more than field testing. Its available components were provided to the Wing for the purpose of establishing operational methods and techniques in their integrated use and for actual expeditionary use when required. Up to this time SATS was still a concept.



7th Engineers laying aluminum mats for SELF at Hung Chun airfield.

In order not to confuse this operational use of the components with the SATS concept as a system, the Wing named its project the SELF (Short Expeditionary Landing Field). The CG ordered MAGs 11 and 12 to conduct tests to find out how long and wide the runway would have to be for successful operations. Since modern aircraft require more runway to land than they do to take off, the landing distance would be the deciding criteria. The MK5 Mores gear is acceptable for stopping the aircraft provided the aircraft weight and speed combined as a force are within its stopping capabilities.

The arresting gear has to be placed close to the landing and of the runway to allow the aircraft to bolter (fly-off) in the event it misses the engagement with the arresting wires. At the same time it has to be placed far enough down the runway to allow the heavier, faster aircraft time to slow down prior to engagement.

The two Groups conducted exhaustive tests and when their results were correlated it was found that a strip 36-foot x 4000-foot, with the arresting gear in the middle, would be operationally feasible for all types. There are, literally, thousands of airfields in the world which are about 4000 feet long, and strongly enough ballasted to handle the job without extensive basic engineering.

The F8U and F4D are heavy and fast. They touch down at the end of the matting and roll into the gear in order to slow down prior to picking up the engagement wires. Although the 36-foot width of the strip leaves no margin for error, moderate crosswinds are manageable because of the plane's weight. A white stripe is painted down the center to guide the pilots in the approach. Afterburners furnish plenty of power for take-off on the short strip even under "no-wind" conditions and with high temperatures.



F4D leaves SELF, Heng Chun, Taiwan, during BLUE STAR.

The A4D presents a different problem. It is light for a jet and can land relatively slowly. These characteristics make it much more difficult to handle in a cross-wind landing, particularly on a narrow runway. The pilot therefore flies the A4D into the Mores gear wires exactly as on an aircraft carrier. If he catches a wire, he cuts off the power; otherwise he adds power and bolters to try again.

Since the A4D does not have an afterburner, some means had to be found to enable it to get off the short runway with a heavy combat load. MWSG-17 furnished a prototype installation for JATO (Jet Assist Take Off) which met with immediate approval of BuWeps. With the assistance of MAG-12's maintenance squadron, MWSG-17 fitted all the A4D's with JATO racks. This allows the A4Ds to carry full combat loads off the SELF. If extended operations are contemplated prior to development of the more practical field catapults, JATO would not be used except for emergency launches. The A4D can get off the short strip with respectable armament loads and, if desirable, can be launched with full loads. In this case the planes would not have full fuel loads aboard but would be air refueled.

SELF was written into the air plan for BLUE STAR. "C" Co, 7th Fwd Bn

of the 3dMarDiv was assigned the job of getting the SELF in operation. It brought the equipment, components, and matting across the beaches, trucked it to the site and worked around the clock laying matting and leveling the overruns.

An old airfield at Heng Chun, Taiwan was the first one to be uncovered by the landing force. It was built during WWII by the Japanese as a base for its Zero fighters. The surface had badly deteriorated but the base was solid. The SELF matting was offloaded over the beaches from assault shipping and trucked to Heng Chun. By the afternoon of D + 2 it was capable of emergency operations and beginning D + 3 it was operational with all equipment in place.

That morning A4Ds, F4Ds, and F8Us flew into the site, refueled, and carried out their missions. The place was bustling with various VIPs. The guest of honor was the Generalissimo, President of the Republic of China.

This first operational use was possible because of years of developmental work. Up to this time, the SATS had been a concept. The 1st MAW took the parts that were available and used them to enhance its readiness posture today.

The old bugaboo of logistics has raised the inevitable question. The added requirements for the shore parties and engineers are heavy. It is the price we must pay to operate in the forward battle areas where no other aircraft can be positioned. This is no longer a concept for use in the future. Now we have demonstrated that we can launch or land a jet plane every 45 seconds in the battle area.

USMC



VITALIZING the VTU



By BGen William T. Fairbourn, USMC
Director, Marine Corps Reserve

THE VOLUNTEER TRAINING UNIT PROGRAM OF THE Marine Corps Reserve has long been a mystery to the average Marine serving with the Regular Establishment. Until he has served a tour of independent duty with either the personnel procurement or Reserve administration agencies of the Corps, the term "VTU" is an enigma.

As a non-drill pay organization, operating until recently with a minimum of assistance, the VTU has been considered by some as the green pasture for the older Marine warhorse. While there may have been some reason for this feeling previously, such is not the case today. The VTU program is rapidly becoming a most effective training vehicle to keep up the mobilization readiness of the Marine Corps Reserve.

The mission of the VTU program is to reinforce the mobilization capabilities of the Organized (Drill-Pay) Marine Corps Reserve. All efforts are therefore directed at the maintenance, and increase, of the military proficiency of the Class III reservist.

Within the past twelve months, the VTU program has been subjected to a detailed re-examination of its value to the mobilization requirements of the Marine Corps. As a result of this scrutiny, the program has undergone several major changes. The aim is to enhance the training efforts of the unit as well as increase the mobilization potential of the individual unit member.

The major changes require that unit members, with a few selected exceptions, be Ready Reservists, subject

to call by the President in time of national emergency. By doubling the number of annual meetings required of these non-drill pay units to twenty-four, and by requiring that at least 50 per cent of all unit training normally be conducted from materials extracted from current Marine Corps Schools resident-school curricula, a realistic means of acquiring worthwhile unit training has been established. During Fiscal Year 1960, the Reserve Liaison and Training Section of the Marine Corps Educational Center at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, in response to requests from the field, will provide over 10,000 hours of instructional material to our 283 ground and aviation Volunteer Training Units. Priority of assignment to the limited number of 15-day formal school billets is extended to VTU members.

With the firm basis for unit and individual training thus established, attention is now directed to the overall officer rank distribution of the entire VTU program. Since mobilization requirements are levied by rank and MOS, this structure is of utmost importance if the VTU is to fulfill its mission.

At the present time, 56 per cent of all VTU (Ground) members are of field grade. The major and lieutenant colonel ranks alone considerably outnumber the company grade officer members. During the next five years, as an increasing number of field grade VTU officers achieve 20 years of satisfactory Federal Service, or pass to Standby Reserve status through being overage in grade, the VTU program may very well lose its present momentum.

In view of current mobilization plans, in which the VTU program plays a major part, this vitality must be maintained. The primary VTU problem facing the Marine Reserve today, then, is the attraction into the VTU program of the younger Reserve officer. This is far from a simple problem, and requires an all-out, effective effort at informing and motivating those younger officers.

Having completed his required period of active duty, this officer is primarily concerned with getting his family established, and becoming settled in his civilian occupation. If he wants service with the Reserve, his financial situation may lead him first to the local Organized Reserve (drill-pay) unit. In view of the officer manning levels currently imposed upon Organized ground units, this avenue of service with the local Reserve may well be temporarily closed to him.

There are two vital characteristics of the newly released company grade officer which emerge at this point, and which, of themselves, may guide him to his local Volunteer Training Unit. These are:

a) His innate feeling of kinship for the Corps. His original motivation for a commission in the world's finest fighting force has probably not diminished. He will always consider himself a Marine, and will consider carefully any action, such as Reserve inactivity, which might lead to discharge from the Reserve and loss of his commission.

b) With the ever present possibility of receiving advance mobilization orders, he will naturally desire to retain his acquired military proficiency, preferably through one of the Reserve media available locally. If no vacancy exists in the local drill-pay unit, the VTU

CAMP CLOUDBURST

By J. A. Martin

WHAT DO YOU DO WITH YOUR WINTER gear when summer rolls around? Store it for use the following year? Up at the Marine Corps Cold Weather Training Center near Bridgeport, California, a similar problem is solved, not by mothballing but by making idle facilities available for family summer vacation use. They call the operation Camp Cloudburst.

Established in 1952, the CWTC, by the very nature of its assigned mission, is located in rugged country. Steep rocky mountains, perilous cliffs, deep snows, and below zero temperatures are *musts* for winter training maneuvers. The site selected, on Forest Service land high in the Sierra Nevada range, fills the bill in every respect. And great is the respect for the Center, of all who have completed the training program.

However each year the arrival of summer transforms the same torturous terrain into a beautiful mountain playground. Rushing trout filled streams, towering conifers, and miles and miles of scenic splendor open up during the short vacation season. It's just the type of territory a lot of folks consider a camping paradise.

Out of necessity, the Cold Weather Indoctrination phase of the training program must shut down. Although *Mountain Leadership* and *Evasion, Escape and Survival* training continues, a segment of the training facilities are not needed. Yet they are not idle by any means. By making them available for family use, the Center has instituted one of the most unusual recreational facilities in the Corps.

It all started in 1955 when, after careful consideration, the plan for



Checking in a new arrival

a greater use of the training facilities was formulated by Training Center personnel. The proposal was approved by the CG, MCB, Camp Pendleton, California, under whose jurisdiction the Center operates, and a three acre area on the banks of

the West Walker River was designated as a camping area.

Ten surplus pyramidal tents were allocated for the project. Fire pits were installed, heads erected, and the "Open for Business" sign hung out. The idea proved an instant success and because of the popularity a "reservations only" policy soon became necessary.

Today the number of tent sites has been increased to 20. Each shows the individuality and improvements so typical of camper ingenuity. Leave your area in better condition than you found it is an unwritten code.

Reservations are still a must and space allocations are on a first come—first served basis regardless of rate or rank. While a large portion of those who use the area come from Camp Pendleton, El Toro and Barstow, the camp is open to members of all branches of the armed forces.

Supervised by Training Center Special Services personnel who keep a watchful eye over things in addition to their regular duties, Camp Cloudburst is an excellent example of Marine Corps know-how and understanding. This campground in the clouds offers a chance for the whole family to vacation together, an opportunity for mom and the kids to experience just a touch of bivouac life, and is a great builder of morale. Thus, through a greater use of existing facilities and at no extra cost to the Corps, camping at Cloudburst is becoming another Marine Corps family tradition.

is the next logical choice.

The future of the VTU program, dependent as it is on the recruitment and subsequent activity of the company grade officer, is the concern of all echelons of command. At the direction of the Commandant, plans are being formulated within both the Division of Reserve, and the Reserve and Recruitment Districts, to increase the number of junior officers within the program. Implementation of a long-range, carefully coordinated recruitment program will aid this effort. To supplement our recruitment endeavors, a staff study outlining a steadily progressive training program within a proposed Reserve officer career pattern, is presently being staffed throughout the VTU program.

It is at the unit level, however, where all efforts culminate and where the success or failure of the enrollment work will be determined. Local efforts based on

the retirement benefits to be accrued at some distant date are of no interest to the 25-year-old first lieutenant fresh from the "best platoon in the FMF." The younger officer will understandably steer clear of any organization which appears dedicated solely to this attainment.

The training efforts of the local VTU must be vital, current, and professionally prepared and presented. Training must make every member, down to the most recently joined lieutenant or captain, proud of his unit and its overall readiness. Unit commanders incapable of initiating or conducting this training, must and will be removed.

This is the challenge facing the VTU program today. From close, personal observation of the demonstrated capabilities of those units, I am confident the challenge will be accepted and mastered.

USMC



ARCHIBALD HENDERSON AN ERA

Extracted from Chapter Four of
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Marine Corps*, by LtCol P. N. Pierce
and the late LtCol F. O. Hough.
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ON OCTOBER 17, 1820, MAJOR ARCHIBALD HENDERSON was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and became the fifth Commandant of the Marine Corps at the age of 37.

Under the blunt, outspoken Henderson the Marine Corps underwent some profound changes. The long span of years of his command were eventful ones, and through a series of dramatic events which commanded wide attention, the Corps established a high reputation with the people of the nation. The man who was to become known as "the grand old man of the Marine Corps" was largely responsible.

Morale was low in the Armed Forces of the 1820s. As usual after each war, the military had been shunted aside. The War of 1812 was rapidly passing into the limbo of forgotten things. It had been an unpopular war to begin with, as far as Americans were concerned. The war-torn era of Napoleon had ended at Waterloo, and the great powers of Russia, England, Austria and Prussia had combined in the Quadruple Alliance to "preserve the tranquillity of Europe" against a revival of revolution. The danger of being drawn into a European war appeared very remote. The Congress of the United States was much too occupied with internal expansion to pay attention to the relatively few people it hired for the defense of the nation. The strength of the Marine Corps stood at 49 officers and 865 enlisted men.

Immediately upon assuming command, Henderson, who had evidently given the matter considerable thought, set about improving the morale and efficiency of his Corps. He began by personally inspecting every shore station which included Marines and many of the ship's detachments. He was a stickler for detail, and

continually gave evidence of knowing thoroughly the job of everyone of his Marines. He insisted on the strictest economy in the expenditure of funds, and personally handled the majority of the Corp's legal affairs. Although he had the reputation of being a martinet, he went to great lengths to insure that his officers and men were properly accorded their every right.

In the matter of training he was almost a fanatic. He had long realized that the key to the efficiency of any fighting organization lay in two inseparable and basic fundamentals—training and spirit. He ordered all the newly commissioned officers to duty at Marine Corps Headquarters, in order to personally supervise their indoctrination and training. During most of his tour of duty, the Army was unable to absorb all of the graduates of West Point. Henderson obtained as many of these officers as possible for the Marine Corps. To assist in the training of the new officers, and to act as a nucleus for a landing force, he kept a skeletonized battalion at Headquarters. This battalion was thoroughly trained in the latest developments of military weapons and tactics.

Henderson demanded, and received, the strict subordination of all his officers. He took no nonsense from anyone, including his superiors in the US Navy. On one occasion, when the Navy Department countermanded his orders to a Marine Captain to go to sea, Henderson went directly to the President. He respectfully, and probably vigorously, explained that it was imperative that his orders be carried out in order to vindicate his position and authority. Four days later the captain in question reported for sea duty, and the Secretary of the Navy reported to the President for what might have been described as a unilateral conversation.

The agencies for maintaining law and order in the United States during the first half of the Nineteenth Century were few and far between. Those which did exist were poorly organized, and even more poorly trained. During this era the Marines were often called upon to lend a hand in local disturbances.

In the great Boston fire of 1824 they performed both rescue work and police functions in helping to stamp out the wave of pilfering and looting which followed the holocaust.

A short time later, Maj Robert D. Wainwright earned prominent mention in the classic school books of the era, *McGuffey's Readers*. And, for the next 75 years, the nation's school children received a lesson dealing with the heroic conduct of Marines.

The scene of the action was the Massachusetts State Prison at Boston. Having become thoroughly dissatisfied with their lot in life, some 283 prisoners staged a riot which rapidly got beyond control of the prison authorities. With the situation out of hand, the warden sent a frantic call for help to the Boston Marine Barracks.

Maj Wainwright, with a detachment of 30 Marines, soon arrived at the prison area. Making a hasty estimate of what was apparently a bad situation, Wainwright came up with a simple solution. Hastily forming a single rank facing the prisoners, he ordered his Marines to fire a warning volley into the air. The shots had the desired effect and the clamor subsided. As his Marines reloaded their muskets, the major addressed the rebellious prisoners, "These men are United States Marines," he said. "They follow my orders to the letter."

Turning to the Marines, Wainwright consulted his watch, and then issued his orders in a loud, parade ground voice, "Exactly three minutes from now I shall raise my hand over my head," he bellowed. "When I drop my hand you will commence firing. You will continue to fire until you have killed every prisoner who has not returned to his cell."

For three long minutes not a word was spoken. The only sound was the shuffle of the inmates' feet as they dejectedly returned to their cells.

With the advent of the 1830s the traditional isolationist policy of America underwent an abrupt change. It had become apparent to the United States that many areas of commercial advantage lay beyond its own boundaries. This change in policy had a pronounced effect on the functions performed by Marines. As a result of it, the Marines, under the energetic leadership of their fifth Commandant, ranged far and wide to protect the interests of their country.

Late in 1831 the natives of Sumatra seized and robbed an American merchantman in the harbor of Quallah Battoo. This act of piracy resulted in the murder of several members of the crew. In retaliation the United States sent the frigate *Potomac*, especially outfitted for the job, on a punitive expedition against the Sumatran pirates. Arriving in February 1832, the *Potomac* put a landing force of over 250 Marines and sailors ashore. In two days of bloody warfare, the force captured four pirate forts and reduced the town of Quallah Battoo to a heap of smouldering ruins.

At the same time, on the other side of the Southern

Hemisphere, Marines were having some difficulties in South America. Argentina was attempting to establish claim over the Falkland Islands. In pursuit of this claim, that country looked with extreme disfavor on American vessels conducting trade with the Islands. In an effort to discourage this practice, the Argentinians proceeded to impound three American schooners and jail their crews. Marines from the sloop *Lexington*



Gil Walker

United States Marines of General Henderson's era.

waded ashore and through dint of considerable small arms fire, succeeded in impressing the Argentine officials that the United States did not look kindly upon such treatment of its ships and citizens.

But, as far as the Marine Corps was concerned, the most far-reaching effect of the new anti-isolation policy of the United States was reflected in the Act of 1834. Passed by Congress on June 30, the legislation authorized a substantial increase in the strength of the Marine Corps. It also settled the question of its control, by placing it in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy. In addition, it authorized the President to order the Marines into whatever action his judgment dictated, including duty with the Army. Within the year the President was to make good use of his newly granted powers.

In the Everglades of Florida a bad situation of long standing was rapidly coming to a head.

Over a period of many years runaway Negro slaves had found refuge with the Seminole Indians and many slaves and members of the tribe had intermarried. The southern planters, aware of this refuge for their escaped slaves, had made repeated petitions to the Crown of

Spain, without avail. Unhappy with the refusal of Charles IV to take the necessary steps to return their slaves, the southern land owners began to petition their own government for the annexation of Florida. In 1819 a portion of Florida was purchased from Spain for \$5,000,000. Immediately the slave owners renewed their demands to the government that their slaves be returned. Inasmuch as some 75 years had passed since their ancestors had taken refuge in Florida, it was a little difficult for the Seminoles to understand the claims of the planters. As a result, such demands met with a particularly unenthusiastic response by the Seminoles.

Under the political pressure eventually brought to bear by the slave owners, the Administration completed a treaty with the Indians, under which the government would take the tribe under its protection and assign the Indians to reservations. Perhaps things might have worked out if certain enterprising souls hadn't become aware of the lucrative possibilities in the profession of slave catching. The "slave hunters," in direct violation of the terms of the treaty, entered Florida in organized bands to catch runaway slaves who brought high prices on the slave markets. There is no evidence to indicate that the government made any attempts to stop this practice, although the Indians continually demanded redress.

In 1828 the proposal was made to the Seminoles to move to a reservation in the area now occupied by the state of Arkansas. Tribal chiefs made a reconnaissance of the area and returned with the report that "snow covers the ground, and frosts chill the bodies of men." Their objections notwithstanding, the Seminoles were ordered to emigrate West. At which point, things got rapidly out of hand.

Determined to force the emigration, the government sent troops into Florida. Just as determined to remain where they were, the Seminoles made preparations for war. In December 1835 the hostilities began in earnest, and in a short time the horrors of the Seminole War were being chronicled throughout the land.

BGen D. L. Clinch, who was commanding the US troops in Florida, was charged with the responsibility of the removal of the Indians. The end of the year found the well-armed Indians, under the leadership of a colorful half-breed named Osceola, assembled in the almost inaccessible swamps of the Withlacoochee River.

Clinch, whose immediate problem was to protect the white settlers, decided to attack the Indians. Since his own force, which occupied Fort King near the present town of Ocala, was too small for the job, he sent to Fort Brooke on Tampa Bay for reinforcements.

The reinforcements, numbering 110 and under the command of a Maj Dade, answered the call of Gen Clinch with colors flying and bugles blaring across the swamps. With the possible exception of Custer's debacle at Big Horn, the fate of this force is without parallel in the history of Indian warfare.

Shortly after Dade's force crossed the Withlacoochee, they were met with an ambush so effective that only two survivors remained to crawl through the wire grass to safety. One was Pvt Clark of the 2d Artillery who, although badly wounded, is reputed to have crawled to Fort Brooke, a distance of 60 miles. The other was

Louis Pacheo, a Negro slave who acted as guide for the force. There is reason to suspect that the escape of Pacheo from the ambush was something more than blind luck. Be that as it may the only man to survive without a scratch lived to the venerable old age of 95 without being taken to task for his treachery, if such it was.

On the same day as the Dade Massacre, Osceola and a small band invaded a dinner party given by Gen Wiley Thompson, who had been sent from Washington to oversee removal of the Indians, and murdered the General and his five guests. If there had been any doubts about the earnestness of the war in Florida, the Dade Massacre and the murder of Gen Thompson provided the clinching argument.

By the spring of 1836 the Army in central Florida found themselves in difficulty. Some 1,000 soldiers were trying to round up and deport over 3,000 Indians. The State militias, which had originally augmented the Army of the South, soon had their stomachs full of poor food, swamp fever and general discomfort. And, with the coming of spring, they left Florida for healthier climes.

To add to the general misery, the Creek Indians of southern Alabama and Georgia decided to go on the warpath. The results of this uprising were severe enough to cause the Army to shift its main effort from the Seminole country to the area occupied by the Creeks.

At this juncture Archibald Henderson volunteered the services of a regiment of Marines for duty with the Army. The offer was promptly accepted. On May 23, 1836, President Jackson, under the recently enacted law, ordered all available Marines to report to the Army. Henderson, never one to sit on the sidelines, insisted on leading the regiment personally. By taking practically all officers, reducing shore detachments to sergeant's guard, and leaving behind only those who were unfit for duty in the field, Henderson was able to mobilize more than half the total strength of the Corps.

There is a tale, often related by Marines, that Col Henderson closed Marine Corps Headquarters during this period. It is said that he locked the door to his office, placed the key under a mat, and tacked a neatly lettered sign to the door which read:

Have gone to Florida to fight Indians.
Will be back when the war is over.

A. HENDERSON
Col. Commandant

More reliable accounts indicate that the Commandant left the Headquarters in charge of LtCol Wainwright, with the Band to provide the guard. Among those deemed unfit for duty in the field was one Sgt Triguët, whom Henderson commended to Wainwright in a letter of instruction which began: "Sergeant Triguët is left to assist in attending to the duties at Headquarters. He is a respectable old man, and has no other failing than that which but too often attends an old soldier. . . ."

Henderson, with a force of 38 officers and 424 enlisted men, reported to Gen Winfield Scott at Columbus, Georgia. Since the Commandant was under direct orders of the Secretary of War, he technically became

an Army officer and was placed in command of a brigade composed of Marines, Army Infantry and Artillery, and friendly Creeks.

Presaging the modern Marine battle garb of dungarees, the troops wore white fatigues, rather than the green and white uniforms of the period. Armed mostly with muskets, they also carried some of the new-fangled Colt rifles which had a disconcerting tendency to explode spontaneously when carried loaded for any length of time in the hot sun.

Both the Marine commander and Gen Scott took an optimistic view of the final outcome of the campaign. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Henderson wrote: "It is now expected that the Campaign will be closed in the course of ten days or two weeks. . . ." On the same day Gen Scott went on record to the effect, "war against the hostile Creeks is supposed to be virtually over." One may well speculate as to the thoughts of Gen Scott a month later when he was recalled to Washington for an investigation of his conduct of the war against the Creeks and Seminoles. After a long, drawn-out investigation, Scott was exonerated and restored to his command.



Osceola, Chief of Seminoles

The end of summer brought with it the termination of the Creek Campaign. The Creeks were removed to a reservation in what is now the state of Oklahoma, and the Army of the South again turned its attention to the problem of the Seminoles in Florida.

On June 24 a battalion of Marines under LtCol W. H. Freeman reached Milledgeville, Georgia, and moved on into Florida. In October Freeman's battalion was consolidated with the one Henderson had been leading into a six-company regiment and moved to Apalachicola, to garrison Fort Brooke. The Marines were augmented by a regiment of Creek Indians, some 750 strong, who had been mustered and were paid as militia. The regiment was officered mainly by Marines, and wore white turbans to distinguish them from the enemy during battle. The Seminoles were rather unhappy about being pursued by their blood relatives, and showed their dislike by scalping all Creeks who fell into their hands.

On November 21 the Creeks, under the command of 1stLt Andrew H. Ross, fought an advance guard action at Wahoo Swamp. From Wahoo a four-pronged advance, two columns of Army troops and two of Marines, pushed the Seminoles back to the Hatchee-Lustee River. Six days later the main body of Indians was located in the area of the Great Cypress Swamp, and was promptly attacked. The attackers managed to capture the horses of the enemy and 25 prisoners, most of whom were women and children. The braves slipped back into the swamp. Henderson left a detachment to guard the prisoners and horses, while the regiment pressed on after the warriors who had taken up positions on the opposite bank of the Hatchee-Lustee. The troops extended along the river bank and took up a cross fire, in an effort to dislodge the enemy. As soon as the Indians' fire slackened, the troops crossed the river by swimming and by means of logs. According to Henderson's report, ". . . we pursued the enemy as rapidly as the deep swamp and their mode of warfare permitted."

The chase continued until nightfall when Henderson was forced to withdraw his troops from the dense undergrowth. The result of the day's operations was the capture of the Indian women and children, already mentioned, 23 Negroes, a few horses and some clothes and blankets. The battle report states that one Indian and two Negroes were seen dead by the troops.

As a result of his routing of the Indian forces Henderson was brevetted a brigadier general and several Marines were promoted for "gallantry." Four days later, Abraham, a Seminole Chief, appeared at Henderson's camp under a flag of truce. This marked the beginning of several days of negotiations between Maj Gen T. H. Jesup, to whom Gen Scott had relinquished command upon being recalled to Washington, and the Indian leaders at Fort Dade. These meetings finally resulted in an agreement by the chiefs to assemble their people for transportation to their new reservation. The peace treaty was formally signed on March 6. Jesup, believing the war to be over, began to discharge his volunteers.

On May 22, 1837, Henderson received orders to proceed to Washington. Taking with him all Marines ex-

cept two companies, which totalled 189 officers and men, Henderson left Florida the next day.

On the night of June 2, Micanopy, grand chief of the Seminoles, and several of his lesser chiefs who had encamped with their followers near Tampa Bay, the port of embarkation, were abducted and taken to the interior. The next day a report was received from the troops south of Hillsboro that the Seminoles encamped in that vicinity had disappeared. These two incidents were the signal of the renewal of hostilities. Gen Jesup reported, "This campaign, so far as relates to the Indian emigration, has entirely failed," and requested to be "immediately relieved from the command of the Army." The Seminole War was far from over.

For the next five years Archibald Henderson vainly tried to get the remaining Marines recalled from Florida. His appeals were met with refusal by the Secretary of War, who felt that the need for Marines in Florida was more pressing than the need for their return.

Jesup was finally relieved and realized what had been his burning desire since the beginning of the campaign—to join his family and spend the rest of his life on his farm. He was replaced by Col Zachary Taylor, who was soon promoted to the rank of brigadier general.

The campaign wore on and the possibility of success appeared more remote with each passing day. Osceola, who had been arrested while conferring with Gen Jesup, died in prison at Fort Moultrie in October 1837. The next year some 4,000 Seminoles made the move to Oklahoma, though many of them slipped away from the New Orleans concentration camps and returned to the Everglades.

The two remaining companies of Marines put in four more years of duty along the coast and around the keys of Florida with the Mosquito Fleet. From June 1838 to the summer of 1842, this array of half a dozen small vessels, two barges and 140 canoes was manned by 68 officers and 600 men. The Marines of the fleet numbered about 130, and for the first two years of operation were commanded by 1stLt George H. Terrett who, seven years later, was to lead the way into Mexico City.

The object of the Mosquito Fleet was twofold, to intercept communications between the Indians and small boats operating off the Florida coast, and to conduct amphibious sorties into the interior of the Everglades. The fleet operated successfully throughout the remainder of the campaign, and the Indians came to have great respect for the "sailor boats" as they called them.

In the summer of 1842 the Seminole War gradually waned, without formal cessation of hostilities and with neither side clearly victorious. The Marines returned north in July, well pleased to be relieved of what had been six long years of extremely dreary duty. In the final accounting, 61 Marines had given their lives in the Seminole Campaign. Over half of them had died from disease, and one unfortunate soul had departed the scene, dispatched by a friendly musket ball—"discharged by accident." In analyzing the success of the campaign, one need only reflect upon the fact that the Seminoles still occupy the Everglades of Florida.

With the Seminole War a matter for the record books, Henderson again turned his attention to strengthening and developing the Corps. His efforts



The arrest of Osceola, who later died in prison.

were aimed at keeping the Marines in a state of readiness for any emergency, domestic or foreign. The remainder of his career was distinguished by such important events as the Mexican War and Perry's Expedition to Japan. Under his direction Marines virtually covered the globe. To protect Americans and their commerce with China, they stormed the forts of Canton during the great Taiping Rebellion. In the South Seas they splashed ashore to bring the rampaging Fiji Islanders to heel. In the jungles of Central America they made their first contact with the Republic of Nicaragua, which was to see the repeated return of Marines over the next three-quarters of a century. Along the Gold Coast of Africa the slave traders, on more than one occasion, felt the bite of a Marine's bayonet.

For the 50 years he wore the uniform of a Marine, Archibald Henderson preached the gospel of strong leadership and constant readiness. At 74, he dramatically demonstrated that advanced age was no deterrent to practicing what he preached.

The issues of the elections of 1857 were particularly bitter ones. In an effort to control the election in Washington, the "Know Nothing" Party imported a gang of hired thugs, known as the "Plug Uglies," from Baltimore. The gang commenced activities by physically threatening the voters, and finally put a complete

halt to the elections by taking possession of the polling places throughout the city. Civil authorities, unable to cope with the situation, appealed to the President who ordered two companies of Marines from the Marine Barracks to restore order to the city.

The Marines met the "Plug Uglies" on Pennsylvania Avenue, in the vicinity of City Hall. The rioting thugs, who were armed with every conceivable weapon, dragged up a brass cannon, aimed it at the Marine formation and demanded that they return to their barracks. Capt Tyler, commanding the Marines, ordered a detachment forward to capture the cannon. At that moment, Gen Henderson, who had been mingling with the mob and was dressed in civilian clothing, walked calmly up to the muzzle of the cannon and forced the weapon around. Henderson addressed the "Plug Uglies," warning them of the seriousness of their acts and telling them that the Marines would fire if it became necessary. In the hectic few minutes that followed, a number of rioters who fortunately were very bad marksmen, fired their pistols at Henderson. A platoon of Marines charged in to protect the Commandant and capture the cannon. One of the rioters, at point blank range, aimed his pistol at Henderson's head. A Marine knocked the pistol to the ground with a butt stroke of his musket. The General promptly grabbed the culprit by the collar and the seat of his pants and marched him off to jail. With the riot getting out of control, the Marines opened fire. The rioters, suddenly convinced that the Marines meant business, beat a hasty retreat and order was restored to the city.

On January 6, 1859, the "grand old man of the Marine Corps," who had served as Commandant under 11 Presidents, died in office at the age of 76. The impact of his strong personality and zealous devotion to duty




General Henderson facing up to the "Plug Uglies."

remains to this day, indelibly engraved on the Corps to which he devoted over 50 years of his life.

The era of Archibald Henderson had encompassed two wars worthy of examination from the standpoint of the nation's history. One, which had been purely internal, was the protracted campaign against the Creek and Seminole Indians. The other, which took place on foreign soil, provided the Marines with the first line to their hymn, and the nation with something it had long wanted—a western boundary that bordered the blue Pacific.

USMC



Residence of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Does Archibald Henderson's Ghost Haunt CMC's House?

On the bleak winter's night of February 13, 1943, Gen Thomas Holcomb was entertaining dinner guests in the house which had been home to Archibald Henderson for so many years. Among the other duties he had attended to that day, Commandant Holcomb signed an order establishing the Women's Reserve. During the course of the dinner conversation, he remarked to his guests, "Old Archibald would turn over in his grave if he ever found out that females could become commissioned officers in his beloved Marine Corps." The words had hardly left his lips when Henderson's portrait, which hung over the sideboard, came crashing to the floor.



Gen Washington crossing the Delaware

GUIDEPOSTS TO LEADERSHIP

By Cpl Gary C. Cooper

❖ WARS ARE OLDER THAN CIVILIZATION. Although the methods and tools of dissent have changed throughout the ages, warfare is still basically the same. It is a conflict between men. When men meet on the field of battle there are winners and there are losers. Among them are brave men and cowards; there are those that follow and those that lead. How well men lead and how men follow usually determines the outcome of the conflict. It is important to us then, as professional fighting men, to understand and review the characteristics of good military leadership; in order to be assured of the support and effectiveness of our followers.

In this tumultuous world we may be called upon at any time to defend a way of life that thousands of good Marines have already laid down their lives to preserve.

The importance of effective military leadership will then be of the utmost importance in determining the basic issues of conflict—the issue of who wins and who loses.

There are four requirements to consider in achieving effective military leadership. Likened to the markers and sign posts spotted along our highways, if the requirements are correctly and intelligently followed, they will guide us along the road of combat effectiveness to our ultimate destination—victory in battle. Now that we have our beginning and know where we want to go, we will do well to investigate

the landmarks along the route. We find four major points to look for: Discipline, Morale, Esprit de Corps and Efficiency.

As we progress from the status of followers to that of a leader, it is well not only to approach and pass the Discipline check point with merely a side glance—the area surrounding it affords considerable room for examination. Where does Discipline begin, and what areas does it cover? Do you recall your own early days in the Marine Corps? Remember Boot Camp? The harassment of the DI? The mental and physical fatigue? Then that day that was so slow in coming, graduation. You became a Marine. During these initial months you had been groomed and polished, largely through discipline. One thought dominated your mind, "It's not for me to reason why, it's just for me to do or die." But once away from the eagle eye of the DI, exposure to a little too much salt and hot air without frequent and vigorous application of polish and preservative allows time to take its toll. A tarnish dulled a fine product capable of much brilliancy. The leader's job then, is to renew or to preserve the glitter and not allow it to dull of itself through neglect. In what way can the leader renew and preserve discipline?

First by reward, for work well-done. Personal commendation, citation, meritorious mast, promotion or a verbal "pat on the back" to the group are obvious examples. Disci-

pline also stems from the mutual respect and confidence shared between the leader and his followers. To establish these, Marines must recognize the leader's ability and his willingness and capability to shoulder the responsibility of his rank. He must recognize his obligations to his men. He must create a desire among his men to emulate him. A third and less pleasant contributing factor to discipline is proper punishment. Punishment should not be designed nor intended for harassment. It should create a respect for authority and afford a means of unbiased military justice. It should be properly placed and correctly administered.

The second major area on the way to effective leadership is morale. One definition of morale is, "an emotional and mental state of the individual." Or, more simply, morale is how men feel and act. It is not USO shows, razor blades, candy and tobacco. It goes deeper. What are some characteristics of morale? Zeal, or the willingness of a Marine to do his job, over and above that which is expected, is a primary factor and result of morale. By doing his duty willingly and to the best of his ability, a Marine develops still another factor necessary to high morale. He develops a feeling of personal worth. He believes that he is the most important part of the most important team in the whole Marine Corps. He develops confidence in his ability, in his lead-

ers, and in his equipment. Along with this confidence, he has fostered satisfaction (not smugness) which is also imperative for high morale.

The next sign along the road toward effective military leadership has its base planted firmly on the broad shoulders of Marine Corps history. It is probably the most important single factor in the manifestation of leadership. It is marked "esprit de corps." Probably, esprit de corps is best defined as the mental and emotional state of an entire unit. It differs from morale in that esprit de corps embraces the attitude of the entire unit, as opposed to the morale of an individual.

This tremendous driving force has contributed to the success of almost every Marine Corps campaign. Although ancient leaders such as Ghengis Khan, Attila the Hun, Alexander the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte may or may not have the blessing of modern society or admirable personal attributes, they certainly surpassed their opponents in achieving and maintaining an esprit de corps. For example, the approach of Attila the Hun struck terror into the hearts of the once great Roman Empire. Tales were spread of his savage hordes numbering more than the stars, burning and plundering, leaving a wake of death and devastation. Yet history tells us that this leader had a force which often came to less than 1500 men. It was more likely their tremendous spirit and unyielding aggressiveness that fostered belief in their mythical numbers.

Consider too, the esprit de corps that bound together Presley O'Bannon and his few Marines during their march across 600 miles of scorching desert to stand triumphant at the shores of Tripoli. In our own time, in the frozen wastes of Korea, a trapped Marine division fought its way bravely to the sea through 6 communist divisions; largely on esprit. But it is not these individual campaigns, with which we are concerned. Rather, it is the spirit which motivated these men to overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles. How is esprit de corps developed? It is the product of the interaction of personnel. Simply, it amounts to the way one Marine acts toward another. High morale of individuals in a unit is essential, and a spirit of

competition between units is another contributing factor. One begets the other. It is well to note that a unit's achievements, past and present, enhance esprit de corps.

The guideposts of discipline, morale and esprit de corps have brought us thus far. Are these 3 fundamentals enough for successful leadership? The answer is no. There is still another area to pass. Another sign points the way. We call it "efficiency." A loose definition of efficiency might be: The realization of the greatest output in the shortest possible time and with the least amount of effort. To Marines it might also mean getting the job done promptly and correctly.

Efficiency comes from proper training. Continual practice of fire team and squad tactics, Artillery Firexes, Phiblexes and Fexes, to mention a few, are training to develop efficiency. It is not enough that a Marine possess discipline and high morale, and units possess esprit de corps. Marines must know their job and be able to do their job efficiently. This can be accomplished only through intensive and proper training. It incorporates and molds the essentials of discipline, morale and esprit de corps. Training develops in the Marine a responsibility, confidence and a technical knowledge of his particular job; an understanding of the equip-

ment he employs and has at his disposal. Consequently, when all these traits are developed, he begins to believe he is an important member of the greatest fighting team in the world—and he is.

These then are the four basic effects of good military leadership. To know what they are is not enough. We must continually review them to insure that we are not lacking in one or the other. To be lacking in effective leadership is to be lacking in combat-readiness. The result is defeat and death.

However, if effective leadership is evident and functioning, we are strong and ready. If we are well disciplined, of high morale, possess an unquenchable unit spirit, and are efficient, we are the best in the business.

Strive to create discipline in yourself and your men. Encourage high morale, foster esprit and train for efficiency. You may never win the Medal of Honor, you may never be cited for your outstanding example, but you will have an inner satisfaction that comes only to those that give their all. Then, if you listen carefully at your retirement parade, you will hear the voices of all the other good Marines who have gone before whisper the greatest commendation of them all—"Well done, Marine."


US MC



Marines moving toward objective on central front in Korea.

"AN UNEXPECTED FORCE OF ARTILLERY"

By Capt P. E. Wilson




✻ WHEN ASKED ABOUT THEIR TRADE, most artillerymen answer, "We shoot, move and communicate." A few might give you the primary missions: 1) to provide close support to the infantry and armor, 2) to isolate the battlefield, and 3) to gain supremacy over hostile artillery by counterbattery fire. Very little else do they agree on as a group—except their dissatisfaction with the present weapons system in the artillery regiment of a division. Maybe some of them cast envious eyes on the 4.2 inch mortar when the infantry had it. But they didn't think anyone would take them seriously. Mortars are okay—but . . .

Nevertheless the trend has been going this way for quite a time. Many an artilleryman mourned when, as Col Henderson so wonderfully expressed it, we had to say "Farewell to Cannoneers" (GAZETTE: Nov '54). From the time the

"Slingers" of Sennacherib's Assyrian armies (hundreds of years before Christ) laid waste to Phoenicia with their arched arrows and stones, to the "Honest John" artilleryman of today, armies struggled to put the right weapons in the right place at the right time. Those who made the wrong selection met disaster so often that we could fill volumes merely listing them. A recent example: the French reliance on their "impregnable wall" which fell easy prey to a mobile opponent.

The true artilleryman will wonder at the marvels of the guided missiles. Generally he doesn't believe that such tools of war lessen his value. History has proved that nobody gets the title to real estate unless he puts his infantry on it. Where the infantry goes, his supporting arms go.

Historically our Marine Corps artillery regiment as such is not yet



of legal age. Marines of those early Quantico days planned but seldom had the funds to test such size units. Not until 1940 was the Corps able to draw up and field full strength divisions with T/Os and T/Es. Basically, these contained three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, and a variety of supporting elements. Following amphibious landing exercises in 1941 there were some changes but the basic structure proved reliable, and it still is.

That first artillery regiment consisted of three battalions of 75 mm howitzers and one battalion of 105 mm howitzers. Some additional fire support within the division came from the infantry regiments' 60 and 81mm mortars and some 37mm field pieces. When the 1stMarDiv was preparing to leave New Zealand for the landing on Guadalcanal some additional artillery was required. Some 155mm howitzers were offered. Due to the critical shortage of shipping, those weapons remained on the docks when the Division left.

How effective are present weapons within the artillery regiment? We must compare them with the combat tested ones of recent years. Since Guadalcanal they have proved successful. Just how well the artillery regiment did its job has been a part of every report and book dealing with Guadalcanal. From their position in the small hunk of Marine-owned real estate they did every task assigned. This included normal support, extremely effective harassing and interdiction fire on jungle trails and, on several occasions, the direct fire capability was invaluable. One such example was the Kawaguchi attack on Edson's Ridge when the 75's literally held the front with a curtain of metal. This enabled the infantrymen to beat off an overwhelming number of enemy. Because of the losses at Pearl Harbor the division didn't have any naval gunfire available. Although MAG-23 did heroic work it could hardly be said that the division had an abundance of close air support. Thus, the burden for continuous support was on the artillery regiment. It proved equal to the task.

Shore based artillery, naval gunfire and close air support were equal in the early amphibious concept.

By the time the New Georgia campaigns ended, artillery within the division was the prime support. According to a report by CINCPAC, if any amphibious landing was to develop to any extent it was only possible with adequate shore based artillery. Specifically it stated, "Naval gunfire has a variety of uses but once action has begun to move the infantry inland this type of support lacks a great deal." Similar opinions can be found in the reports after the Tarawa campaign. The official report stated, "Field artillery continues to be the most reliable and effective weapon for neutralization purposes in close support of infantry. . . . The greatest neutralization value is gained by tanks and infantry moving into the areas quickly as the fires lift." In particular during this campaign, although not spelled out in the report, was the fact that because of the terrain, the dual high and low-angle capability was extremely valuable in divisional artillery. At the same time the need for heavier caliber weapons became apparent: the enemy dug in deeper and deeper.

The decision was made to replace one of the 75mm howitzer battalion weapons with 105mm howitzers. The change was just in time for the landings in the Marianas. This proved fortunate for the 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines. An enemy counterattack during the campaign swept back the army troops on the front lines. Marine artillerymen were left to contain the attack. In the pits the extra crew members laid down a curtain of small arms fire

while the 105's were used as direct fire weapons. To quote the official report, "The gunners of the pieces were firing at less than four-tenths of a second, time fire. When the fuzes could not be set fast enough they fired ricochet fire by lowering the muzzles and bouncing the shells off the ground." What would have happened if this unit had been equipped with the 4.2" mortar?

Again the reports laid heavy stress on the value of the divisional artillery. Gen Shepherd stated, "Artillery was the most effective weapon employed during the operation. Close support was given the infantry in both attack and defense, and harassing fires at night were particularly effective. The troops had far greater confidence in artillery than in either naval gunfire or air strikes for close support missions."

Peleliu and Iwo Jima again proved the versatility of the artillery weapons. Here again the terrain was the major factor and the high and low angle capability was invaluable for continuous support. In some cases the 75mm howitzers were broken down and hand-carried to almost unbelievable firing positions to bring direct fire on enemy strong points and caves. From the infantry point of view they had no better support than the artillery battery right behind them. Often it was right on the lines with them. But heavier caliber weapons were necessary, even if it meant more weight. Many wanted a mortar similar to those so successfully used by the Japanese. At that time the US Army Chemical Corps had the 4.2" mor-



155mm guns of 3d Marine Defense Bn protect Bougainville, WWII



8-in Howitzer lets loose in Korea

tar in units but it was classed as a chemical delivery agent only.

Prior to the Okinawa landing all the 75mm howitzers in the division were replaced by 105mm howitzers. The general support battalion was given 155mm howitzers. This was fortunate: Okinawa proved to be the artilleryman's nightmare. Early in the campaign there was such a wealth of artillery that TOT's of 24 or more battalions were not unusual. Then the rains came. Naval gunfire became almost valueless; aircraft were glued to the deck; heavy artillery pieces had trouble staying above the mud. Once again when the chips were down the best possible support came from division artillery which stayed in business despite the weather and, at times, trying ammunition restrictions. Through nearly five years of combat experience the Marine Corps developed new techniques and made some changes in the weapons systems. But, in light of the combat experience, their division was valid. The infantryman trusted his supporting artillery (and vice-versa).

Naval gunfire was nice to have, air strikes came in mighty handy. When the infantry needed help on a continuing basis, though, he wanted direct support artillery that belonged to his unit alone.

On 6 August 1945 the tremendous damage to Hiroshima opened a new phase of military warfare. The Corps was aware that many saw no future need for amphibious landing forces. Early in 1946, the use of helicopters in the amphibious operation was proposed. This would allow the necessary dispersal of forces. By 1947 the Corps had HMX-1, an

experimental helicopter unit testing the theories and feasibility of the proposal. What was happening? At Quantico HMX-1 was working to make it possible to air deliver the Marine Division. At the same time the divisions were gaining weight all the way around. The infantry had fought and won the battle for the 4.2" mortar, the tankers had gotten bigger, heavier tanks; the artillery had heavier weapons. A perfect example of this is the report of an experiment made at Quantico in May 1949. It notes the successful demonstration of helicopter techniques which included the following, "two sections of 75mm pack howitzers were laid and ready to fire in three minutes having been airlifted in as fire support." On that date there was not an artillery regiment which had 75mm pack howitzers as a part of its equipment!

It was fortunate that we continued this dual approach. With the advent of combat in Korea we were able to send the Brigade out ready for any type of assignment, and during the first month they were there it was as a fill-in at vital points. When the Inchon Landing was made the First Division structurally was close to the same as when they landed on the 'Canal. Considering the advent of the atomic age and the large amount of opposition to keeping an amphibious force it was a matter of great satisfaction to the Corps when this landing broke open the entire strategy of the enemy. As usual when the infantry moved up out of naval gunfire range they relied most heavily on their own divisional artillery for close support. The real test came, however, when they were forced to withdraw from the Chosin Reservoir.

Citing the official Marine Corps series about Korea we can see of what value the artillery became: "Nearly all of the infantry action of the first three days owed a great deal to the First Battalion 11th Marines (at Chindong-ni) . . . 'I think that this is one of the most important lessons we learned in fighting infiltrating troops,' commented Wood, 'artillery must be able and always prepared to fire in any direction on a moment's notice.'" At Hagaru we read, "Seldom in Marine history have the supporting arms played as

vital a part as when the Marines of Captain Ben S. Read's How Battery shifted trails and plugged the hole in the line with artillery fire alone."

In connection with both of these incidents we find a large portion of the fire involved was low angle or direct fire. This was only possible because of the nature of the weapons: mortars were good for a number of missions but not for this.

Supporting fire became even more important to the front line Marine as the situation stabilized. Static warfare has always increased the need for heavy support. The 1st MarDiv had a lot of it. The infantry alone had the 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2" mortar as well as 75mm recoilless rifles and tanks. In addition to the normal 105mm and 155mm howitzers the artillery regiment controlled a 4.5" rocket battery and several attached units generally equipped with 155mm howitzers. On the western front they also were given operational control of some 8" howitzers and 155mm guns. They needed these units. By this time the Marine Air which normally supported the division was lost to them. Naval gunfire could not be used due to the distances involved. Particularly harmful to the infantry was the delay in getting close air support missions. The Marine who held on to Bunker Hill, Vegas, Reno or any number of such points agreed with his fellow Marine of Edson's Ridge: when the chips were down his best friend was the direct support artillery.

The question of mortars came into great prominence in the Corps during this period and the lid came off when the *GAZETTE* published *Of Mortars and Men* (Jan '54). Pros and cons by the reams came from both sides. It was resolved by action resulting from the special board convened to analyze existing weapons and personnel strength of the division. The criteria which guided this board were published in the April '57 *GAZETTE*. Basically it directed that all unnecessary "fat" be cut from the division—the result must be an organization capable of entering combat under the modern concept for amphibious operations and tactical atomic warfare.

As we know, the result did cut a lot of weight from the division and

made some changes in the triangular structure. The infantry lost the 60mm mortar, heavy machine guns, and tanks. Compensation for this was found in the assignment of 106 mm recoilless rifles. These last came with the comment that they had a high degree of "antipersonnel lethality." Since the infantry battalion was now to become the "basic tactical unit" and had gained an additional company it appears that, compared to any prior system, they were dangerously limited as to immediately controllable supporting fire. To solve this the artillery units were to be placed in closer contact with the basic infantry units. To again quote the board report, "The type mortar support formerly provided the regiment by the 4.2" mortar will now be provided by the close support artillery." Not only was it to be like the 4.2" support, but the direct support batteries were given that mortar, pending the adoption of a 105mm or 120mm mortar.

Few artillerymen will dispute the idea of getting the support units closer to the infantry they support. They like the idea of an eight-piece, two-platoon battery capable of separate fire direction. On the basis of combat experience, however, they don't take kindly to this mortar, or any other mortar for a number of reasons. To list but a few items they have found that for good direct support you need: 1) high and low angle capability; 2) direct fire capability (as distinct from low angle); 3) good degree of accuracy in order to bring fire within very close proximity of front line troops; 4) ruggedness of the weapon including a fairly long service life; 5) maximum range at least in the 7,000 yard category; and 6) reasonable mobility when in support of a rapidly moving attack.

It is not intended to deny that the mortar has a place in our weapons system as for specific tasks it is more suitable than artillery. The most desirable features seem to be: 1) a lower configuration and weight than most artillery pieces; 2) more "punch per pound" (2.87 lbs explosive per 24.5 lb projectile in the 4.2" vs 6.82 lbs explosive per 33 lb projectile in the 105mm How);

Capt Wilson, an AO, has the DFC, nine Air Medals, Purple Heart. Another one, which he is not wearing here, he describes as "quite a pretty one at that." He got it from the Republic of Monaco for his part in the Grace Kelly-Prince Rainer nuptials. As CO of MD, USS INTREPID, he had the honor guard detail for the ceremony. He now commands the 1st HAR Btry, FAC, MCB, 29 Palms. Writing is his hobby along with Civil War research.



3) better sustained rate of fire (5 per minute for 4.2" vs 3 per min for 105mm How); and 4) more easily adapted to helicopter delivery than most artillery pieces.

When compared to standard Marine Corps artillery of the past decade it is my opinion that we lose more than we gain by adopting this piece. Even mortarmen agree to the fixed problems of the weapon. To quote some of them I have but to look through past issues of the GAZETTE: Dec '52, the article *Four-Deuce is a Winner* stated in part, "When it [the 4.2] is used extensively for long periods of time it is likely to break down. . . . One of our biggest headaches was the ammunition supply. When we got ahold of two or three 6x6 trucks, in addition to those provided by the T/E we could keep within effective supporting distance of the attacking battalion . . . in inland operations beyond the normal beachhead five to twelve additional trucks would be required."

In Sept '55, from an article dealing with the hardware itself, we find, "The weapon [4.2] is relatively inaccurate and its range is limited. . . . The weight of the H30 is only 626 pounds complete. If the heavy mortar is to be used as an artillery piece there is no reason why its

weight should be so limited. We could double, or even triple its weight. . . . You can actually grab a 4.2 mortar by the tube and rattle it. That's how loosely the parts fit together."

There are more but I would like to note the emphasis is always on "more trucks, more weight," and "more range" throughout these articles. Thus it hardly seems valid to say we are going to adopt them because of less cube, weight and transport problems.


Some of the facts that I have stated were, of course, mentioned in the discussion about the adoption of the mortar in the artillery regiment. To offset obvious deficiencies the board report stressed the need for improvement in four fields.

First, there must be better aircraft and better coordination in the close air support system.

Secondly, we should make better use of naval gunfire and, particularly, with the new guided missile ships.

Third, is the creation of a new type of supporting artillery known as Force Artillery.

Fourth, we should strive to improve and make an operational unit out of our present rockets. This is a commendable list but let us briefly see what each has to offer.



115mm XM-70 ready to fire during MCLFDC test at Quantico

Close air support is dear to all Marines—it is one of our contributions to modern warfare. Even those closest to it and responsible for making improvements seem to agree that it cannot in the foreseeable future become a 24-hour-a-day close support unit in relation to the front lines. *GAZETTE* articles such as *Night Support, a New Weapon* (Nov. '51), *Round the Clock Close Air Support* (Sep '54), *Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces* (Dec '55) and other military magazine articles, *Korea, A Reflection from the Air* (Naval Institute Proceedings: July '56), *Tactical Air Forces in a Future War* (Military Review: Apr '55) agree on this fact. Almost unanimously they advise that we must realize that aircraft will never replace the existing close support weapons of the ground units for night operations and during bad weather. Marine air does a better job than any other unit in the world, but let us not ask them for more than their inherent capabilities and abilities allow.

The matter of naval gunfire was given an excellent treatment in *Naval Gunfire and the Atom* (*GAZETTE*: Sep '58), but here again we are obliged to accept the fixed restrictions of the support weapon. Once we move inland or, for other reasons have spread the shipping excessively from the infantry, then we just lose this arm. Since the vertical assault concept assumes that at least one element would land far inland in relation to range capabilities we might say that for that landing element they have no naval gunfire support. If we are to avoid the type of large single beachhead concept in amphibious operations as known to us, we must also reduce the value of naval gunfire. Here again we must realize the supporting arm has lessened in value due to the type of warfare we seek to employ.

When speaking of heavy support artillery at the present time we refer to the units in Field Artillery Groups. Included in this are batteries of 155mm howitzers, 155mm guns (self propelled), 8" howitzers (self propelled), and HAR battery. Theoretically, these units are available for assignment to any FMF unit for a specific operation. Particularly in self-propelled guns and

rockets, the batteries are further organized so as to allow independent operation by platoons (normally able to do so with no additional support). Each of these units has a particular capability which must be considered in relation to assignment (nuclear, range, etc.). Due to the fact that we have very few of each type battery and, under normal circumstances, a need for a full battery of self-propelled or rockets would not exist at the one division



Firing 105mm Howitzer in Korea

level, a serious problem of operational control exists.

To clarify the last statement, let us consider any single amphibious landing employing one division. Assuming that we will have one landing force delivered by helicopter and the other on a limited size beachhead we have a problem of delivering such heavy support weapons. In the case of the self-propelleds, there is no possible concept of air delivery in our theory as they weigh in at 50 tons or more. Landings must be made either by direct beaching of the landing craft or over a causeway. One platoon of an 8" howitzer battery requires at least eight additional vehicles to assure a continuing operational capability. Thus, it can be seen that if even one full battery is assigned as support to the division they greatly expand the logistical requirements and also require a wider beachhead and zone of operations upon landing. Similar problems exist with the rocket battery due to the large

amount of hardware required to make them operational. Clearly then, we are placed on the horns of a dilemma—either severely limit the attachment of such elements to the division or sacrifice the planned mobility and dispersion of the landing forces.

One additional note might be made in regards to the matter of rockets. Some serious consideration should be given to the proper assignment of any rocket hardware within the division or an attachment thereto. Generally having an atomic capability and of a "one shot" nature these units will presumably be held as the real "Sunday punch." It is possible that we might develop operational rockets small enough and requiring limited apparatus to allow assignment in general support roles on a continuing basis.

From all the military reports and studies I have read this will not be happening in the very near future. Until such time the reliance for heavy support must be placed on some of the weapons we have mentioned. The question then stands as: what weapons do we require in view of our tactical scheme and where should they be assigned?

Initially, I stated that I opposed the assignment of the mortars under the present system. Later it was noted that for some reasons and in some tasks the mortar is useful. Here's how we can use the best of what we have:

1) Retain the present available heavy mortars in the First Battalion of the Artillery Regiment. R&D should press for a type of mortar-howitzer (example: Brandt) to replace this "mortar-only" concept. This battalion, equipped with either type weapon, will not be assigned as a permanent supporting unit to any infantry unit. Instead: train and equip it for delivery by air. Because of the nature of air-landed operations we should not risk success of such an operation by the use of units which have been trying to keep equipment, personnel assignments, and tactical plans for two or three types of delivery. This way, when the decision is made to land a unit by air, we don't have any problem—the first battalion is

ready, equipped, and trained to go. In the event of an extended operation along conventional lines they could be employed according to the nature of the terrain and the support requirements of any infantry unit. Because they can be air lifted this would mean, in the event of a sudden attack in any sector, they could be delivered quickly as a direct support unit.


2) Equip the remaining three battalions of the artillery regiment with 105mm howitzers and assign them as direct support units to the infantry regiments. One battery in each battalion will be given additional training for air delivery. The feasibility of such delivery has been proven as recently as Jan '59 at MCB, 29 Palms. My reason for this secondary role is to provide a support artillery unit with low angle capability and enough range in the event of an incident such as described on Guadalcanal or in the Marianas. In effect, it would serve as the general supporting arm for air delivered landing forces.

3) Since the artillery regimental commander under the present concept has become a "noncombat" function in regards to his own command I would utilize him as the controlling point for any attachments to the division of heavy weapons. At present such units initially are attached to a battalion of the artillery regiment. This has proven unsuccessful in the opinion of almost every Force Artillery officer I have talked with about it. The only other way it has been tried is to insert a Field Artillery Group type element in for control of the heavy artillery units. This again in a division size operation seems to unnecessarily "beef" up the landing force. An experienced artilleryman, the regimental commander could assure the proper employment of these heavy weapons as well as make recommendations concerning attachment and release of such units as the situation develops. From personal experience in divisional landing exercises and in discussing this matter with Force Artillery personnel such experienced control is most necessary due to the misconceptions about the inherent capabilities of the heavier weapons and the type of ammunition and rates

of fire they can be expected to deliver. This is also true as we develop more atomic delivery capabilities within these units.

Flexibility is the keynote in modern warfare. Old traditions and ideas must stand aside if we are to remain a "force-in-readiness." But we must not allow ourselves to ignore the lessons of the past. How often we have heard that a Marine fights best when he has Marines on either side, in the air overhead, and Marine artillery behind him? This reliance is in direct relation to the weapons system which we provide. If articles and discussion are any criteria the present weapons system of supporting arms satisfies neither the infantryman nor the artilleryman. It is not enough that we sit and discuss this among ourselves. As it was so well put in the article *Amphibious Artillery of the Future* (GAZETTE: Dec '55) by Col F. P. Henderson, "To wait until we get our new weapons and equipment before developing the doctrines and techniques for using them could be fatal. . . . With a little imagination and ingenuity we can endow the weapons and equipment we have now with the qualities and capabilities we want them to have in the future. . . . When we finally get the new tools of amphibious warfare, we will be ready to use them."

Let us remember the lessons of the last 20 years and not be afraid to admit that maybe we have jumped too quickly in this weapons



First Prize — Group II

assignment. Would it hurt to dust off the old 75mm howitzer and see if we really have a better answer at hand? Could it cost much to ask a cross section of the experienced infantry and artillery personnel in the operating units what they think? After the battle of Frieland in which the sudden appearance of mobile guns saved the day Napoleon said, "Once the melee has begun the man who is clever enough to bring up an unexpected force of artillery is sure to win the day." He could have added, "if that artillery is of the proper type for the task at hand." Perhaps he could assure this happened on a continuing basis because he was a military genius but I believe it was because he learned through experience and advice of his fighting forces. Our infantry places a great deal of trust in the artillery and so it is up to us to assure them that when "the melee has begun" that we have the right gear to "bring up an unexpected force of artillery." USMC



37mm field piece softens route to Garapan, Saipan, WWII

The Extension School's CHALLENGE

BASIC SCHOOL LEVEL

1 Circumstances necessitate that you as a front-line platoon commander fire an artillery mission on an enemy antitank weapon. If you do not know the artillery base point or any artillery check points, how would you describe the location of the target in your initial fire request?

- a. By direction and distance from a known terrain feature to target.
- b. By giving grid coordinates from the map.
- c. By requesting a marking volley and shift from that.
- d. Any or all of the above.

2 As Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, you send the following initial fire request:

- I. *This is Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon, Bravo Company.*
- II. *Fire mission.*
- III. *Coordinates 733546.*
- IV. *Enemy antitank weapons well emplaced with protecting infantry.*
- V. *Precision.*
- VI. *(Ammunition element is omitted if shell HE is desired as in this case.)*
- VII. *Fuze action usually omitted. (FDC will use fuze quick.)*
- VIII. *Will adjust.*

What essential element has been omitted from the initial fire request above?

- a. Azimuth from observer to guns.
- b. Location of observer.
- c. Azimuth from observer to target.
- d. Elevation of target in relation to observer.

3 When plotting 81mm mortar fires on the battalion fire support overlay, only concentrations are plotted to scale.

- a. True.
- b. False.

4 The best means of computing the amount of fuel likely to be used by a unit for a particular

period is from

- a. Tables of Allowances.
- b. Allowances of Common Items for Motor Vehicle Operation and Maintenance.
- c. Tables of Equipment.
- d. Experience factors.

JUNIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

5 The principle of war which is most applicable and important in an enveloping attack is _____, while _____ is the principle of fundamental importance in a penetration.

6 The lowest tactical command echelon of Marine aviation, which is organized, equipped, and is capable of sustained operations in the field is the

- a. Marine attack squadron.
- b. Marine composite squadron.
- c. Marine aircraft group.
- d. Marine aircraft wing.

7 The primary purpose of an intelligence estimate is to

- a. serve as a check-off list to ensure that all steps in the intelligence process are covered in a logical and orderly fashion.
- b. arrive at logical conclusions relative to enemy intentions.
- c. present, in an orderly manner, information on the enemy and the area of operations.
- d. assist the commander in the preparation of his estimate of the situation.

8 What is the most reliable method of locating enemy air defense installations?

- a. Visual reconnaissance.
- b. Photo reconnaissance.
- c. Electronic reconnaissance.
- d. Debriefing combat air crews.

SENIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

9 A regimental commander decides to attack with two battalions abreast, the main attack being made by the battalion on the left. This attack should be planned so as to give the left battalion a narrower zone of action and a priority of fire support and, in addition, the battalion commander should be told that since his will be the main attack he should make an all-out effort to secure the objective.

- a. True.
- b. False.

(Answers on page 56)



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Give IG Team
The Red Carpet



"Captain, the inspection schedule and roster of inspectors just came in," 1stSgt Stover said. "Some of the inspectors are rough!"

"That's fine!" I said, rubbing my hands together in anticipation.

Stover shook his head. "You sound pleased," he said, puzzled. "Why?"

"Well, Smoky," I leaned back and paused. "On second thought I won't tell you now. Get the officers and staff NCOs together at 1330. I'll give you the word then."

"Aye, aye, Sir," Stover said and marched out.

Stover knocked at precisely 1330. He had prepared my junior leaders for a lecture and they came in subdued and dubious. I wouldn't disappoint them.

"You've seen the inspection schedule and roster of inspectors," I said. "We're lucky!"

"Lucky?" Lt Durham, the exec, exclaimed. "We'll be lucky if half of us aren't locked up!"

"Well, Bull," I said, "I'm sorry you have such a low opinion of my company. I disagree and still say we're lucky. I know Col Snorter Coleman. There's no sharper officer in the Corps. He's picked a team of experts and he's gonna help us! I say again, he'll help us! Contrary to popular opinion, the inspector's mission is instruction, not destruction. Every officer and man in the party is well informed. They have a wealth of tested and proven ways and means of getting the job done. They'll pass them on to us and study our methods to see if we have any good skinnies they can pass on to the next unit they inspect.

"I'm gonna say it one more time. This inspection will help us. To get the most benefit, everyone must have an open mind. We're gonna roll out the red carpet for the inspector."

"What about all the gear we used on SWANDIVE?" GySgt Jacobs asked. "It won't be cleaned, boxed, and crated. Shall I steer them away from the storeroom?"

"I'll lock you up if you do!" I pounded my desk. "We've got nothing to hide. Bring out your problems, the inspectors will help solve them. Don't be on the


defensive either. Treat questions as requests for information and not as preludes to fault finding. Answer briefly. Don't say, 'Well, Sir, let me give you the background. About a year ago. . . .' The inspector isn't interested in the background, he'll want to find out whether he can help you. If you do all the talking, this company won't profit from the knowledge and experience of the inspectors.

"Remember I said the mission of the inspector is instruction? It follows that his main concern is correcting errors. When he finds something wrong, he works on a solution. He doesn't waste time finding out why or how the error was made or who is responsible. Fixing responsibility is our job and we'll do it after the inspector leaves. While he's with us, we'll listen to what he says about straightening things out.

"All inspectors, but particularly Col Coleman, frequently give advice. They know that because something worked well in Camp Pendleton doesn't mean it'll work in Camp Lejeune. When things we're doing aren't wrong but the inspector knows better ways to accomplish the mission, we'll get advice and recommendations. Whether we adopt the advice and recommendations is up to us. However, don't let me hear anyone telling an inspector something won't work. Be polite enough to think about what he says. If it doesn't apply, it may work well at your next duty station," I paused and looked at each individual in my office. "That's why I say we're lucky. Any questions?"

"I get the idea," Lt Durham said. "We roll out the red carpet, not to butter up the inspectors but because they're here to help us. How much they help depends on whether or not we keep an open mind."

"That's right, Bull," I nodded approval. "When an inspector recommends something, he isn't necessarily condemning what we're doing, so we don't have to defend ourselves. The inspector seeks to correct and he advises and recommends. It isn't his job to place responsibility. Listen and think about what he says. You'll learn and the outfit will improve. Always welcome the inspector."



THE STRIKE CELL

PART 1

(Of Two Parts)

Deploy each attack squadron to several small airfields, says the author. This helps in training, increases the threat to the enemy and is an effective passive defense measure.

By Capt J. G. Martz III

THE DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF THE modern light attack squadron compares to that of the last generation like a hurricane compares to a window fan. One light attack jet airplane may, on one sortie, apply more destructive force against an enemy than was applied by all the sorties

flown by similar types since men first started dropping bombs.

This is not news to any literate individual. In fact, most military men, individually and collectively, have accepted the new destructive force. Having accepted it, the tendency is to conclude that from de-

structive force comes operational effectiveness; that is, 20 airplanes can deliver 20 times the destructive force of one airplane, so 20 airplanes are 20 times as effective as one airplane.

This is a valid hypothesis within certain limits. Twenty airplanes are potentially twenty times as effective as one if:

- each receives enough support to equal availability as a weapons system,

- each has an equally competent crew,

- there are enough targets to employ all airplanes without an absurd degree of overkill and

- all airplanes are dispersed so that a proportional increase in effort is required by the enemy to defend against them or neutralize them.

From years of expensive experience have come the present organization and equipment of the light attack squadron. The number of airplanes versus the number of men and tools and support required is in delicate balance. Reduce the manning level, or the tools, or the support, and the operational effectiveness of the squadron goes down. Increase the number of airplanes assigned and the same thing happens. Yet, a light attack squadron with 20 airplanes undispersed does not force the enemy to a proportional increase in defensive or neutralization effort over that required for a light attack squadron with only one airplane. Of course, a squadron with only one airplane would be grossly inefficient and 20 times nothing would still be nothing. How, then, may the most be made of a light attack squadron?

The classic answer to this question includes emphasis on adequate support, sufficient training and sound employment. The categorical if mentioned earlier, which seems to be ignored completely, is *dispersion*.

Perhaps the long-accepted principle of dispersion in passive defense has not been ignored, but has been dismissed as more harmful than beneficial. It appears to tamper with the delicately balanced ratio of men and machines which, so far, has proven to be the most efficient. But dispersion need not disturb this balance if both essential elements involved in the principle of dispersion in passive defense are considered: space and time.


A squadron disperses whenever two or more of its airplanes are parked at different airfields. This amounts to dispersion in fact, but not in principle. This is dispersion in a haphazard manner, without regard for maintaining or improving offensive stature. It is purely defensive in nature and, as such, as bad as if the enemy had a perfect defense against air attack. But it proves a point: light attack squadrons can and do disperse for limited periods of time. How much more effective this maneuver would be if it improved the offensive posture of the squadron! How much better if it forced the enemy to expend more effort on defense, or reduced the effectiveness of his defense for any level of effort!

How can this proven capacity for dispersion be used to better advantage? By including offensive capability with the dispersion unit.

How can the delicate organization of a light attack squadron withstand the tearing apart, the subdividing of its sensitively balanced ratio of men and machines, without losing efficiency? By limiting the period of time during which its detached component parts must maintain an offensive posture before returning to a centralized location.

The strike cell, limited in space by the range of its airplanes, and limited in time by its inability to operate for long without full squadron maintenance, is the means by which the most can be made of the tremendous destructive power of the light attack squadron. The questions:

- how many airplanes should be dispersed,
- how much self-support must the squadron provide,
- how much air transportation will be required for the squadron's



men and equipment?

Let's take these questions one at a time.

The strike cell must have enough airplanes to be worthwhile, but not so many as to overload the transient servicing facilities of the host airfield. Airplane availability and the scheduling of routine checks by the squadron at home base to avoid transporting heavy equipment make four airplanes seem like a good number.

Transient servicing can provide fuel, oil and oxygen. It can't be expected to provide spare tires or line maintenance on avionics equipment, airframes or engines. Line maintenance personnel would be required from the squadron to include those skills, some spare parts and a few tools. All ordnance personnel and equipment must be provided by the squadron. Actual ordnance could be laid down in advance or transported by the strike airplanes. Sufficient clerks to man a communications watch and keep the necessary logs would be required; also, an appropriate number of spare pilots. One transport airplane could move these men and equipment.

A typical strike cell consists of

the pilots and four airplanes, the ordnance team and their weapons and tools, the maintenance team and their equipment, the clerical team and their documents and logs. This means about eight officers and sixteen men. Not an impressive mass, perhaps, but capable in one launch of delivering twice the destructive power delivered by all the airplanes in WWII—or, if you choose, able to deliver lesser explosives accurately for several consecutive days. An entire light attack squadron can only do the same things on a larger scale.


This is the case for the strike cell. Some people will not have bothered to read this far. Some will dismiss the entire proposition as illusionary scheming. Some will want to argue. Let's face them, one at a time.

Argument #1. Any airfield capable of handling light attack airplanes will have at least a squadron based there already and the principles of passive defense involved pay off only if more airfields are made a threat to the enemy.

Rebuttal. Increasing the number of airfields which threaten the enemy is not the principle involved. Every airfield and aircraft carrier from which an offensive operation can be launched is a threat to the enemy and we must assume his intent to destroy or neutralize them all. The principle involved includes time as well as space. When we have the capability of dispersing the light attack squadrons in strike cells, the neutralization of an airfield offers only temporary respite for the enemy from a threat from that airfield. He must neutralize simultaneously all airfields which lie within a reciprocal striking range or else destroy



Capt Martz sent his first article to the GAZETTE four years ago (AGILITY IN FLIGHT, July '56). Two years later he followed with THE BEST DEFENSE (May '58). Both articles were written, he said, "to make the GAZETTE more interesting to aviators." We go along with that; welcome articles about Marine Aviation for the interest of all our readers as well as NAs. The author is with VMA-324 at Cherry Point, N. C.



them. The offensive effort required by the enemy to do this goes up geometrically with the ability of the light attack squadrons to disperse their strike cells. So, the mere capability to disperse while retaining an offensive posture forces the enemy to much greater offensive effort with reduced probability of success.

Argument #2. Should an airplane in a dispersed strike cell require maintenance beyond the capability of the strike cell, it would be out of commission longer than if it had been at home base. Thus, the overall effectiveness of the squadron would be reduced.

Rebuttal. This is an argument against landing squadron airplanes at any airfield other than home base. It is equally sound against any operation which requires a squadron airplane to land away from home. But squadrons will conduct cross-country navigation training and will land airplanes away from home base regardless of whether they embrace

the concept of the strike cell or are merely flying away from a hurricane or making a routine cross-country flight. It is therefore not a matter for grave concern. In fact, many grounding discrepancies experienced away from home base on routine cross-country flights are within the capability of the strike cell to repair. There should be fewer cases of stranded airplanes with the strike cell than without it.

Argument #3. Division of a light attack squadron into strike cells would (a) tend to form cliques, (b) reduce standardization of operational procedures and (c) require decisions from persons not qualified to make them.

Rebuttal. (a) Division of a light attack squadron into strike cells should foster a healthy competition, but should in no way subvert the loyalty of any individual to the squadron. After all, the strike cells have a common goal and individuals function as members of a squadron to a much greater extent than as members of a strike cell—an administrative nonentity. (b) Standardization of operational procedures should have been accomplished long before a squadron ever undertakes to form strike cells—a latter phase maneuver. (c) Skill in making decisions comes from experience. This comes from making wrong decisions. No one is qualified in making decisions until he has some experience in making them. Is it not better to gain the experience of making wrong decisions which affect the operation of a strike cell rather than a larger unit?

Argument #4. The strike cell concept is something new and untried. The FMF should confine itself to becoming proficient in proven procedures with proven weapons. Research and development are better left to those who have no operational mission.

Rebuttal. The strike cell concept may or may not be new. The methods are certainly tried and true. Anyway, what does the light attack squadron have to lose? The forming of operational strike cells is nothing more than making more efficient use of the effort expended.

Argument #5. The logistic and



fiscal requirements for the operation of strike cells on a routine basis can not be sustained.

Rebuttal. The funds to support the light attack squadrons already have been budgeted. No increase in cost of operations is involved with strike cells. The transport squadrons are required now to perform missions of much lower precedence than direct support of our combat forces. Certainly, an improvement in the combat capability of our existing forces will not be thwarted for minor pecuniary reasons or because of the small increase in air transport service required.

In summary, the ability to disperse while retaining an offensive posture would increase the military effectiveness of the light attack jet squadron. The strike cell provides the means by which a proven capability to disperse can better our offensive posture for a limited period of time. In the final analysis, it doesn't cost much more.

USMC



Once Removed

A YOUNG SERGEANT WAS BEING INTERVIEWED as a warrant officer candidate. "What," asked the chairman of the interview board, "is the relationship between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations?" The Marine pondered the question briefly, then sheepishly blurted, "I don't know, sir, unless, perhaps, they're distant cousins."

\$15.00 to ASSgt William M. Hamilton

The Marine Reserve

BGen W. T. Fairbourn
Director, MCR

WHEN MARINE RESERVISTS REPORT to annual field training this summer, they'll be greeted at the main gate by fellow Reservists whose primary duties will be to guide them through two weeks in the field. The welcoming committees will consist of Reserve Training Assistants, assigned annually to every Reserve training site. They in turn serve to augment permanent Reserve liaison representatives, stationed on a year-around basis at nine major posts and stations.

Sixteen Reserve officers fill liaison representative billets. In that capacity, they are responsible to the base commander on all Reserve affairs. They plan and conduct annual pre-training conferences, submit annual field training reports on organized units in training at their respective bases, and constantly advise HQMC on local training facilities and schedules.

Annual field training and active duty for training courses at Marine bases are the culmination of year-long preparation by liaison training groups as well as organized units in training. Almost from the moment the last Reserve unit packs for home each year, Reserve liaison training is planning for the future. At this writing, for example, tentative training schedules have been established for the next three summers.

Reserve liaison training groups are permanently established at Quantico, Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, Little Creek, Coronado, San Diego, Parris Island and Pearl Harbor. Training assistants also are assigned to temporary groups at other posts. Examples are the CWTC, Bridgeport, Calif., and MB, Hawthorne, Nev.

Among the unique missions of Reserve liaison training groups is that performed by the Quantico contingent. There, a permanent five-

officer section is beefed-up each summer to take on the influx of Reservists reporting for Reserve Junior and Senior Amphibious Warfare courses.

This summer, 78 Reserve officers, most of them in Class III (non-drill pay) will report as Reserve Training Assistants. They will be aided by hundreds of enlisted regulars, temporarily serving as instructors, range coaches, cooks and bakers and in informational services and administration. Each group has its own

technical information section, where thousands of news releases and photographs are processed for distribution to media in the organized units' respective areas.

Aside from assisting Reserve unit commanders who ramrod a rigid training schedule at each training base, Reserve Training Assistants handle the lion's share of administration. Included in their inheritance: billeting, messing, pay and supply.

USMC

Gratified with the results of the Reserve Mobilization Exercise, the Director, Marine Corps Reserve, has reported "very satisfactory" to the Commandant. RESMOBEX, conducted in two phases, swung into operation with a dispatch from Marine Corps Headquarters. It was conducted primarily to test the mobilization machinery of the Marine Corps Reserve.

The only reservists who actually participated in RESMOBEX were members of organized units designated as Mobilization Stations. One station was activated in each MCRRD, and the 14th Marine Corps Reserve District. Units affected were:


1st MCRRD, 1st Communications Support Battalion, Fort Schuyler, N. Y.; 4th MCRRD, 69th Rifle Company, Eddystone, Pa.; 5th MCRRD, 1st 105mm Howitzer Battalion, Richmond, Va.; 6th MCRRD, 2nd Amphibian Tractor Company, Jacksonville, Fla.; 8th MCRRD, 6th Infantry Battalion, Houston, Tex.; 9th MCRRD, 102nd Rifle Company, Des Moines, Ia.; 12th MCRRD, 8th 105mm Howitzer Battalion, Los Angeles, Calif.; 14th MCRRD, 27th Rifle Company, Pearl Harbor.

The Class II units that were involved are part of a net of more than 80 Reserve Mobilization stations established by Headquarters. The purpose of activating the stations for RESMOBEX: to process Class II's equal in number to the Class III's who would normally be processed in a one-day period during actual mobilization.

The initial phase of RESMOBEX started with receipt of the priority dispatch at each District Headquarters. Until that time, even Directors had no idea of when the exercise would be kicked-off. A previous order had directed that they designate a unit training exercise within five days following execution of Phase I. But no one outside of Washington knew when the button would be pushed.

Mobilization stations, once the word was received from their respective District Directors, became operational for a day. Troops were given physicals, briefed on assignments to reporting stations in the Fleet Marine Force and handed their orders. Though they never got past the front door of the training center, reservists ran the gamut in realistic fashion.

The second phase of RESMOBEX was handled solely at District and MARTCOM, which received orders from Washington containing a new set of requirements. The criteria used bore no relationship to any anticipated mobilization requirements, but served more to test the data processing procedure used to scan records for particular reservists with certain skills.



GENERAL MILITARY SUBJECTS SCHOOL

Can support units—HqBn, SerBn, MWSG, H&MS—afford fulltime instructors for basic training classes? Can smaller units afford to lose for 30 days a quota of men to attend fulltime basic training? The author agrees that it's painful—but only at first, as his article points out. Result: Marines who know their ABCs about GMSTs, training that fulfills MCO 1510.2A.

By MSgt James B. Pace, USMC

IN PRACTICALLY EVERY UNIT OF every post or station we find Marines attending "Basic Training." We find Staff NCOs and officers on the platform trying to teach military subjects to 100 or more men. But, are they teaching the men? Some men have the knack of teaching others. Some can be taught this wonderful gift, while others can never be taught the art of teaching. Through instructing we have learned that to be an effective instructor is a full time job. Can the small units afford men for full time instructors? Some cannot, but we feel that for a battalion such as ours it pays off. We have records to back us up.

You can order a Marine to instruct other Marines. But, if he is

burdened down with other duties, he will not be a good instructor. He must have time for proper research and study. But, primarily, he must have the desire to teach.

When the instructor is assigned subjects to teach, he is confronted with many disadvantages. Just to mention a few, we find that a classroom is one of his biggest problems. He has to hold classes in the Mess Hall or the Gym, maybe even outdoors.

If held outdoors and bad weather comes his way, he has to move indoors or even call off training for that day. Even if he goes ahead with his schedule he doesn't have all of the troops required to attend. No one likes to get soaking wet, and



Fieldstripping a .45 or . . .



putting on a gas mask;



mine warfare firsthand and . . .

will not if he can help it.

How can he tell if all hands are attending or not? Most of the time there isn't a roster. If there is, there are always last minute changes. Usually no action is taken if a man fails to attend classes. Most personnel never attend class more than once a month.

To administer an effective quiz is almost an impossibility, hence, no records can be kept. The quiz itself is not effective since the instructor is not trained as such. The instructor not being school trained has to teach by his own methods. A good possibility is that his methods are not suitable for effective teaching.

He has to check out training aids daily or make his own. When he

wants a certain training aid; he finds it is checked out by another unit. If he tries to make his own, he runs into trouble trying to get the proper material.

To mention all the disadvantages that confront an instructor would fill a book. An instructor finds that he faces many problems even when teaching in an ideal setup.

A little over a year ago several officers and men of the Service Battalion felt that a thorough analysis of the training program should be made. The need for a well organized school was apparent from the start. It would be tailored to needs of all combat support units.

On 16 January 1959 the CO, SerBn, wrote a letter to the CG, 2dMarDiv. He stated the recent analysis of the training procedures in the command. He also said they did not meet the requirements of MCO 1510.2A and DivO 1540.2C, to the extent to equip personnel to insure passing of GMSTs. His proposals: All military subjects instruction would be conducted at the battalion level instead of the company level. A school, under the supervision of the Bn S-3, with a permanent staff of Staff NCOs as instructors would be started. The course would consist of 156 hours of instruction in all required subjects, as well as physical training evaluation and special subjects. The course would be spread over four weeks, with 11 four-week periods conducted through the calendar year. Each class would consist of approximately 100 students of the rank of Sergeant and below. In this way all Sergeants and below would have attended a class, insuring the passage of GMSTs.

Staff NCOs would be given proficiency tests periodically to determine their knowledge of military subjects. Those whose level proved unsatisfactory would be required to attend classes at the school. In addition, all Staff NCOs would attend sessions on higher level subjects from time to time.

Growing Pains

In early 1959 a meeting of all SNCOs was called by the CO, 2dSerBn. He outlined his policy on training on military subjects. He went over the responsibility of all SNCOs. He informed them that such a school would be set up and



the feel of hand-to-hand combat;

that operation would start as soon as classrooms could be obtained and instructions prepared. MSgt Neilson (ret), NCOIC of the project, immediately asked for volunteers. Quite a few men answered the call.

The long and tedious job of interviewing the men began. Eighteen were selected and transferred into Headquarters and Service Company. Some of the men had experience as instructors. Insofar as an organized school was concerned, most of them didn't. All were willing to work and had the push.

The Plans and Training Office decided the Unit Instructors Course (UIC) at Montford Point would be used. The instructors were put through the course as soon as possible. The course has a fine reputation, and would get the instructors off to a good start. They would get used to good instruction habits instead of bad ones.

Half of the men were sent to the UIC. The rest were put to work making lesson plans and setting up a room in the Bn Mess Hall. This would serve as office and working space for the instructors. The furnishings were obtained on a lend-lease affair. It wasn't very fancy, but it served the purpose. In addition to this room, there was half of a small warehouse in Building 530 that could be used, in a pinch, as a classroom. A pinch it was: no cooling system; no money to install one. Cold as Korea in the winter and hot in the summer. Another room was found in Building 535. It had been used as a classroom and was not too bad, but needed painting. With the three locations, the school was laid out in a rough triangle, some 100 yards separating the units. This wasn't desirable, but it was a start.

By this time the instructors who had attended the UIC had com-

pleted three weeks of learning the technique of instruction and the teaching process. Upon their return, they worked on lesson plans and tried to talk a Supply Sergeant out of a desk, chair, and perhaps a filing cabinet.

The remaining instructors were sent to the UIC. Upon their return Sgt Neilson was ready to launch his ship of pains and hard knocks upon the sea of knowledge.

While these preparations were being made, the S-3 section had not been idle. An order went out to each company in the battalion asking for a quota of students in relation to the strength of each unit. Each company commander knew he would lose his men for one month, painful at first, but realized at the end of that period the men would end their military subjects training for the year.

School Receives Students

The school was ready to receive the first class on 2 February 1959. General opinion was: "This day we will make the school, or fall flat on our face." The instructors were keyed up and ready to go.

Personnel came from all fields. They came from seven companies and 107 different sections. There were office "pinkies" and weather-beaten heavy equipment operators.

The Bn CO was present for the opening day and has made it a policy to address each new class. He has attended every graduation except one, his absence due to a military commitment. The colonel has encouraged all company commanders to drop in and see how the students from their particular units are progressing. The interest shown by the colonel is a morale factor for young students. Without his support the school would not have been possible.



a trip to Sackville and . . .

MSgt Pace is the NCOIC, General Military Subjects School, 2dSerBn. A 2dMarDiv veteran of the Guam invasion, he has been stationed at Quantico, Cherry Point, Ft. Worth, Portsmouth, Iwakuni, Japan, Korea and Camp Lejeune. MSgt Pace says, "I feel that officers and SNCOs in units like ours might benefit from our year and a half experience." This article is his first attempt at writing for publication.



When MSgt Neilson retired last June, I joined the school staff as his replacement. A few weeks later Maj Bruce Magruder joined our Headquarters as S-3 Training Officer. This worked out fine as it enabled us to get off to a good start in school together. In an operation of this type, one has to work hand in glove with the S-3 office. By this time we had graduated our sixth class (my first). Credit is due to the instructors who put in many hard hours to accomplish our mission.

Under One Roof

The school was doing fine, but we felt the urgent need to bring the classrooms together. Contact from the office in the Mess Hall to the classrooms was by field phone (EE8). Another disadvantage was having to move the training aids back and forth. This certainly had its drawbacks in foul weather. Our opportunity came when the Communications Section moved out of Building 535. We moved in and it is our present location.

In the month of July 1959, we realized that in order to justify the large number of instructors we were carrying on our roster, we would have to take more of the work load off the S-3 Section. It was decided that we would make up and administer the promotion tests for lance corporals and corporals. In doing this we used the list of questions approved and sent out by HQMC. So

far we have tested about 350 Marines. We also make up tests for privates and PFCs. These are held in our custody, and checked out to the companies. The school grades the answer sheets and sends the results to the S-3 Office with the records of students who have gone through. This is a very good opportunity to see how effective our school is. Out of one group of PFCs tested, 50 per cent of the men who had not been through the school failed the test. Of the men who had gone through the course only 15 per cent failed the GMST. Similar results were received from the S-3 tests.

The school also furnishes contact teams to the different companies for instruction in the functioning and technique of T/E weapons (crew served). Our instructors also take the troops out to one of the ranges

and conduct live firing and are available for on-the-spot lectures, such as Dry Net Training. The school has also furnished instructors for Vehicle Safety lectures. So far our instructors have spoken to over 800 men on this subject.

I'm not trying to, and I hope that I have not, left the impression, that we are reaching back and patting our shoulder with this "we can do" bit. I am a firm believer in the school, and in my own humble way am trying to point out the many and varied jobs that a well trained team of instructors can accomplish.

At present we have a student body of 71 Sergeants and below, a Staff NCO class of 16 men. Our plans are to graduate 10 classes a year, with a quota of 80 men each. Transfers and military commitments usually cut this down to around 75 by the time graduation day rolls around.

HqBn, 2dMarDiv, is in the process of organizing a school along the same lines as this one.

We, and I believe I can speak for all the Marines connected with the school, feel that a school such as ours can be tailored to fit the needs of most battalion-size units. We know it is the answer to our training problems.

Would it solve yours? USMC




... range procedures—all part of the curriculum.



Right The First Time

A brand new corporal, pressed and polished, was standing in ranks during an A&I inspection on Guam. In his desire to make an outstanding appearance, he had forgotten one important item: chevrons on his shirt. His sleeve was as slick as a recruit's pate. The inspecting officer, upon coming up to him, was so impressed by the glitter that he turned to the company commander beside him and exclaimed: "Captain, this man should be made PFC. He's the sharpest Marine I've seen out here." The subject of discussion, gulped a few times, begged the colonel's pardon, and reported that he was a corporal, who neglected to wear a shirt with chevrons. "Captain," the colonel growled, "you heard me; make this man a PFC!"

\$15.00 to AMSgt W. A. Daum



RECOMMENDED BY OUR REVIEWERS

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OBSERVATION POST



This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment at regular rates on publication.

"Our Shield is Tarnished"

By LtCol Robert S. Stubbs II

THE SHIELD OF ELITENESS WHICH HAS been for years the bulwark of the Marine Corps' *raison d'être* is becoming tarnished, according to a leading military critic. Hanson Baldwin, military editor of the *New York Times*, has noted in widely-read periodicals the evidences of deterioration in morale, discipline and efficiency in the armed forces. One of his observations pertained to Marine Corps units, traditionally the elite of American military organizations.

Mr. Baldwin's examination was dispassionate and without frenetic panic. The merits of his criticism and the validity of his conclusions as to the causes for his concern are not questioned, nor are they endorsed. Rather, it seems that we should take a good look at ourselves with a view towards change or improvement from within. Too often the organization and the character of our armed forces is determined by those with experience gained in other pursuits, but possessing responsive audiences.

Is there room for real criticism of the Marine Corps, especially in the fields accented by this critic? Unfortunately, but honestly, there is. The individual Marine is subjected to as competent training as ever; his leaders, officer and NCO alike, are as intelligent and as well motivated as in the "old Corps"; his equipment is more deadly, more efficient, and more modern. Why, then, does he not measure up to the traditional standards we have set for him and for ourselves? There is no easy answer, but some of the problems can be isolated and attacked.

Anyone intimately associated with military administration and discipline cannot help but think that the emphasis on procurement is the number of bodies, not the standards of the man who is enlisted. When our recruit de-

pots complete their testing of new enlistees, we end up with something in the order of one out of six who is below the national average in capacity to learn. In a modern military arm with an absolute necessity for technical know-how plus mental flexibility to react to changing combat conditions, the Marine Corps saddles itself with known quantities of misfits.

It is argued that we don't learn of the low-GCT Marine until he reaches boot camp. So what? Test him before he is accepted for enlistment! Then, we are told that it is national policy to accept enlistments in proportionate numbers from each of the GCT groups. If we are to be our nation's elite, then let us prevail upon our policy-makers to modify the rules. Failing this, by our own administrative techniques let us bring about the separation of those who quickly show they are unsuitable for efficient service in a complex military force. It should be noted, before leaving this issue, that there is a positive correlation between years of formal education and GCT scores. The Marine Corps can dictate to its recruiters the minimum levels of education which are acceptable.

A second area of weakness is the marital urge that seems to possess so many of our young Marines. It is a paradoxical policy that forbids the initial enlistment of a married man, and, then, the day after enlistment, benignly smiles on conjugal bliss and, in fact, aids and abets wedlock by providing increases in pay. If we don't want married men in our lower enlisted grades, why permit them to remain on duty? It is not a condemnation of marriage to separate such a Marine; rather is it a recognition that too often marriage is incompatible with the requirements and emoluments of military service, at least of a truly pro-

fessional group. To many of us, it has seemed that the Marine Corps has taken on the attributes of a welfare organization in its dealing with the multiple problems engendered by the marriage of its lower graded enlisted personnel.

One final group that has diminished the luster of the Marine Corps' reputation is the military juvenile delinquent, the tight-rope walker who continually causes trouble without ever falling on his face. These people are helped along by those officers who believe that a slap on the wrist is the best way to straighten a back. We do nothing for our own self respect when we tolerate those who can't or won't honor the purpose and effort of the great majority of our men who are doing their best. We already have at our disposal the administrative means to weed out as unfit those who are at odds with the mandates of discipline, law and order. Let's use them!

Although statistics themselves prove nothing, they do tend to indicate the extent of a problem. For example, the one-sixth of the Marine Corps in the two lowest GCT brackets accounts for a third or more of our court-martial prisoners; the twelfth of our people who have nothing more than a grade school education alone fill up nearly a fifth of our brig spaces. Each month we burden our administrators and lower unit commanders with the paper work necessary to separate nearly two companies of unsuitables, misfits, hardships, and offenders. Think of the better usages we could put our good Marines to if they didn't have to take care of the ones we can't use and don't want! Better use of the administrative tools already at hand and a tightening of the standards for enlistment, while reducing our overall strength, would surely free many from typewriters and court rooms for direct military duties and leave us with a trimmer, tauter ship.

And while we're tightening our belts and refurbishing our units with good military citizens, let's restore the esteem of the FMF by knocking off the planks in so many housekeeping organizations! We have too many Marines who joined

Tarnished

the Corps for duties promised on recruiting station posters and end up doing a civilian's work. We can satisfy the needs for Marines in the FMF if we look at every base and station T/O with a critical eye and three questions in mind: 1) Does this Marine's job involve military policy making; 2) Does this job parallel one in the FMF that the incumbent will be better qualified when he goes back to the FMF; and, 3) Does this job require direct dealings with another Marine? If we don't get a "yes" answer from one of the questions, then the job should be done by a civilian, not by a Marine!

Maybe these comments won't meet all the objectionable features found by Mr. Baldwin, but they could help us say in truth that our people are the elite of this country's forces-in-arms, and they could help us reorient our thinking and job desires to the professional point of our sword, the FMF. The magnitude of a problem varies inversely with the distance from it, but the tarnish on our shield requires elbow grease all up and down the line.

USMC

Headquarters, MCB
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

A Better Way . . .

To Supply Overseas Bases

By AMSgt E. A. Hulbert

I PROPOSE AN INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING mail order house to support overseas bases. I believe it is both feasible and economic.

Many MB's and FMF units stock individual clothing. Hundreds of Marines and civilians are employed in receiving, warehousing, accounting, packing and shipping. Add to this the cost of preparation, shipping, pilferage, damage and deterioration, plus cost to maintain warehouses, and the Marine Corps has a costly operation.

How about the mail order house? The mission of this Marine Corps "Sears and Roebuck" would be to supply the needs of Marines overseas, via parcel post, thus doing away with the costly system now used. MCO 10120.17B has established a precedent for what I propose, and with modification it could be employed as I visualize.

Commanding Officers would probably argue that their troops would be walking around in rags due to the lack of a cash sales outlet close at hand. My answer: The ICR lists the minimum allowance required, in a serviceable con-

dition, and states that Commanding Officers are required to insure that individuals meet this requirement prior to transfer.

Further, paragraph 1262e of the ICR, states that items such as socks, drawers and undershirts will be sold in the PX. A normal tour of duty should not require more than the purchase of the items stated above.

Perhaps this system is not feasible. However, countless numbers of Marines and vast amounts of warehousing space could be diverted to more vital uses.

USMC

Field Supply Analysis
Hdqts, FMF PAC
FPO San Francisco

A BETTER WAY

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High-Priced Pmts

By SSGT C. R. Robinson

WITH THE "NEW" RANK STRUCTURE in the Marine Corps we have a "new look" about our corporals and sergeants. We have older, more mature men in these ranks than we did, and also more career Marines.

It is traditional for a NCO to receive added privilege with responsibility. Under the former rank structure this was not always practical due to insufficient NCO billets for corporals and sergeants in many units. The present rank setup decreased the number of NCOs and thereby increased the authority inherent in those ranks.

We now have a group of professionally capable NCOs in positions of leadership and responsibility. In too many units we offer them only a pay increase for this. Money is important but alone will not provide incentive for an individual to become the type of NCO leader we want. We need a statement of policy from HQMC defining the status of NCOs in the ranks of corporal and sergeant. If I could assist in the formulation of that policy I would include these recommendations:

1) *Billeting.* Sufficient NCOs shall be billeted in squadrooms to keep order

and discipline and to give those of lower rank opportunity for off-duty counseling and instruction. All other NCOs shall be billeted separately, on a battalion basis when practical.

2) *Duty assignment.* Each NCO shall be assigned duties commensurate with his rank. Should he demonstrate he is incapable to perform such duties, provisions of Paragraph 9453, Marine Corps Manual, (reduction for incompetence) will invariably apply.

3) *Messes.* NCOs will be subsisted in the general mess but a separate section for NCOs will be set aside whenever practical. If conditions permit, meals will be served "family style." NCOs shall be encouraged to organize messes and allowed to assess members for whatever items desired but not furnished by the general mess. Provision may be made for a small payment to messmen for extra services.

4) *Clubs.* NCO Clubs suitable for entertaining families and guests will be authorized. (Officials from the local Staff NCO Clubs could initially organize and oversee the management of the clubs).

5) *Liberty.* At the discretion of commanding officers, NCOs are allowed to retain possession of their liberty cards. This is on an individual basis and any abuse is reason for withdrawal of the privilege.

6) *Training.* Leadership classes for NCOs shall be stressed within each unit. In addition, training for NCOs shall be on a higher level as opposed to the current practice in many units of grouping all ranks, private through sergeant, in the same classes.

These are a few suggestions that may provide motivation and incentive for our corporals and sergeants. These are the leaders with the most personal contact with the troops.

I have processed over six undesirable and bad conduct discharges in one company during the past 18 months. I believe inspired leadership at the corporal-sergeant level could have directed four of those men into a successful if not outstanding Marine Corps career. Too many of us think only of the staff NCO when we hear NCO leadership mentioned. Let's stop treating the corporal and sergeant as a highly paid private and make him the leader he deserves to be.

USMC

1stFSR
Camp Pendleton



OBSERVATION POST CONTINUED

A Better Way . . .

To Color Match Uniforms

By Capt MacDonald Greer

ALL OF US HAVE SEEN THE ENLISTED man in formation in smartly tailored and pressed greens with clean ribbons, blitized brass and spit-shined shoes who still doesn't look truly sharp. The reason is that he probably has up to four different shades of green in his uniform components. The same problem is true of the tropicals and, to a lesser degree, the officers' service attire.

The Marine Corps recognizes this discrepancy. However, even with strict color tolerances, there is going to be a variation due to purchases from several manufacturers, large volume buying and the fact that it is impossible to keep items from the same production-run together as they flow down through the supply system. Yet, there are some things that we as Marines can do to better the situation.

First, at the issue and cash sales level every effort should be made to match the uniform components given or sold to any man. In doing this the items should be compared for color in daylight. Incandescent light, even fluorescent, gives a false impression. At recruit depots and stations inducting personnel for officer programs this may be added work. Yet, it is here that the most good, or damage, can be done for appearance.

Individual issues and cash sales for a replacement item should be afforded the same comparison by daylight against the other items with which it is to be worn. The self-service type clothing stores in the Corps aid in this inspection.

The individual Marine should by all means make a color comparison as I have mentioned whenever replenishing his wardrobe. Also, the helter-skelter type of replacement of components of outer clothing should be avoided. Rarely will a uniform become unserviceable during a first enlistment if the Marine takes care of it and his figure. Therefore, reenlistment bonus time is the time to make major replacements in the seabag. The uniform maintenance allowance should be spent on shoes, underclothing, fieldscarfs, etc.

As a Marine accumulates several complete uniforms, they should be marked

inside for identification. For instance, if a new trop shirt, trousers and cap are bought, they might be marked with the purchase date. This facilitates the combining of these items into a matching uniform and eliminates wearing a "fuzzy" new shirt with four-year-old, thin trousers, etc. Next clean all components equally. Otherwise, the action of the cleaning solvents and the pressing will tend to change the color and texture of one item more than the other. Of course trousers get dirty and wrinkled faster than coats. However, the coat

should be cleaned at least once to every three times the trousers are cleaned.

Lastly, uniforms should be cleaned regularly even though they are not obviously spotted or dirty. Otherwise hidden dirt and perspiration will be ground and pressed into the material, weakening the fabric and rapidly wearing it out.

These pointers are not offered as a cure-all for the color problems in our uniforms. But by practicing them at the issuing and individual level, and by education at the organizational level, I believe a great stride can be made toward reducing uniform costs to the individual and further toward eliminating the camouflage look in our appearance.

USMC
Headquarters Bn
2dMarDiv FMF

A Better Way . . .

Reaches the Field

ASSGT R. A. WICKLAND, 1/6, 2d MarDiv, originally suggested the idea of a 106mm recoilless rifle carrying device. Ordnance School, MCS, Quantico, Va., built one for testing. The idea proved useful for Marine purposes and it is being sent to the field.

A few modifications to the original carrying device resulted in the development of a lightweight device (see cut), easily constructed from materials available in the field. The device, which was tested by the MCLFDC, uses a 1/4 inch pipe for handle grips and as a center hinge.

The device is six inches wide and 30 inches long in the carrying position. Barrel "grips" should be wrapped with friction tape or other material to avoid scoring the rifle barrel. The device also


affords light weight and compactness when folded.

To construct the carrying device you need 1) two pieces of 1/4 inch X 48-inch rod (shaped handles). 2) four pieces of 1/4 inch X 10-inch rod (braces). 3) three pieces of 3/4 inch X five-inch pipe (two grips and one hinge).

Handles are shaped and pipe grips and hinges are installed before bending the closing sides. Connections and braces are then spot welded.

By using this type device, four men can: Transport a 106mm rifle barrel when displacing the ground mount. Handle or transport a hot 106mm rifle barrel immediately after firing. Transport a 106mm rifle complete with ground mount for short distances.

USMC




For Air-Ground Coordination

By Carl H. Strandberg

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY ENABLES BETTER air-ground coordination in many ways. Since both pilots and foot soldiers can see the same view of the ground in far greater detail than is shown on a map, information exchange between them is simplified.

A technique which may further simplify information exchange is overprinting a 360 degree protractor centered on the photographs. This should permit them very easily and precisely to express both distance and direction. A simple measurement from the center of the photograph to the image of the place on the ground in question locates the image by polar coordinates, just by noting the point on the overprinted protractor where the extended straight line cuts the edge.

Mounting the photographs on a simple plotting board, such as the Mark 3, would further simplify handling. Such a plotting board can easily be made from a piece of Masonite or plywood.



A disc 15 inches in diameter, with a snap and peg in the center, with a gridded transparent disc mounted over the photograph is all that is required. Rotating the plotting disc until the same grid line extends through the observer's position and the image in question permits reading the polar coordinate heading at the point where the parallel center grid line intersects the edge of the protractor.

Vertical aerial photographs having a scale of 1/40,000 to 1/80,000 show enough detail so that individual moderately large trees can be identified. At these scales, 9" x 9" prints—the normal size—cover from .32 to almost 130 square miles of ground area. Using the method outlined, locations of significant enemy activity seen from either ground or air could be transmitted in the clear.

A transmission from an aerial observer such as "On photo five, four tanks, 4 inches at 330 degrees" would be gibberish to anyone not having photo five available. An enemy might attach no significance to it until the tanks were hit with everything but the kitchen sink.


From the standpoint of the man on

the ground, a combat patrol leader's request for an air observer to report "any activity at the farm building 3 inches at 179 degrees on photo three" would probably receive a faster and more accurate reply that the same request citing appropriate map coordinates. This seems logical, because the air observer would have an aerial view of his objective to help him find its precise location, and the patrol leader would have an aerial view to help him understand the air observer's verbal report of what he saw.

USMC

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(Answers to questions on page 42)

1 (d) Reference: FM 6-135, paragraphs 18a, b, c, d, and e. There are five methods of locating a target: By (1) coordinates; (2) shifting from known points such as base points, check points, numbered concentration; (3) geographic location; (4) marking valley; and (5) polar coordinates.

2 (c) Reference: FM 6-135, paragraph 14b.

a. The azimuth from observer to guns is irrelevant.

b. The location of the observer is not important except when firing by polar coordinates.

c. When using the target grid system in a will-adjust mission, the azimuth from observer to target must be known by the artillery Fire Direction Center.

d. When using the target grid system in a will-adjust mission, the Fire

Direction Center will determine the altitude of the target.

3 (b) Reference: MCS 3-34, paragraphs 49a and b. The barrage for each mortar is plotted as a 50-yard wide and 100-yard deep rectangle drawn to scale on the battalion fire support overlay. 81mm concentrations are drawn on the fire support overlays as numbered circles of convenient size.

4 (d) Reference: MCS 3-34, III-3-7f (2), 4-7d. The question asks for the *best* method. While the T/A gives fuel consumption rates for various vehicles, actual experience factors, locally developed, will be more accurate for that unit.

5 Surprise; mass. Reference: J/COS (J)500; TIP (S)1, para-

graphs 20b (1), 20b (2), 20d (1), 20d (3); TIP (J)4, paragraph 17b (2). This is a question of principles of war as applied to offensive operations. It may logically be argued that special consideration may invalidate the answers given but, under "average" circumstances the principles given are of paramount importance to the successful execution of the two types of offensive operations cited.

Surprise is the one element which the envelopment can least afford to be without. As in all cases, it is highly desirable that adequate consideration be given to all other factors (principles), but factors other than surprise may be more safely overlooked if one wishes to increase the chances of a successful envelopment.

It may be readily agreed that a penetration depends for success upon the massing of combat power over relatively narrow frontages. As in the case of an envelopment, a wise commander will give due attention to other factors and principles, but without the successful massing of overwhelming force opposite a narrow portion of the enemy front an attempted penetration is predestined to fail.

6 (c) Reference: SM-80, paragraph 72. The concept of employment of the Marine aircraft group states that the group represents the lowest tactical echelon designed for sustained independent operations with no outside assistance except access to a source of supply.

7 (d) Reference: TIP (INT)1, paragraph 4. Answers (a), (b) and (c) are invented distractors which might appear reasonable to someone who does not know the answer.

8 (b) Reference: MCS 3-79, paragraph 24c. The most reliable method of locating enemy air defense installations is by photo reconnaissance. Visual reconnaissance and debriefing of combat crews come within the same category in that both will not be able to cope with the enemy camouflage and identify air defense installations. It is true that often photo coverage will be hampered because of overcast skies, and that electronic reconnaissance will be able to assist, but for an extended period photo reconnaissance will be superior.

9 (b) Reference: TIP (J)4, paragraph 16e(1)(c). The main attack is characterized by narrow zones, strong support and depth. However, the commander should not be told that he is making the main attack.



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Fr Paris France
By3Aug
To SACEur
Tinsley, J. H. 9906
Fr HQMC
WDJun
To MCRD PISC
Vogel, F. H. 9906
Fr Ft Benning Ga
By3Aug
To HQMC
Vogt, A. L. 9906
Fr MCRD PISC
By18Aug
To ICAF WashDC
Walton, R. C. 9906
Fr MB GTMO
30Jun
To HQMC
Wann, E. F. 9906
Fr 2dMarDiv
By18Aug
To NWC NPT
Warren, C. E. 9906
Fr Nav War Col
WDJul
To 1stMarDiv
Wood, R. M. 9906
Fr USFor Japan
WDJul
To HQMC

Retired

Asmuth, W. 9906
HQMC
30Jun
Bergren, O. V. 9906
Ofc SecDef
31Jul
Games, E. B. 9906
MCB CamLej
30Jun
Mattison, C. T. 9907
MCAB West
30Jun

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Appleyard, J. O., DivPlansOff, 2d
MarDiv
Barnum, A. T., Inspector, 3dMAW
Barrett, A. J., Asst C/S G-1, For
Trps FMFLant
Bisceglia, V. A., CO 8thMar, 2dMar
Div
Brackett, E. E., AsstWingCmdr, 3d
MAW

Buzhardt, H. O., DivDirector and
BnCmdr Materiel, MCSC Albany
Coln, R. W., Asst C/S G-3, 3dMAW
Danser, D. M., Asst C/S G-2, FMF
Pac
Decher, J. E., CbtTacticsCtr,
MCLFDC, MCS Quant
Dill, J. K., CO MAG-33, 3dMAW
Dobbin, J. F., C/S, 3dMAW
Everton, L. D., CO MAG-15, 3d
MAW
Hitt, W. H., Asst C/S G-2, 2dMar
Div
Hurst, E. H., CO ScolBn, MCB Cam
Pen
Johnston, E. W., C/S, FMFPac
Kelly, C. W., CO 2dMar, 2dMarDiv
King, J., CO MAG-36, 3dMAW
McDaniel, J. T., DivAirOff, 2dMar
Div
Mee, F., LegalOff, MCS Quant
Nickerson, N. R., Comptroller, FMF
Pac
Pregnall, D. S., C/S ForTrps, FMF
Lant
Riche, H. H., OinC, ComOffMess,
MCB CamPen
Stapp, D. H., CO, MAG-24, 2dMAW
Stephan, S. L., Deputy C/S G-2,
FMFPac
Sutter, A., Asst C/S G-3, FMFPac
VanStockum, R. R., DivInspector,
2dMarDiv
Wright, E. A., C/S, 2dMarDiv

Lieutenant Colonels

Temporary Promotions

Cass, B. G. May
Ewers, N. G. Jun
Kern, R. H. Jun
McGraw, T. F. May
Reed, H. C. May
Sigler, W. M. May
Swinford, D. G. Jun

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Borellini, D. May
Brooks, J. B. May
Buchser, E. May
Connelly, T. D. May
Deland, W. P. May
Dougherty, P. W. May
Fritz, H. H. May
Geuss, J. J. May
Gregory, A. May
Hanbey, B. R. May
Hoops, D. A. May
McInnis, R. J. May
Moister, F. L. May
Newhouse, L. May
Parry, R. T. May
Reedy, L. A. May
Ritchie, J. A. May
Sibulkin, M. L. May
Smith, W. E. May
Smith, J. E. May
Spierring, G. H. May
Swick, O. R. May
Therault, N. T. May

Transfers

Akstin, A. A. 0302
Fr Stf ComPhibLant
WDJul
To 2dMAW
Allen, P. L. 7333
Fr MCAS CherPt
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Amerine, R. R. 7333
Fr NAS Olathe Kans
WDJul
To 3dMAW
Anderson, R. W. 0802
Fr Stf ComGRULant
WDJul
To FMFLant
Anderson, E. A. 7302
Fr Monterey Calif
WDJul
To HQMC
Andre, P. L. 0802
Fr SandiaB NMex
WDJul
To MCS Quant
Armstrong, R. C. 7333
Fr SandiaB NMex
WDJul
To 1stMAW
Averill, G. P. 0302
Fr Bridgeport Calif
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Bale, E. L. 1802
Fr SDiego
WDJul
To NWC NPT
Barbour, R. J. 7307
Fr NAS Patuxent R
By25Jul
To Monterey Calif
Barker, E. L. 7333
Fr 2dMarDiv
WDJul
To 1stMAW

Barnes, F. W. 3002
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
WDJul
To MCSC Barstow
Beckett, J. W. 0802
Fr MB Anna
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Boag, A. R. 7333
Fr 2dMAW
5Jul
To Verona Italy
Bohannon, T. J. 0302
Fr Kans City Mo
WDJul
To AFSC NorVa
Bristow, J. B. 0302
Fr 4thMCRD
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Burnam, T. J. 7332
Fr MCS Quant
WDJul
To 1stMAW
Callahan, D. S. 0302
Fr Stf CincPac
WDJul
To HQMC
Card, E. W. 1302
Fr MCS Quant
WDJun
To HQMC
Carlson, A. G. 7335
Fr USS Boxer
WDJul
To MCS Quant
Carrington, G. W. 0802
Fr 2dMarDiv
WDJul
To MCS Quant
Carroll, J. H. 7335
Fr AFSC NorVa
WDJul
To HQMC
Case, W. N. 7331
Fr Stf STRIKForSouth
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Cervell, J. G. 0302
Fr MCRD PISC
WDJul
To AFSC NorVa
Clelland, D. 7332
Fr 1stMAW
WDJul
To MCS Quant
Cole, G. O. 0302
Fr I-I Nrlms
By12Aug
To AFSC NorVa
Cook, E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
16Jul
To 3dMAW
Cummings, D. L. 7333
Fr MCAS CherPt
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Daniels, E. R. 2502
Fr WashDC
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Dees, H. C. 7302
Fr FMFLant
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Dunn, E. P. 7335
Fr 1stMAW
WDJul
To MCAF NRiver
Emmis, A. L. 0302
Fr Stf CincPac
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Eubank, W. L. 3002
Fr MCSC Albany Ga
11Jul
To HQMC
Farish, G. B. 7333
Fr Formosa
WDJul
To MCS Quant
Feezell, F. D. 0302
Fr I-I Forest Pk III
WDJul
To FMFPac
Fields, T. M. 0302
Fr AFSC NorVa
WDJul
To HQMC
Fields, J. R. 3002
Fr NorVa
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Finlayson, E. H. 7302
Fr 2dMAW
WDJul
To AFSC NorVa
Fribourg, L. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
WDJul
To MCRD PISC
Frothingham, J. L. 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
WDJul
To MB GLakes
Gall, W. 0302
Fr Stf CincPacFlt
By10Aug
To AWC Carlisle Pa
Garner, J. E. 3002
Fr HQMC
11Jul
To 1stMarDiv
Gilliland, G. A. 0302
Fr Stf SACEur
WDJul
To MCS Quant
Grady, T. T. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
WDJul
To 3dMarDiv
Graves, J. B. 7302
Fr NAS CorpC
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Hachl, R. J. 0302
Fr 5thMCRD
11Jul
To 3dMarDiv
Hammond, R. H. 2502
Fr AirFMFPac
By18Aug
To NavWarCol
Hansen, J. E. 7335
Fr 2dMAW
By23Aug
To MCS Quant
Harper, E. A. 7331
Fr Litton Ind Calif
By23Aug
To MCS Quant

Harrington, F. W.	0302	McNeil, M. E.	7335
Fr CincPacFlt		Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To HQMC	3Jul	To 2dMarDiv	
Hartley, D. S.	7333	McShane, B.	7333
Fr HQMC	20Jul	Fr MCS Quant	10Jul
To NWC NPT		To 2dMAW	
Hasperis, T. N.	0302	Melin, E. I.	7302
Fr Stf Phib Group 4	WDJul	Fr Goch Germany	WDJul
To MCB CamPen		To AFSC NorVa	
Hearn, A.	7307	Mesko, J.	0302
Fr MCS Quant	WDJul	Fr MCRD PISC	WDJul
To 1stMAW		To MCS Quant	
Herrick, D. L.	0302	Mickelson, L. M.	7307
Fr Saipan	WDJul	Fr NAS Pncla	By23Aug
To AFSC NorVa		To MCS Quant	7335
Hinsdale, C. E.	0195	Mitchell, W. P.	7335
Fr 1stMarBrig	WDJul	Fr MAD NATTC JAX	WDJul
To HQMC		To Maxwell AFB Ala	
Hise, H. W.	7305	Moore, R. L.	3002
Fr 1stMAW		Fr HQMC	11Jul
To NWC NPT	By18Aug	To MCSA Phila	
Hoffman, C. W.	0302	Moos, K. L.	7335
Fr HQMC		Fr 3dMAW	
To AWC Carlisle Pa	By10Aug	To MCS Quant	By23Aug
Hogan, J. K.	0302	Mosca, H. P.	7302
Fr MCS Quant	WDJul	Fr MCS Quant	By25Aug
To 3dMarDiv		To CincUSNavEur	7331
House, C. A.	7335	Nichols, W. P.	WDJun
Fr 3dMAW		Fr Univ Md	
To MCS Quant	By23Aug	To NAS CorpC	
Hull, M. A.	0302	Noren, W. C.	0302
Fr MCS Quant	WDJul	Fr AFSC NorVa	WDJul
To Ft Bliss Tex		To 2dMarDiv	
Jerue, G. E.	1802	Norton, K. W.	0302
Fr 1stMCRD		Fr Stf ComUSForJap	WDJul
To MCS Quant	By23Aug	To MCS Quant	
Johnson, C. M.	0802	O'Mahoney, T. J.	0302
Fr 1stMCRD	WDJul	Fr FMFLant	WDJun
To MCS Quant		To HQMC	
Johnson, V. M.	2502	Olson, D. T.	7307
Fr HQMC	WDJul	Fr AFSC NorVa	WDJul
To MCS Quant		To HQMC	
Keller, K. T.	7302	Pawloski, S. K.	0802
Fr MCS Quant	21Jul	Fr MB NAS Atsugi	WDJul
To NAS NorVa		To MCS Quant	
Kelley, E. W.	7331	Persinger, D. M.	0302
Fr AFSC NorVa	11Jul	Fr HQMC	25Jul
To 2dMAW		To AirFMFPac	
Kersey, R. W.	7302	Poggemeyer, H.	0802
Fr 2dMAW	WDJul	Fr DASA WashDC	
To AFSC NorVa		To AWC Maxwell AFB	By4Aug
Kew, G. D.	7302	Pope, E. J.	7333
Fr 2dMAW	WDJul	Fr MCB CamLej	
To AFSC NorVa		To MCS Quant	By23Aug
King, G. W.	1302	Porter, M. B.	7302
Fr MCRD PISC	WDJul	Fr LdgForTraUPac	
To MCS Quant		To NAS LBeach	By1Jul
Kirkpatrick, F. C.	7333	Randall, T. L.	0802
Fr 1stMarDiv	WDJul	Fr MCS Quant	WDJul
To 1stMAW		To 3dMarDiv	
Kohler, W. J.	0802	Reamy, J. S.	2502
Fr FMFLant	WDJul	Fr Ft Monmouth NJ	WDJul
To 3dMarDiv		To MCAS El Toro	
LaPlant, C. R.	0702	Riley, R. R.	7335
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun	Fr NAS Pncla	WDJul
To MCB CamLej		To 2dMAW	
Landrum, J. C.	0302	Rosacker, R. C.	0302
Fr AirFMFPac	WDJul	Fr 1stMarDiv	WDJul
To Tsoying Taiwan		To Nav War College	
Lane, W. E.	0302	Ross, G. O.	7333
Fr AirFMFPac	WDJul	Fr AFSC NorVa	WDJul
To Tsoying Taiwan		To HQMC	
Lawrence, G. E.	0302	Rumbold, C. S.	7332
Fr NAG Korea	WDJul	Fr MCS Quant	WDJul
To Ofc Of CNO		To Stf CincPac	
LeMay, J.	2502	Sabatier, H. S.	7335
Fr Pentagon	15Jul	Fr 2dMAW	By23Aug
To AirFMFLant		To MCS Quant	0302
Leitner, W. A.	0302	Scantling, F. H.	0302
Fr Stf CincPac	WDJul	Fr I-I Detroit	WDJul
To MCS Quant		To FMFPac	
Lodge, O. R.	3002	Shaffer, R. D.	0802
Fr HQMC	11Jul	Fr Stf CincLant	WDJul
To FMFPac		To FMFLant	
Long, F. A.	0302	Shapiro, V. W.	0802
Fr PhibLant	WDJul	Fr MCS Quant	WDJul
To Hawthorne Nev		To USForJapan	
Lupton, E. I.	7302	Smith, J. T.	0302
Fr MCAS Beaufort	By23Aug	Fr 2dMAW	WDJul
To MCS Quant		To 3dMarDiv	
Mack, W. E.	2502	Staples, M. M.	7302
Fr MCS Quant	WDJul	Fr MCS Quant	WDJul
To CincPac		To 1stMAW	
Mahon, J. L.	7335	Stimson, E. M.	0302
Fr 3dMAW	By23Aug	Fr 2dMAW	11Jul
To MCS Quant		To FMFLant	
McBarron, A.	7335	Stockwell, T. D.	0302
Fr 2dMAW	By23Aug	Fr MCB CamLej	WDJul
To MCS Quant		To MCS Quant	
McCaleb, E. H.	7302	Sullivan, J. B.	0802
Fr 2dMAW	By23Aug	Fr NS San Juan PR	By23Aug
To MCS Quant		To MCS Quant	0302
McClane, G. E.	7335	Tillmann, A. A.	0302
Fr 3dMAW	By23Aug	Fr 2dMarDiv	WDJul
To MCS Quant		To CincSouth	
McClanahan, J. F.	0302	Tosdal, O. S.	7333
Fr MCRD SDiego	By23Aug	Fr MCS Quant	By1Aug
To NWC NPT		To Izmir Turkey	
McMaster, R. G.	0302	Wegley, D. E.	7302
Fr AmerEmb Baghdad	By18Aug	Fr 2dMAW	WDJun
To MCS Quant	By23Aug	To Ft Leavenworth	
		Whipple, W. E.	0302
		Fr HQMC	12Jul
		To NWC NPT	

Wilkinson, F. R.	0302
Fr Saigon Vietnam	WDJul
To HQMC	
Williams, W. L.	0302
Fr Pt Lytautey	WDJul
To HQMC	
Winters, J. B.	7302
Fr NAAS Beeville	WDJul
To NAS Corpe	
Witt, W. T.	7302
Fr 2dMAW	By23Aug
To MCS Quant	
Wojcik, M. F.	0802
Fr 3dMAW	By23Aug
To MCS Quant	
Zimmer, A. M.	0302
Fr AFSC NorVa	WDJul
To 2dMAW	

Retired

Belzer, T. R.	0802
MCB CamPen	30Jun
Cermak, F. J.	3015
MCSC Barstow	31Jul
Fleissner, W. G.	0802
MB NB Brem	31Jul
Giles, W. R.	6602
MCAS El Toro	30Jun
Gray, R. H.	0702
I-1 KSc	31Jul
Milne, H. T.	1802
LanForTraUPac	31Jul
Streeter, W. M.	1802
MCS Quant	30Jun

Recent Command and

Staff Assignments

Boortz, N. A., CO H&MS-33, 3d	
MAW	
Christenson, C. L., ExOff H&SBn,	
Camp H. M. Smith	
Dibble, J. G., CO 2dPioneerBn, 2d	
MarDiv	
Doney, G. W., StaSupOff, MCAS El	
Toro	
Giddens, R. M., SignalOff, FMFPac	
Glick, J. E., CO ServBn, 1stMarBrig	
Gunner, F. A., CO 2dITR, MCB	
CampPen	
Knapp, C., CO MASS-2, 1stMAW	
Lanigan, J. P., ExOff RTR, MCRD	
PISC	
Love, J. W., Deputy C/S, 2dMarDiv	
Lowman, J. H., G-3, 1stMarBrig	
McHenry, G. W., CO HqBn, MCS	
Quant	
Morrison, R. J., CO VMA-212, 1st	
MarBrig	
Patterson, W. D., CO VMF(AW)-	
114, 2dMAW	
Rouse, J. M., CO 1stTrngBn, T&T	
Regt, MCS Quant	
Schmidt, C. E., OpOff, MAG-13, 1st	
MarBrig	
Sullivan, F. E., CO WpnsTrngBn,	
MCRD PISC	
Thomas, B., CO VMF-334, MAG-33,	
3dMAW	
Thompson, R. H., G-3, 1stMarBrig	
Walsh, K. A., ExOff, VMR-352, 3d	
MAW	
Weiland, C. P., ExOff, MCAS Beau-	
fort	
Willcox, J., CO MASS-3, 3dMAW	
Wojcik, T. P., G-4, MCS Quant	



Majors



Temporary Promotions

Beyerle, G. T.	May
Cross, W. E.	Jun
Cunningham, R. L.	May
Deering, C. E.	Jun
Foley, K. S.	May
Grubaugh, W. R.	May
Hart, E. B.	Jun
Mathis, J. F.	Jun
Stine, H. E.	Jun

Temporary Promotions,
Reserve

Appelfeller, J. E.	Jun
Brydon, E.	May
Cannarella, K. P.	May
Colling, A. M.	May
Current, J. P.	Jun
Daugherty, B. P.	May
Dudman, H. G.	May
Egger, E. L.	Jun
Espenschied, R. F.	Jun
Galdi, A. L.	May
Godfrey, E. J.	May
Harris, J. W.	May
Hatch, N. T.	May

Hilse, A. D.	May
Houston, J.	Jun
Jernigan, E. G.	May
Leary, J. F.	Jun
Ltuz, W.	May
Massaferi, R. F.	May
McMullin, J. L.	Jun
Menges, B. C.	Jun
Norvell, H. H.	May
Pack, K. M.	May
Reid, T. P.	May
Stehle, J. A.	May
Tankersley, E. J.	May
Urias, G.	May
Webbeking, A. G.	May

Transfers

Aitken, H. S.	0302
Fr MCS Quant	
To NWC NPT	By18Aug
Alford, B. W.	0302
Fr LanForTraULant	20Jul
To NAS CorpC	
Anthony, W. S.	0302
Fr FMFLant	
To MCS Quant	By23Aug
Armstrong, G. C.	7335
Fr 1stMAW	WDJul
To 3dMAW	
Ashman, J. S.	7335
Fr MCAF Santa Ana	WDJul
To 2dMAW	
Baeriswyl, L.	0302
Fr MB China L Calif	
To MCS Quant	By23Aug
Ball, V. E.	7304
Fr 1stMAW	WDJul
To 2dMAW	
Barrett, R. L.	0302
Fr HQMC	18Jul
To MCS Quant	
Barrie, R. L.	0302
Fr Univ Md	
To HQMC	By11Jul
Barton, L. C.	7331
Fr NAS Pncla	WDJul
To 2dMAW	
Beach, W. L.	7304
Fr WashDC	
To MCS Quant	By23Aug
Berard, J. L.	3002
Fr MCSC Albany Ga	11Jul
To HQMC	
Blagg, R. E.	0802
Fr 2dMarDiv	
To MCRTC Dvr	5Jul
Bradley, L. J.	1302
Fr ForTrps FMFLant	WDJul
To LCreek NorVa	
Bunnell, C. F.	0302
Fr 2dMarDiv	
To NWC NPT	By18Aug
Burke, G. R.	0302
Fr Ofc CNO	WDJul
To El Toro	
Camporini, E. E.	0302
Fr Geo Wash Univ	
To Univ Of Va	ByAug
Champion, C. L.	7335
Fr 1stMAW	WDJul
To MCS Quant	
Clark, T.	7305
Fr NAS Pncla	WDJul
To MCS Quant	
Connolly, M. F.	0302
Fr NorVa	
To MCS Quant	By23Aug
Conroy, D.	7307
Fr Belmont Abbey Col	WDJul
To MCS Quant	
Cordes, A. M.	2502
Fr MCRD SDiego	WDJul
To MCAS CherPt	
Cory, O. E.	7307
Fr NAS CorpC	
To MCS Quant	By23Aug
Counsellman, J. D.	0302
Fr 1stMarDiv	WDJul
To Taiwan	
Craig, J.	1803
Fr ForTrps FMFLant	WDJul
To 3dMarDiv	
Creel, W. B.	0302
Fr 1stMarDiv	
To Tulane Univ	By30Aug
Culver, R. K.	0195
Fr MCB 29 Palms	15Jul
To MCRD PISC	
Curwen, B. H.	0302
Fr HQMC	19Jul
To MCS Quant	
Daigle, A. P.	3002
Fr HQMC	11Jul
To QMDepot Rich Va	
Dauphine, G. M.	7304
Fr 2dMAW	WDJul
To MCS Quant	
Davis, R. L.	0802
Fr Japan	
To MCS Quant	By23Aug

May	Davis, S.	0302	Heyer, W. A.	0302	May, D. L.	7333	Sanders, R. M.	7307
Jun	Fr MCRS Hartford		Fr 2dMarDiv	WDJul	Fr TACRON-11		Fr Nav War Col	
May	To Ft Leavenworth	By25Aug	To PhibGru 3		To HQMC	By1Aug	To EurCom Paris	By1Aug
Jun	Davis, D. A.	2502	Hill, F. A.	1803	McCaleb, A. F.	7302	Sanzo, J.	0302
May	Fr MCRS Albany		Fr 1stMarDiv	WDJul	Fr 2dMAW		Fr MCRD PISC	WDJun
May	To HQMC	By20Jul	To 1stMarBrig		To MCS Quant	By23Aug	To MCB CamLej	
Jun	Davis, D. L.	7333	Hines, C. V.	0302	McGeehan, D. F.	1803	Savage, R. A.	7302
Jun	Fr MCAS CherPt		Fr MCB CamPen	By23Aug	Fr 3dMarDiv	WDJul	Fr 2dMAW	
May	To NWC NPT	By18Aug	To MCS Quant	1302	To MCB CamPen		To USNA Anna	By18Jul
May	Dempster, D. R.	7302	Hoereth, W. H.	1302	McNaughton, G. C.	0302	Scharfen, J. C.	0302
May	Fr NWC NPT		Fr 2dMarDiv	WDJul	Fr 2dMarDiv		Fr 2dMarDiv	
May	To E Suffolk England	By11Jul	To MCS Quant		To MCS Quant	By23Aug	To Univ of Mo	By30Aug
May	Dickey, R. R.	0302	Holt, T. J.	0802	McNew, R. E.	2502	Scheffer, C.	0302
May	Fr MCS Quant	WDJul	Fr 2dMarDiv		Fr 12thMCRRD	WDJul	Fr HQMC	WDJul
May	To OpTaskForEur		To NWC Npt	By18Aug	To ForTrps FMFPac		To MCS Quant	
May	Duffy, L. M.	1302	Hoskins, R. E.	0302	McNicholas, R. J.	0802	Schmuck, P. A.	3002
May	Fr LCreek NorVa	WDJul	Fr 1stMarBrig		Fr HQMC	18Jul	Fr MCSC Barstow	11Jul
May	To MCS Quant		To Seal Beach Calif	6Jul	To Las Cruces NMex		To MCB CamPen	
0302	Dunbar, M. J.	0302	Izzo, R. E.	0302	Meeker, E. L.	1302	Schwartz, J. L.	3002
Aug	Fr ComPhibTraPac		Fr HQMC	15Jul	Fr MCS Quant	WDJul	Fr HQMC	WDJul
0302	To MCRS Lville	By11Jul	To MCS Quant		To MAAG Tsoying		To MCSA Phila	
Aug	Ebert, J. R.	7304	Janiszewski, G.	0302	Metcalfe, R. B.	0802	Schwartz, L. R.	0302
0302	Fr 3dMAW	By23Aug	Fr US NavAcad Anna	By11Jul	Fr AirFMFPac	By23Aug	Fr HQMC	18Jul
0302	To MCS Quant	7304	Joens, R. N.	0302	To MCS Quant	0302	To MCS Quant	
0302	Engelke, E. L.	By23Aug	Fr MCS Quant	WDJul	Fr 1stMarDiv	By30Aug	See, C. M.	0302
Aug	Fr AirFMFLant	0302	To 3dMarDiv	WDJul	To Univ of Minn	7335	Fr MCRS Jax Fla	WDJul
7335	To MCS Quant	WDJul	Johnston, H. J.	0302	Fr NAS Pncla		To MB Red Bank NJ	
7335	Fr 5thMCRRD		Fr Thailand	1803	To MCS Quant	By23Aug	Segner, D. R.	7335
7335	To MCS Quant	1802	To 1stMarDiv	WDJul	Fr MB NE LBeach	WDJul	Fr NAS Patuxent R	By31Aug
0302	Erdinger, D. E.	By8Aug	Johnson, R. T.	0302	To MCB CamPen		To Maxwell AFB Ala	0302
7335	Fr Coronado Calif	0302	Fr HQMC		Mize, C. D.	0302	Fr HQMC	20Jul
7335	To MCRS Milwaukee	WDJul	Johnson, J. R.	15Jul	Fr DASA WashDC	WDJul	To MCS Quant	0302
0302	Ester, R. F.	0302	Fr Stf ComPhibGru 4	By12Aug	To MCS Quant	7333	Shepherd, G. E.	By23Aug
0302	Fr 9thMCRRD		To AFSC NorVa	1302	Moak, D. R.	WDJul	Fr 2dMarDiv	
0302	To MCS Quant	0802	Johnson, T. D.	WDJul	Fr 1stMAW		To MCS Quant	
Aug	Ezell, D. D.	0302	Fr ForTrps FMFLant	15Jul	To 2dMAW	7304	Shook, F. A.	7335
7304	Fr Duke Univ	0302	To MCS Quant		Moncrief, M. G.	19Jul	Fr HQMC	By23Aug
7304	To MCS Quant	WDJul	Jones, J. R.	3002	Fr 2dMAW		To MCS Quant	
0302	Fassino, A. N.	0302	Fr ForTrps FMFLant	0302	To 3dMAW	0802	Siegfried, W. G.	7335
18Jul	Fr 4thMCRRD		To MCSC Albany Ga	27Jul	Morel, O. J.	By23Aug	Fr 2dMAW	By23Aug
0302	To MCS Quant	7304	Kane, D. T.	0302	Fr HQMC	0195	To MCS Quant	0302
0302	Fees, F. J.	25Jul	Fr HQMC		To MCS Quant	15Jul	Fr 2dMarDiv	By30Aug
0302	Fr MCS Quant	3502	To 2dMarDiv	By23Aug	Moritz, A. B.		To Univ of SC	7304
17Jul	Finney, H. F.	WDJul	Karukin, D. S.	0302	Fr MCRD SDiego	0302	Fr FMFLant	11Jul
7331	Fr 4thMCRRD		Fr 4thMCRRD	By23Aug	To MCS CamLej		To 2dMAW	
7331	To MCS Quant	7333	To MCS Quant	2502	Nelson, A. A.	By5Aug	Snapper, J. N.	7304
7304	Fr 2dMAW		Kearney, J. R.	WDJul	Fr Ft Leavenworth	3002	Fr 1stMAW	By23Aug
Aug	To Maxwell AFB Ala	By31Aug	Fr MCS Quant	7332	To FMFLant	15Jul	To MCS Quant	0302
3002	For, G. C.	0302	To PhibForUSPacFit	11Jul	Nelson, A. L.	3002	Fr MCS Quant	31Jul
3002	Fr HQMC	By23Aug	Fr 1stMarDiv		Fr 2dMAW	3002	To 1stMAW	0302
0302	To MCS Quant	0302	To 3dMAW	2502	To MCB CamLej	11Jul	Spencer, D. E.	0302
17Jul	Gallo, J. A.	0302	Kern, R. H.	By12Aug	Nelson, W. L.		Fr Tsoying Taiwan	WDJul
0802	Fr US NTU Salpan	WDJul	Fr Univ of Scalif	0195	Fr HQMC	1803	To Birmingham Ala	
5Jul	To LanForTrauLant	7335	To AFSC NorVa	1Jul	To 1stMAW	3502	Fr Tsoying Taiwan	WDJul
1302	Gibson, J. A.	By23Aug	Kerr, M. H.	0130	Nevill, H. E.	WDJul	To 2dMarDiv	
0302	Fr 1stMAW	1302	Fr FMFPac	By22Aug	Fr 1stMarBrig		Stoneham, R. H.	7305
0302	To MCS Quant	By11Aug	To 1stMarBrig	0302	To 1stMarDiv	0802	Fr 1st MAW	WDJul
Aug	Goode, C. L.	1803	Kieberger, D. V.	0802	Olson, F. O.	By23Aug	To 2dMAW	
0302	Fr FMFPac		Fr MCRD PISC	WDJul	Fr Detroit Mich	3002	Swanda, D. F.	0302
Aug	To Ft Belvoir	By25Aug	To 5thMCRRD		To ForTrps FMFLant	11Jul	Fr HQMC	15Jul
0302	Greene, R. F.	7335	Kiefer, G. C.	7335	Peck, W. H.	0302	To MCS Quant	
0302	Fr MCS Quant	15Jul	Fr Princeton Univ	By23Aug	Fr 2dMarDiv	0302	To MCS Quant	
0302	To Ft Leavenworth	0302	Fr 3dMarDiv	7307	Penley, V. R.	By12Aug	To MCS Quant	
0302	Greene, J. R.	0302	Knocke, J. K.	0302	Fr MCSC Albany Ga	0302	Taylor, P. N.	1302
0302	Fr NAS NorVa		Fr Ft McClellan Ala	0302	To HQMC	By23Aug	Fr MCS Quant	WDJul
0302	To 2dMAW	0302	To MCS Quant	0302	Peterson, W. S.	7302	To 2dMarDiv	
Aug	Grooms, R. C.	0302	Knowles, H. R.	By1Aug	Fr 12thMCRRD	7335	Taylor, W. F.	0302
7335	Fr MCRS Lville	By25Aug	Fr TACRON-12	0302	To MCS Quant	By23Aug	Fr FMFPac	By23Aug
7335	To Ft Leavenworth	7307	To MCS Quant	0302	Petty, D. D.	7335	To MCS Quant	0302
7335	Fr AirFMFLant	11Jul	Koler, J.	By30Aug	Fr Univ Md	WDJul	Thomas, A. I.	By25Aug
7305	To 3dMAW	7333	Fr MCS Quant	7305	To MCS Quant		Fr I-I Toledo	0302
0302	Hall, C. L.	0302	To FMFPac	2502	Phillips, A. E.	0802	To Ft Leavenworth	
0302	Fr 3dMAW	15Jul	Landrigan, J. M.	0302	Fr MCS Quant	By18Aug	Fr MCB CamLej	By23Aug
0302	To 2dMarDiv		To Tufts Col	0302	To FMFPac	0302	To MCS Quant	
0302	Hall, J. S.	0302	Le Falvre, E. N.	By22Jul	Plaskett, W.	0302	Thomas, J. J.	0302
Aug	Fr Ft Bliss Tex	By23Aug	Fr Univ Md	0302	Fr Manila	0302	Fr MCB CamLej	By23Aug
7307	To MCS Quant	0302	To FMFPac	0302	To NWC Npt	By18Aug	To MCS Quant	
7307	Halliday, M. G.	WDJul	Leeseberg, P. K.	By23Aug	Platt, R. M.	0302	Fr Tsoying Taiwan	WDJul
2502	Fr MCB CamPen	7304	Fr 2dMarDiv	0302	Fr HQMC	8Jul	To 2dMarDiv	
7307	To 3dMarDiv	WDJul	To Ft Monmouth NJ	19Jul	To MCS Quant	1802	Troen, L. G.	0302
0302	Halligan, W. J.	0302	Laidy, A. L.	7335	Pomeroy, W. D.	By12Aug	Fr 9thMCRRD	By23Aug
0302	Fr WashDC	0302	Fr HQMC	11Jul	Fr Clarksburg WV	0302	To MCS Quant	7302
0302	To MCS Quant	3002	To MCS Quant	0302	To HQMC	0302	Fr 2dMAW	By23Aug
0302	Hamlin, C. F.	0302	Lemmons, R. T.	0302	Powell, D. D.	6Jul	To MCS Quant	0302
0302	Fr MCAS Kaneohe Bay	WDJul	Fr NAS Pncla	7332	Fr 2dMarDiv	7302	Turner, K. E.	0302
0302	To MCSC Albany	7331	To 3dMAW	By30Jul	To MCRS Jacksonville	By11Jul	Fr USNA Anna	By23Aug
1803	Harris, C. R.	2502	League, J. J.	WDJun	Quinn, W. R.	7302	To MCS Quant	
7307	Fr 1stMAW	0302	To Ft Leavenworth	0302	Fr Univ Md		Walles, E. A.	7307
7307	To 2dMAW	7333	Fr HQMC	0302	To Goch Germany	By11Jul	Fr PGScol MIT Mass	WDJul
0302	Harris, C. W.	0302	Lerond, J. M.	0302	Remington, E. F.	7302	To HQMC	
0302	Fr Stf ComPhibPac	By25Aug	Fr HQMC	0302	Fr AirFMFPac	By5Jul	Ward, C. C.	7335
0302	To Ft Leavenworth	7333	To 3dMAW	0302	To HQMC	0702	Fr NAS Pncla	WDJun
0302	Harris, D. R.	0302	Lewis, E. L.	0302	Roberts, D. E.	By18Aug	To 1stMarBrig	7304
0302	Fr AirFMFPac	By23Aug	Fr Univ of Md	1302	Fr ForTrps FMFPac	7305	Fr AirFMFPac	By31Aug
0302	To MCS Quant	7331	To PhibGru 3	0302	To NWC Npt	WDJul	To Maxwell AFB Ala	7333
0302	Haynes, G. A.	0302	Mader, J. F.	0302	Fr 1stMAW	0302	Fr NAS Pncla	By31Aug
0302	Fr Monterey Calif	By15Aug	Fr HQMC	0302	To 1stMarDiv	WDJul	To Maxwell AFB Ala	7302
0302	To HQMC	0302	Magness, B. L.	0302	Rodes, N. G.	0302	Webster, W. J.	
0302	Hecker, J. S.	0302	Fr 9thMCRRD	By23Aug	Fr MCRS Seattle Wash	WDJul	Fr NAS Pncla	By23Aug
0302	Fr HQMC	1803	To MCS Quant	0302	To NAG Korea	0802	To MCS Quant	0802
0302	To MCS Quant	WDJul	Malden, R. F.	7305	Rudzis, E. M.	By25Jul	Westphal, H. A.	WDJul
0302	Heldrick, J. G.	0302	Fr 8thMCRRD	0302	Fr SandiaB NMex	7333	Fr MCS Quant	
0302	Fr Galveston Tex	0302	To MCS Quant	0302	To Monterey Calif	By22Aug	To 3dMarDiv	7304
0302	To 3dMarDiv	7335	Maloney, E. S.	0302	Rutledge, R. M.		Whitaker, J. L.	
0302	Hennenberger, H. G.	0302	Fr 1stMAW	0302	Fr England		Fr HQMC	
0302	Fr 2dMAW	By15Aug	To MCS Quant	0302	To HQMC		To MCS Quant	By23Aug
0302	To NAS NorVa	0302	Manley, N. C.	0302				
0302	Fr 12thMCRRD	By23Aug	Fr FMFLant	0302				
0302	To MCS Quant		To Fallbrook Calif					

Wilkerson, H. L.
Fr CinCPacFlt
To Duke Univ
By30Aug
7303

Wolf, H.
Fr 3dMAW
To NWC NPT
By18Aug
0302

Woodruff, P. E.
Fr Taiwan
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
7335

Wydner, C. E.
Fr 1stMAW
To MCS Quant
WDJul
0302

Young, R. F.
Fr Europe
To 1stMarDiv
WDJul
0302

Young, F. R.
Fr HQMC
To 1stMarDiv
WDJul
0302

Young, J. R.
Fr MB NE Brem
To Univ Of Lville
By30Aug
2715

Youngs, C. A.
Fr HQMC
To 3dMarDiv
WDJul
7304

Yount, V. L.
Fr AirFMFPac
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
0302

Ziegler, P. E.
Fr CinCPac
To MCRC Cleveland
By5Aug
0302

Zimmerman, C. C.
Fr MCRC Raleigh NC
To Rota Spain
WDJul

Retired

Bradshaw, F. L.
MCSA Phila
30Jun
0302

Epplin, A. R.
1stMarDiv
30Jun
0302

Kittredge, G. E.
1stMarDiv
30Jun
0802

May, C. H.
MCS Quant
31Jul

Deaths

Bruce, R. L.
MCAS El Toro
23May
7335

Deaths, Retired

Miller, W. J.
USNH Bethesda
25May

Miller, H. W.
St Albans NY
23May

Wilson, W. V.
Demarest, N. J.
7Feb

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Bachstein, R., Career & Welfare Off.
MAG-15, 3dMAW

Bowen, E. D., ExOff WpnsTrngBn
MCRD PISC

Buettner, R. H., CO H&MS-13, 1st
MarBrig

Cline, R. W., ExOff, VMA-225, 2d
MAW

Dicus, W. A., ExOff 1stRectTrngBn.
MCRD PISC

French, H. D., ExOff 3dRectTrngBn.
MCRD PISC

Hanlon, E. W., I&I RTR, MCRD
PISC

Harris, J. W., CO MACS-6, 2dMAW

Hean, H. L., CO H&MS-15, 3dMAW

Honnold, H. L., CO Hq & ServBn,
1stFSR, MCB CampPen

Hughes, T. H., Asst Depot G-3,
MCRD PISC

Hunter, W. G., ExOff, Camp H. M.
Smith

Jones, J. R., DirAdminDiv & HqBn
Cmdr, MCSC Albany

Kelly, J. J., CO 2dRectTrngBn,
MCRD PISC

Lucas, B. L., S-3 RTR, MCRD PISC

Neuman, J. L., OinC MWHG Tac-
ticalAirControlCtr, MCAS CherPt

Pett, R. H., CO MAB-33, 3dMAW

Reese, H. E., CO AutoSupDistBn,
1stFSR, MCB CampPen



Captains



Temporary Promotions

Albert, K. V.
Jun

Arney, H. E.
Jun

Bickel, D. C.
Jun

Blanchard, R. E.
Jun

Camper, R. M.
May

Canzano, P. J.
May

Chmelik, J. J.
May

Cisewski, R. J.
May

Coffin, J. C.
Jun

Esterline, C. S.
Jun

Forehand, L. L.
May

Gannon, D. R.
Jun

Hallden, R. C.
Jun

Hawthorne, R. W.
May

Hayes, C. H.
Jun

Hejde, C. C.
May

Henson, E. B.
Jun

MacNulty, W. K.
May

Maitland, P. R.
May

Marello, J. C.
Jun

McAfee, C. K.
May

Milone, D. E.
May

Morris, J. C.
Jun

Pifel, B. A.
May

Poland, J. A.
Jun

Roberts, F. H.
May

Shea, W. S.
Jun

Tashjian, R. C.
Jun

Terhorst, B. R.
May

Trueblood, C. R.
May

Votaw, E. F.
May

Wiedemann, R. J.
Jun

Transfers

Abbott, C. W.
Fr MCRD SDiego
To Garden City LI NY
By11Jul
0702

Alexander, M. H.
Fr 4thMCRD
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
7302

Andersen, E. J.
Fr NAS CorpC
To Seattle Wash
WDJul

Andrillunas, F.
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
0802

Arneson, R. B.
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
2502

Babski, B. S.
Fr 2dMarDiv
To LanForTraUPac
WDJul

Baker, G. G.
Fr MB LasVegasNev
To 2dMarDiv
WDJul

Baker, F. J.
Fr 1stMarDiv
To New Haven Conn
By20Jul
0202

Bay, W. R.
Fr 2dMAW
To HQMC
By1Aug
3502

Baylor, J. D.
Fr New Haven, Conn
To 1stMAW
WDJul

Beeler, W. R.
Fr MAG-26
To 2dMAW
By1Aug
3002

Bell, R. H.
Fr MCS Quant
To Monterey Calif
By25Jul
0302

Bendell, L. R.
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv
WDJul

Bench, A. E.
Fr 9thMCRD
To MCS Quant
WDJul

Borlan, A. G.
Fr Port Lyautey
To MCS Quant
WDJul

Bradberry, J. E.
Fr MAG-26
To 1stMarBrig
WDJul

Bray, R. P.
Fr 1stMAW
To 3dMAW
WDJul

Brewton, D. P.
Fr Coronado Calif
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
7305

Bright, R. E.
Fr Dow AFB Maine
To 2dMAW
WDJul

Brothers, W. Q.
Fr Luke AFB Ariz
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
3502

Brown, J. W.
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv
WDJul

Brown, R. G.
Fr 4thMCRD
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
1302

Bryson, J. H.
Fr 2dMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv
WDJul

Buckley, C. C.
Fr MCSC Barstow
To Monterey Calif
By25Jul
0702

Bumpas, H. R.
Fr Monterey Calif
To ForTrps FMFPac
WDJul

Campbell, W. J.
Fr 1stMAW
To MCAS El Toro
WDJul

Campbell, G. W.
Fr Columbus Ohio
To MCS Quant
WDJul

Chauvin, J. E.
Fr MCAF Santa Ana
To 1stMAW
WDJul

Colvin, H. C.
Fr England
To MAD Point Mugu
WDJul

Conrad, B. D.
Fr MCRD SDiego
To MCS Quant
WDJul

Cook, H. L.
Fr MCB CampPen
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
0302

Coughlin, R. L.
Fr 2dMarDiv
To Ft Benning Ga
By29Aug
7335

Cunningham, W.
Fr NAS Pncla
To 1stMarDiv
1Aug

Cunningham, E. C.
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMarDiv
By1Aug
0130

Cusimano, J.
Fr HQMC
To 1stMAW
28Jul

Danielson, D. C.
Fr MCSA Phila
To 1stMarDiv
WDJul

Davis, T. G.
Fr I-I Omaha Nebr
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
0802

Deal, C. T.
Fr MCRD PISC
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
1802

Delaney, J. J.
Fr MCRD PISC
To Ft Knox Ky
By31Aug
1302

Dininger, C. F.
Fr Tsoying Taiwan
To 2dMarDiv
WDJul

Dinnage, M. W.
Fr 1stMAW
To Kingsville Tex
WDJul

Donovan, O. E.
Fr 1stMAW
To MAD NATTC MFS
WDJul

Dunn, W. F.
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
To 1stMarBrig
WDJul

Dunn, H. T.
Fr MCRD PISC
To MCRC Albany NY
By20Jul
0802

Dunwell, R. P.
Fr USS Princeton
To MCS Quant
WDJul

Duphiney, R. W.
Fr 1stMCRD
To 2dMAW
15Jul

Earles, M. J.
Fr FMFPac
To MCB CamLej
WDJul

Eddings, O. G.
Fr NAAS Beeville
To NAS MFS
WDJul

Ferry, R. T.
Fr MCS Quant
To HQMC
WDJul

Gale, J. R.
Fr 2dMarDiv
To I-I Wmsport Pa
WDJul

Gallant, R. L.
Fr NorVa
To 1st MAW
WDJul

Gambardella, J. J.
Fr MCS Quant
To Northwestern Univ
By12Jul
2715

Garrett, W. D.
Fr MCB CampPen
To 2dMarDiv
WDJun

Gentry, G. H.
Fr NTC Bain
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
0130

Ghiselli, R. F.
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMAW
1Jul

Glazer, A. A.
Fr WashDC
To 2dMarDiv
WDJul

Glowicki, W. F.
Fr FMFLant
To USNA Anna
By20Jul

Gogglin, T. P.
Fr Portsmouth NH
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
0302

Gonzalez, J. C.
Fr NTC Bain
To Monterey Calif
By25Jul
3502

Gordon, A.
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To 1stMAW
WDJul

Green, J. D.
Fr HQMC
To 1st MAW
15Jul

Greenwald, J.
Fr 1st MAW
To 3dMAW
WDJul

Green, A. H.
Fr 1stMAW
To Dow AFB Maine
WDJul

Green, B. R.
Fr 1stMarBrig
To 2dMAW
By1Aug

Gruenler, R. E.
Fr 9th MCRD
To MCS Quant
WDJul

Grunwald, H. H.
Fr 3dMAW
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
7335

Guinee, V. J.
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW
WDJul

Hamber, J. W.
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To USS Forrestal
WDJul

Hardacker, N. S.
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv
15Jul

Harris, R. E.
Fr MB WashDC
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
7333

Hawes, R. E.
Fr HQMC
To 1stMAW
20Jul

Hawkins, D. C.
Fr Monterey Calif
To 3dMarDiv
WDJul

Hawkins, H. E.
Fr MCAS CherPt
To 3dMarDiv
WDJul

Hayes, D. B.
Fr MCRD PISC
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
7307

Hefty, M. T.
Fr 3dMAW
To Litton Ind Calif
WDJul

Hennelly, J. A.
Fr Tex Christian U
To 3dMarDiv
WDJul

Higgins, J. H.
Fr I-I Montgomery Ala
To Ft Benning Ga
By29Aug
7336

Higghouser, L. D.
Fr 1stMAW
To MCAS El Toro
WDJul

Hoch, L. A.
Fr Ft Sill Okla
To 1stMarDiv
WDJul

Hopkins, D. M.
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To MCS Quant
WDJul

Horais, W. G.
Fr Las Cruces NMex
To HQMC
By1Aug
0302

Howell, D. W.
Fr 6thMCRD
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
2502

Huerlimann, E. A.
Fr 2dMarDiv
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
0802

Hughes, R. C.
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
0302

Huizenga, E. F.
Fr MCB CampPen
To Columbus Ohio
8Jul

Hutchison, W. E.
Fr 12thMCRD
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
7302

Ihli, L. J.
Fr 2dMAW
To Maxwell AFB Ala
By31Aug
7305

Johnston, C. B.
Fr 1stMAW
To Kingsville Tex
WDJul

Kaasman, R. A.
Fr MB NS Trinidad
To MCS Quant
By23Aug
1802

Kain, E. W.
Fr MCRC Albany NY
To Ft Knox Ky
By31Aug
7333

Kane, J. J.
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW
WDJul

Keene, G. A.
Fr 2dMAW
To ForTrps FMFLant
WDJul

Kennicutt, O. E.
Fr 1stMAW
To ForTrps FMFLant
WDJul

Kerr, C. R.
Fr HQMC
To Barstow Calif
15Jul

King, J. W.
Fr 3dMarDiv
To LCreek NorVa
WDJul

Kitterman, W. P.
Fr MB GTMO
To Monterey Calif
By25Jul
0302

Knobel, W. H.
Fr 3dMarDiv
To Lewiston Me
By20Aug
0302

Koethe, F. R.
Fr 2dMarDiv
To HQMC
7Jul

Landis, J. E.
Fr HQMC
To 1stMarDiv
25Jul

Lane, G.
Fr AirFMFPac
To NAS Jax
WDJul

Lapham, T. J.
Fr MB WashDC
To Monterey Calif
By25Jul
6403

Lark, S. E.
Fr MCAS CherPt
To HQMC
1Jul

Larsen, E.
Fr 1stMAW
To 6th MCRD
WDJul

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Acott, R. D.	7304
3dMAW	WDJul
Alexander, P. B.	2502
MCB CamLej	WDJul
Anderson, L. E.	2502
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Andreoli, A. J.	0302
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Andrews, O. N.	1302
ForTrps FMFLant	WDJul
Auer, C. H.	7335
3dMAW	WDJul
Aulbach, C. R.	3010
MCSC Albany	WDJul
Baldwin, A. C.	3010
MCS Quant	WDJul
Banche, N. C.	0302
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Harrington, C. A.	0802
ForTrps FMFLant	WDJul
Bartels, R. P.	6502
MCAS El Toro	WDJul
Beane, R. D.	0302
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Beggin, J. P.	7333
3dMAW	WDJul
Bernard, E. A.	0702
MCB 29 Palms	WDJul
Bernsten, B. T.	0302
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Binford, D. A.	3502
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Botchan, R. L.	0302
MCB CamLej	WDJul
Briggs, K. R.	0302
1stMarBrig	WDJul
Briner, G. R.	3025
MCS Quant	WDJul
Brooks, J. F.	2502
ForTrps FMFLant	WDJul
Brophy, F. R.	3502
ForTrps FMFLant	WDJul
Brown, D. H.	0302
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Budig, G. J.	0702
MCB 29 Palms	WDJul
Bushar, C. W.	2502
MCB CamPen	WDJul
Caley, W. H.	9901
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Cameron, H.	7335
2dMAW	WDJul
Carpenter, J. T.	0302
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Casanova, W. A.	7335
3dMAW	WDJul
Clayton, J. M.	0802
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Clipper, G. E.	0802
ForTrps FMFLant	WDJul
Cohen, C.	0302
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Coolidge, P. W.	1302
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Cooper, B. K.	0302
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Coxon, F. D.	0185
MCB CamPen	WDJul
Criner, H. H.	2502
MCRD SDiego	WDJul
Dolce, A. J.	6502
MCAS El Toro	WDJul
Donahue, R. F.	1302
MCRD SDiego	WDJul
Eagen, P. F.	0302
MCB CamLej	WDJul
Egan, W. J.	0302
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Emery, R. A.	0802
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Eubank, H. M.	1802
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Euler, R. J.	0302
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Failman, J. E.	0802
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Farrell, J. W.	2502
MCRD PISC	WDJul
Fischer, W. F.	0302
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Fish, W. T.	0802
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Forrest, J. B.	0302
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Fulgham, R. R.	1803
MCS Quant	WDJul
Furman, R. K.	0302
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Gamble, D. R.	7333
NAS Pncla	WDJuly
Gibson, C. R.	0802
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Gilbert, G. F.	0802
2dMarDiv	WDJul
Gipson, C. R.	0302
MCB CamLej	WDJul
Gladstone, A. S.	3000
MCSC Albany	WDJul
Graham, G. P.	0302
1stMarDiv	WDJul
Harp, G. L.	0302
2dMarDiv	WDJul

Harris, C. F.
1stMarDiv
Harrison, J. H.
1stMarDiv
Harrigan, K. J.
1stMarDiv
Harris, C. A.
2dMarDiv
Helmoski, J. R.
ForTrps FMFLant
Held, A. E.
1stMarDiv
Hennedy, J. F.
2dMAW
Hereford, H. D.
2dMarDiv
Hezel, J. D.
ForTrps FMFLant
Hill, N. D.
1stMarDiv
Hines, E. J.
MCS Quant
Hoffman, F. W.
MCB 29 Palms
Hoffsis, R. S.
1stMarDiv
Holman, J. R.
MCB CamLej
Hoogerwerf, T. T.
2dMarDiv
Hummel, R. P.
2dMarDiv
Hurzeler, R. P.
ForTrps FMFLant
Kane, T. E.
2dMAW
Kauppila, R. P.
3dMAW
Kazanjan, R. M.
2dMarDiv
Kelly, C. W.
2dMarDiv
Kennedy, S. R.
2dMAW
Kramer, M. S.
2dMarDiv
Lampert, E. E.
2dMAW
Leppert, P. A.
1stMarDiv
Lindholm, R. M.
3dMAW
Lipe, J. G.
MCSC Albany
Loeb, T. F.
1stMarDiv
Losce, W. H.
ForTrps FMFLant
Lovejoy, T. F.
ForTrps FMFPac
Magliano, P. A.
1stMarDiv
Marsh, W. R.
MCB 29 Palms
McCauley, D. J.
MCS Quant
McGee, J. W.
NAS Pncla
McGuinn, J. M.
1stMarDiv
McKeever, J. E.
2dMAW
McNeill, D. L.
3dMAW
Meekles, J. D.
1stMarDiv
Meigs, W. M.
3dMAW
Meyer, R. C.
3dMAW
Middleton, S. G.
1stMarDiv
Miller, R. F.
MCS Quant
Minotti, P. L.
MCAS CherPt
Mora, J. E.
MCB CamLej
Muscatello, A. C.
2dMarDiv
Nettles, C. W.
2dMarDiv
Nickerson, S. C.
3dMAW
Norman, P. E.
1stMarDiv
Norton, T. R.
MCB 29 Palms
Noyes, C. R.
2dMarDiv
O'Connor, W. J.
MCS Quant
Odbash, A. R.
2dMarDiv
Faton, T. B.
ForTrps FMFLant
Paul, S. K.
2dMarDiv
Pendleton, C. S.
2dMarDiv
Pierce, D. L.
2dMAW
Porter, L. M.
2dMarDiv

[illegible]

Potter, R. L.
1stMarDiv

Price, T. D.
2dMarDiv

Quayle, R. W.
2dMarDiv

Rafferty, J. M.
2dMarDiv

Reidy, J. M.
ForTrps FMFLant

Reiland, R. F.
3dMAW

Reiter, H. L.
MCB 29 Palms

Richardson, R. E.
ForTrps FMFLant

Rogers, J. C.
MCRD SDiego

Rose, W. A.
3dMAW

Rowley, J. T.
1stMarDiv

Rubsamen, T.
MCB 29 Palms

Rumer, R. J.
MCB CamLej

Russell, J. P.
MCSC Alban

Sawyer, G. J.
1stMarDiv

Scotes, T. J.
1stMarDiv

Scribner, R. O.
3dMAW

Semones, H. F.
MCB CamLej

Shaw, C. F.
ForTrps FMFLant

Sherman, R. E.
2dMarDiv

Sims, R. E.
2dMAW

Slocum, J. M.
2dMarDiv

Spaulding, J. L.
NAS CorpC

Stafford, J. M.
1stMarDiv

Stenger, E. A.
2dMarDiv

Sterling, G. C.
1stMarDiv

Stonecipher, E. H.
3dMAW

Suits, J. S.
3dMAW

Sutherland, J. P.
1stMarDiv

Sylvester, N. N.
ForTrps FMFLant

Taylor, F. C.
ForTrps FMFLant

Timmons, W. P.
MCB CamLej

Toigo, H. H.
2dMAW

Travis, F. L.
ForTrps FMFLant

Weber, R. K.
MCS Quant

Wember, P. A.
3dMAW


Wilson, J. A.
3dMAW

Wind, W. J.
2dMarDiv

Winderlich, L. A.
1stMarDiv

Wright, A. C.
MCB 29 Palms

Yeomans, M. M.
1stMarDiv

 **2d Lieutenant**
Transfers

Barberi, J. M.
Fm FMFPac
To MCB CampPen

Carew, J. H.
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv

Green, E. L.
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv

Huebner, A. C.
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW

Martell, D. W.
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW

McGlynn, P. J.
Fr MCS Quant
To 2dMarDiv

Sheetz, W. O.
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv

Thien, R. L.
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW

Whelan, J. J.
Fr MCS Quant
To ForTrps FMFLant

Drake, D. A.	7399
NAS Pncla	23May
Smith, L. E.	7333
2dMAW	16May

Beard, J. B.	2010
Fr 1stMarBrig	WDJul
To ForTrps FMFLant	
Carnahan, D. K.	2010
Fr JAX Fla	WDJul
To 3dMarDiv	
Colwell, J. R.	0130
Fr MB NS SFRan	WDJul
To 1stMAW	
Cotten, C. R.	1500
Fr MCB Campen	WDJul
To 3dMarDiv	
Cowsert, M. J.	1300
Fr MCRD PISC	WDJul
To MB Pearl	
Darrow, M.	6600
Fr 2dMAW	WDJul
To 1stMAW	
De Caro, G. J.	0800
Fr MB Sasebo Japan	WDJul
To 1stMarDiv	
Dickerman, W. N.	6600
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To NATTC Memphis	
Doyel, G. R.	2020
Fr ForTrps FMFPac	WDJul
To 1stMarBrig	
Fensler, R. K.	1230
Fr Bridgeport Calif	WDJul
To 1stMarDiv	
Fletcher, C. H.	0130
Fr 9thMCRD	WDJul
To 3dMarDiv	
Hollis, J. F.	7100
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To 3dMAW	
Milliman, G. P.	6600
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To NATTC Memphis	
Myers, P. A.	6700
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To 3dMAW	
Nagy, W.	3070
Fr MCB Camlej	WDJul
To 3dMarDiv	
Nicolai, P. W.	6600
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To NATTC Memphis	
Sakert, J. T.	6800
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To 3dMAW	
Shea, R. E.	3510
Fr 2dMar Div	WDJun
To 3dMarDiv	
Skektor, C. D.	0130
Fr 2dMardiv	WDJun
To MCB 29Palms	
Sowers, J. E.	6600
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To NATTC Memphis	
Steele, J. M.	6730
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To 3dMAW	
Sutterley, J. H.	3510
Fr MCSC Albany	WDJun
To 3dMarDiv	
Thrallkill, A. B.	6600
Fr MCS Quant	WDJun
To NATTC Memphis	
Tyree, F. H.	3010

Barberi, J. M.	3516
Fm FMFPac	WDJu
To MCB CampPen	
Carew, J. H.	9901
Fr MCS Quant	15Ju
To 1stMarDiv	
Green, E. L.	9901
Fr MCS Quant	15Ju
To 1stMarDiv	
Huebner, A. C.	7335
Fr 1stMAW	WDJu
To 2dMAW	
Martell, D. W.	7335
Fr 1stMAW	WDJu
To 2dMAW	
McGlynn, P. J.	9901
Fr MCS Quant	21Ju
To 2dMarDiv	
Sheetz, W. O.	9901
Fr MCS Quant	WDJu
To 3dMarDiv	
Thien, R. L.	7301
Fr 1stMAW	WDJu
To 2dMAW	
Whelan, J. J.	9901
Fr MCS Quant	5Ju
To ForTrps FMFLant	

Blankenship, T. P.	340
MCRD SDiego	30J
Carney, R. B.	30J
MCB CampEn	30J
Clark, C. B.	30J
2dMarDiv	01J
Cyr, A. J.	30J
HQMC	30J
Good, H. M.	30J
ForTrps FMFlant	30J
Martin, C. R.	30J
MarPac	31J
Noonan, T. P.	35J
MCB CampEn	30J

New Look In Warrants

Marine Corps planners expect big results from the new WO program. Within two years nearly 10% of 2dLt-1stLt technical billets will be filled by young, hand-picked and highly-trained warrants. Top junior non-coms can now set their sights on a WO-LDO career. Odds will be better than to make SgtMaj.

How is the first crop stacking up? Outstanding, says Maj F. W. Tief, CO of the first WO Basic School company. "The professional attitude of these Marines is outstanding. They are mature individuals who know what they want; their careers are chosen when they get here. This new program is the only way warrant officers should be procured."

The goal is 1,300 WOs by the end of FY '62. With 187 just graduated from Basic School there are now less than 900 on active duty. Quotas will be about 200 each in FY '61 and FY '62. Also, 55% of eligible temporary captains and lieutenants are expected to revert.

In getting 200 WOs each of the next two years G-1 will use a 60/40 rule; they will seek 120 Marines from the 6-8 years bracket, the remaining 80 from more senior staff sergeants, AGySgts and above.

Beginning FY '63, the only WOs selected will be from ranks of enlisted Marines, corporals and above with at least six, no more than eight years service.

G-1 said there is no change planned for those now in WO billets. Younger officers will be phased in gradually as vacancies occur due to normal attrition. Though USMC is shooting for 1,300 WOs by the end of next fiscal year they say they can probably use more and plan to stretch this figure to 1,600 if the need arises.

Hump? G-1 says it's unlikely. The program spread over a three-year period will use up a lot of slack. Also, the current LDO ceiling is 460; filling vacancies here as they occur from W-2 and above will prevent a pileup. Actually, by 1965, the only highway to LDO will be via private-to-NCO-to-WO. Only the best will be promoted, of these mainly from W-2 in order to get the edge on both experience and youth.

Next chance to apply? The FY '61 program will again be in two stages. First phase: young NCOs, 6-8 year's service. Selection board meets in October. G-1 is still working out billet vacancies. Those selected go to screening course at MCS, Quantico in January for four weeks, follow with ten weeks basic school. Of 1,147 WO applicants last fiscal year, 201 ended up at the screening course, 187 went on to Basic School. Graduation 17 June was 100 percent.

A Closer Look

Let's take a look at this first WO basic class. Maj Tief, three years affiliated with Basic School, says it's the finest all-around group he's handled there. "These, like the ones who follow them, will make an impact felt Corpwide. COs will be getting well-rounded officers who can serve in any lieutenant's billet in the FMF as well as their own technical field. They will expect more from the Marines who work with them."

Here's a closer look at the new WO:

- Average age: 27.
- Average time in service: 7½ years.
- Average GCT: 124 (Only one of the 187 in the first WO class is a college graduate, although one-third had some college credits.)
- Eighty nine had wartime service in Korea; six are WWII veterans.
- Rank breakdown (at time of application): 14 corporals, 61 staff or AGySgts, 108 sergeants or ASSgts, four Gunnery sergeants or AMSgts. One-third hold aviation MOSs.
- Nearly all are married (168.) All are members of the MCA.

Schooling for WOs

G-1 said this about its new WO program: "Use of warrant officers is appropriate in billets on the level of responsibility of a lieutenant which require a degree of technical knowledge and experience not normally present in the unrestricted officer."

To make sure the degree of technical knowhow is high enough, G-3 has scheduled post graduate courses for WOs completing WO Basic Course. Schedules will be revised annually to fit MOS of WOs selected each fiscal year to fill valid billet vacancies. Item: Training in all fields is continuous. Refresher courses and new courses will be used to maintain and increase efficiency.

Following are the schools this first crop of WOs will be assigned to; training will begin or be completed by the end of FY '61.

0130—Administrative Off

Course—Marine Warrant Officers Course
Location—Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, S. C.

Duration—4 weeks

0803—Survey and Meteorological Off
Course—Artillery Ballistics Meteorology (6-N103.1)

Location—US Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Okla.

Duration—11 weeks

1310—Engineer Equipment Off
Course—Combat Engineer Officer Course
Location—US Marine Corps Engineer School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Duration—4 weeks

To be followed by:

Course—Engineer Equipment Officer Course

Location—US Marine Corps Engineer School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Duration—9 weeks

1320—Utilities Off

Course—Combat Engineer Officer Course
Location—US Marine Corps Engineer School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Duration—4 weeks

To be followed by:

Course—Utilities Officer Course

Location—US Marine Corps Engineer School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Duration—12 weeks

1390—Bulk Fuel Off

Course—Combat Engineer Officer Course
Location—US Marine Corps Engineer School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Duration—4 weeks

To be followed by:

Course—Petroleum Products Supply Officer Course (10-A-4960)

Location—US Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Va.

Duration—15 weeks

1402—Mapping Off
Course—Cartographers Course
Location—US Navy Hydrographic Office, Suitland, Md.
Duration—11 months

2010—Tracked Vehicle Maintenance Off
Course—Armor Maintenance Officer (17-B-0606)
Location—US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Ky.
Duration—15 weeks

2025—Instrument Repair Off
Course—Optical Instrument Repair Course
Location—Ordnance School, MCS, Quantico, Va.
Duration—To be determined

2040—Ammunition Off
Course—Ammunition Officer Course
Location—US Marine Corps Ordnance School, Quantico, Va.
Duration—10 weeks

2045—Explosive Ordnance Disposal Off
Course—Surface Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Location—US Naval School, EOD, Indian Head, Md.
Duration—13 weeks

or:
Course—Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Refresher Course
Location—US Naval School, EOD, Indian Head, Md.
Duration—6 weeks

Note—Basic and Refresher Courses are Officer/Enlisted Courses. Warrant Officers who have completed the Basic EOD Course as enlisted men will attend the Refresher Course.

2050—MLS Maintenance Off
Course—Hawk Maintenance Supervisor (9-S-4817)
Location—US Army Ordnance Guided Missile School, Huntsville, Ala.
Duration—40 weeks

2602—Wire Off
Course—Communications Officer Course
Location—MCS, Quantico, Va.
Duration—11 weeks

2715—Radio Off
Course—Electronics Maintenance Officer
Location—Electronics Officer School, Great Lakes, Ill.

3010—Unit Supply Officer
3015—General Supply Officer
3020—Ordnance Supply Officer
3025—Engineer Supply Officer
3030—Electronic Supply Officer
3035—Motor Transport Supply Officer
3060—Aviation Supply Officer
3095—Warehousing Officer
Course—Unit Supply Officer Course
Location—Marine Corps Supply School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Duration—7 weeks

Note—Aviation Supply Officers (MOS 3060) will receive 2-3 weeks additional training in Aviation Supply.

3090—Contracting Off
Course—Unit Supply Officer Course
Location—Marine Corps Supply School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Duration—7 weeks

To be followed by:
Course—Procurement Management (400-I-4320)
Location—US Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Va.
Duration—8 weeks

3102—Traffic Management Off
Course—Unit Supply Officer Course
Location—US Marine Corps Supply School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Duration—17 weeks
To be followed by:
Course—Traffic Management Advanced (55-G-F3)
Location—US Army Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Va.
Duration—4 weeks

3202—Supply Service Off
Course—Unit Supply Officer Course
Location—US Marine Corps Supply School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Duration—7 weeks
To be followed by:
Course—Armed Forces Surplus Disposal Management
Location—US Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Va.
Duration—6 weeks

3302—Food Services Off
Course—Unit Supply Officer Course
Location—US Marine Corps Supply School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Duration—7 weeks
To be followed by:
Course—Food Services Supervision (10-B-4114)
Location—US Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Va.
Duration—16 weeks

3402—Disbursing Off
Course—Unit Supply Officer Course
Location—US Marine Corps Supply School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Duration—7 weeks
To be followed by:
Course—Disbursing Officer Course
Location—US Marine Corps Supply School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Duration—9 weeks
3510—Motor Transport Maintenance Off
Course—Advanced Motor Transport
Location—Marine Corps Supply School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Duration—16 weeks

4002—Data Processing Off
On-the-job-training
4102—Auditing Off
On-the-job-training

4106—Financial Accounting Off
Civilian Schooling, Wash., D. C.

4130—Exchange Off
Course—Special Curriculum courses 141, 142, 150, 151 and 152
Location—George Washington University

Duration—Summer and Fall semesters
4302—Informational Services Off
Course—Information Service Officers
Location—Naval School, Journalists, Class A, Great Lakes, Ill.
Duration—4 weeks

4602—Photographic Off
On-the-job-training
4915—Range Off
On-the-job-training

5802—Correctional Services Off
Course—Institute of Correctional Administration
Location—American University
Duration—4 weeks

6402—Aircraft Maintenance Off
Course—Aircraft Maintenance Officer Course
Location—NATTC, Memphis, Tenn.
Duration—12 weeks

6406—Aviation Materiel Off
Course—Aviation Materiel Officer
Location—Marine Corps Supply School, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Duration—10 weeks

6502—Aviation Ordnance Off
Course—Naval Air Armament and Weapons System School
Location—NATTU, Jacksonville, Fla.
Duration—14 weeks

6602—Aviation Electronics Off
Course—Electronics Technician Course
Location—NATTC, Memphis, Tenn.
Duration—52 weeks

6708—Air Support Control Off
Course—Tactical Air Control Party Course
Location—LFTU, Little Creek, Va. or LFTU, Coronado, Calif.
Duration—3 weeks

6709—Air Defense Control Off
Course—Air Control Officers Course
Location—NAS, Glynnco, Ga.
Duration—5 weeks

6702—Ground Control Approach Off
Course—Air Traffic Control Officers Course
Location—NATTU, Olathe, Kansas
Duration—10 weeks

6730—Airborne CIC Off
On-the-job-training (Selectees are qualified)

Note—Training on new equipment will be conducted as it is introduced.

6802—Aerology Off
Course—Aerology Course Class B
Location—NATTU, Lakehurst, N. J.
Duration—20 weeks

7102—Flight Equipment Off
On-the-job-training (Selectees are qualified)

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
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